The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and its Consequences
| Published date | 01 December 2001 |
| Author | Pippa Norris |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00345 |
| Date | 01 December 2001 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2001 VOL 49, 877–900
© Political Studies Association, 2001.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
The Twilight of Westminster?
Electoral Reform and its Consequences
Pippa Norris
Harvard University
The UK political system has long exemplified ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government, a type
subsequently exported to many Commonwealth countries. The primary advantage of this system,
proponents since Bagehot have argued, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective
governance. Yet under the Blair administration, this system has undergone a series of major
constitutional reforms, perhaps producing the twilight of the pure Westminster model. After
conceptualizing the process of constitutional reform, this paper discusses two important claims
made by those who favor retaining the current electoral system for Westminster, namely that
single-member districts promote strong voter-member linkages and generate greater satisfaction
with the political system. Evidence testing these claims is examined from comparative data
covering 19 nations, drawing on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study finds that
member-voter linkages are stronger in single member than in pure multimember districts, but that
combined districts such as MMP preserve these virtues. Concerning claims of greater public
satisfaction under majoritarian systems, the study establishes some support for this contention,
although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings
for debates about electoral reform and for the future of the Westminster political system.
An ancient and ever-altering constitution is like an old man who still
wears with attached fondness clothes of the fashion of his youth: what
you see of him is the same; what you do not see is wholly altered (Walter
Bagehot, 1867).
The UK political system exemplifies ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government
(Lijphart, 1999), a type subsequently exported with some important variations
to Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand, Canada, India, and Australia, as
well as to many post-colonial nations in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia
where these institutions commonly failed to take root. At the apex of British
colonial power in the late nineteenth century, President Woodrow Wilson (1884)
observed that Westminster parliamentary government had become ‘the world’s
fashion’. The primary advantages of this system, proponents have argued ever
since Bagehot, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective governance.
Yet voices criticizing the Westminster system have strengthened in periodic waves
during recent decades. Under the Blair administration, the British constitution has
undergone a series of major reforms. Some components, like the Scottish
Parliament and Welsh Assembly, and the introduction of party lists for elections to
the European parliament, are already locked in place. Others like the future role
and powers of the House of Lords remain under debate after publication of the
Wakeham report. The prospects for still others, like the Jenkins proposals on
electoral reform for Westminster, remains uncertain.1As with recent changes in
New Zealand, we are perhaps witnessing the twilight of the pure Westminster
model, with only a few states like Barbados continuing to cling to this ideal, as
nostalgically as John Major’s images of cricket whites, British bobbies, and warm
beer.
This study focuses upon perhaps the most important and yet contentious matter
that remains to be resolved – the question of electoral reform for the British
House of Commons. Debate about reform raises difficult and complex issues about
the normative goals that any electoral system should serve, the trade-offs among
these values, as well as the best mechanisms to achieve these goals. An extensive
literature has discussed these issues (Rae, 1971; Lakeman, 1974; Bogdanor and
Butler, 1983; Groffman and Lijphart, 1986; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Reeve
and Ware, 1992; Nohlen, 1996; Norris, 1997; Farrell, 1997; Cox, 1997; Katz, 1997;
Reynolds and Reilly, 1997). In this study we focus upon examining the evidence
for two central claims about the virtues of preserving the current system. Pro-
ponents of the status quo at Westminster have commonly stressed the importance
of keeping single member districts because, it is argued, these maintain the
accountability of elected representatives to local constituents. If individual MPs
misbehave in any regard – if they prove lackadaisical, miscreants, sinners or fools
– then, the theory goes, voters can kick them out. This claim is important since
it lies at the heart of the reform debate in British politics, framing the options
considered by the Jenkins Commission. Moreover advocates argue that first-past-
the-post provides a decisive electoral outcome that is perceived as fairer and more
transparent than the process of post-hoc coalition formation, and one that
therefore increases overall satisfaction with the democratic process.
To explore these claims, the first part of this study first sketches a broad interpret-
ation about how we can best conceptualize the process of constitutional reform in
Britain, drawing upon Lijphart’s theoretical framework. The second part then out-
lines the arguments favoring preserving the status quo of first-past-the-post elec-
tions for Westminster and the claims that the use of single member districts
strengthens voter-member linkages and promotes public satisfaction with the polit-
ical system. The third part examines comparative evidence about the consequences
of single, combined and multi member districts drawing on data from the 19-nation
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study finds that member-voter link-
ages are stronger in single member than in pure multimember districts, but that
combined districts such as those used by Mixed Member Proportional systems
(MMP) preserve these virtues. On the claims of greater public satisfaction with the
political process under majoritarian systems, the study establishes some support for
this contention although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion considers
the implications of the findings for the debate about electoral reform and for the
future of the Westminster system.
Understanding Constitutional Reform
The conceptual framework for this study starts from Arend Lijphart’s classification
of political institutions into majoritarian or consensus democracies (Lijphart,
1999). In this well-known theory, majoritarian systems are characterized by the
concentration of power in the hands of the largest party, on the grounds that this
promotes accountability with effective governance: the party in government is
PIPPA NORRIS878
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