The Two Sides of Euroscepticism
| Author | Petr Kopecký,Cas Mudde |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116502003003002 |
| Published date | 01 September 2002 |
| Date | 01 September 2002 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The Two Sides of
Euroscepticism
Party Positions on European Integration
in East Central Europe
Petr Kopecky´
Universiteit Leiden, The Netherlands
Cas Mudde
Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium
ABSTRACT
This article aims to make a three-fold contribution to the
study of Euroscepticism in the wider Europe. First, it
presents a two-dimensional conceptualization of party
positions on European integration in general, and of
Euroscepticism in particular, distinguishing between diffuse
and specific support for European integration (i.e. ‘support
for the ideas of European integration’ and ‘support for the
EU’). Second, it analyses the location, type, and electoral
strength of party-based Euroscepticism in the four candidate
countries of East Central Europe – the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Third, it contributes to the
ideology vs. strategy debate, showing that ideology is the
dominant explanation for both types of support, although
strategy at times plays a role in explaining specific support.
297
European Union Politics
[1465-1165(200209)3:3]
Volume 3 (3): 297–326: 026076
Copyright© 2002
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
KEY WORDS
East Central Europe
EU enlargement
Euroscepticism
political parties
Introduction
A striking feature of contemporary politics in East Central Europe (ECE) is
the ongoing erosion of the consensus on the question of European integration.
Shortly after the revolutions of 1989, the idea of ‘Europe’ became an all-
embracing concept, which united the political elites and the masses in their
burning desire to join the European Union (EU). ‘Return to Europe’ was one
of the main slogans in the early 1990s (see Pontes Resende and Tanasoiu,
2001). At that time, it was difficult to find a political party or movement that
would seriously consider alternatives to joining the EU in its existing form;
the mass public was overwhelmingly positive too. Now, more than a decade
after the transitions, and shortly before the possible accession to the EU of
the ECE countries, the picture appears to be radically different. Debates
between and within parties are getting more intense, and criticism of the EU
is growing. Moreover, as various public opinion polls indicate, mass support
for EU membership has been declining as well (see Grabbe and Hughes, 1999).
Although the previous, and to some extent romantic and illusory, consensus
concerning Europe has evaporated, a new one has yet to be formed.
However, opposition to the EU within the ECE countries is manifested
differently both in public opinion and by political elites. Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech and Slovak Republics provide such contrasting experiences.
For example, Slovakia, which encountered serious difficulties in its path
toward EU membership, combines a relatively low level of consensus among
the political elite on the question of EU enlargement with a relatively high
level of positive consensus at the mass level. Hungary and the Czech
Republic, which are certain to be among the first ECE countries to join the
EU, are showing signs of ambiguous elite approaches towards the political,
economic, and security structures of the EU, and, in the Czech Republic, a
comparatively high negative image of the EU at the mass level. Poland, also
in the group of front-runners, displays relatively high levels of both positive
elite consensus and mass public support for the EU. Moreover, within these
countries, there are parties as well as party factions that are hostile to
European integration.
But how exactly is the opposition to Europe to be understood, and how
relevant is it in the domestic political structures of the ECE countries? Are the
terms commonly used to categorize opposition to European integration, such
as ‘Eurosceptic’ or ‘Eurorealist’, useful in general, and in ECE in particular?
Indeed, is Euroscepticism really gaining ground in East Central Europe? This
article attempts to answer these questions (a) by developing a conceptual
scheme through which the opposition to Europe in general, and Euroscepti-
cism in particular, can be studied, and (b) by exploring party-based attitudes
European Union Politics 3(3)
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