The two faces of domination in republican political theory
| Author | Michael J Thompson |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885115580352 |
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
2018, Vol. 17(1) 44–64
!The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885115580352
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Article
The two faces of domination
in republican political theory
Michael J Thompson
William Paterson University, USA
Abstract
I propose a theory of domination derived from republican political theory that is in
contrast to the neo-republican theory of domination as arbitrary interference and
domination as dependence. I suggest that, drawing on of the writings of Machiavelli
and Rousseau, we can see two faces of domination that come together to inform social
relations. One type of domination is extractive dominance where agents are able to
derive surplus benefit from another individual, group, or collective resource, natural or
human. Another is what I call constitutive domination where the norms, institutions,
and values of the community shape the rationality of subjects to accept forms of power
and social relations and collective goals as legitimate forms of authority. Each of these
make up two faces of a broader theory of social domination that is more concrete and
politically compelling than that put forth by contemporary neo-republican theory.
I argue that this understanding of domination should be seen as a kind of ‘radical
republicanism’ where the centrality of asymmetrical power relations are placed at the
centre of all political concerns. I end by considering the relevance of the common
interest as a central means by which to judge the existence of these kinds of domination
as well as establish a convincing evaluative criteria for critical judgment.
Keywords
Republicanism, domination, liberalism, power, common interest
Introduction
Domination is rightly seen as one of the central concepts in republican political
theory. Exactly what constitutes domination, however, is rarely clear.
Republicanism is itself a highly polysemic concept, with many off-shoots and inter-
pretive schools. But what I would like to suggest here is a reading that excavates
Corresponding author:
Michael J Thompson, William Paterson University, Raubinger Hall, 300 Pompton Road, Wayne, NJ 07470,
USA.
Email: thompsonmi@wpunj.edu
what I see to be a more radical, indeed more compelling understanding of social
power and social domination than current trends in neo-republicanism have put
forth. Specifically, I want to argue for a ‘radical republican’ interpretation of
domination and power. As I see it, this conception of domination possesses
two essential and, although distinct, nevertheless interdependent facets. On the
one hand, there is the capacity of one individual or group to extract benefit from
you, your capacities, your resources, the resources of the community as a whole,
and so on, for their own ends and their own interests; and second, a power or
ability to shape the forms of legitimate authority through the norms and the
values that orient your ideas about the social world and the logics of institutions
that you live within and which socialise you. This idea of domination is an
essential feature of any hierarchically organised society where power relations
are vertically distributed and some form of social inequality – of resources,
wealth, prestige, etc. – results.
The thesis of ‘freedom as non-domination’ has become a popular concept for
operationalising the idea of domination and allowing a more elaborate repub-
lican political theory to develop. The revival of republicanism should rightly be
seen as an alternative political theory to the predominance of liberalism and
what is quickly becoming a neo-liberal transformation of a once prevalent social
liberalism. But what I would like to suggest is that this conception of domin-
ation is unsatisfying and that there exists a more politically compelling concep-
tion of domination that lays hidden within the tradition of republicanism. My
aim is to clear a path for a republicanism that can confront the kinds of power
relations that predominate capitalist market economies characterised by bureau-
cratic imperatives and highly rationalised social institutions and norms.
The neo-republican theory of domination
For many neo-republicans, the thesis of freedom as non-domination remains a
central pillar for its broader theoretical aims. Philip Pettit’s conceptualisation of
domination is expressed as a condition of living under any agent who possesses the
capacity to interfere with your choices in an arbitrary manner. The theory states
that domination occurs whenever any agent has the capacity to interfere in ‘certain
choices that the other is in a position to make’.
1
Although it is clearly a convincing
thesis to hold that arbitrariness is an essential feature of domination, Pettit further
stipulates that it must also include the interference in choice. Domination is there-
fore in play whenever any agent has the capacity, at their pleasure, to interfere (or
not) in the choices you want or are willing to make. To be free, in Pettit’s sense,
‘requires consciously having the resources, personal, natural and social, to be able
to satisfy your will as between the options. . . . Freedom of choice . . . depends on
how far you can act according to the will or preference you form over the relevant
options’.
2
In this sense, Pettit’s thesis is that domination is the condition of living
under the mastery of some other’s will. The paradigm is therefore that of master
and servant, of as kind of control that one has over another that is conscious,
Thompson 45
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