The U.N. Forces in Korea and Sinai
| Published date | 01 April 1961 |
| Date | 01 April 1961 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711786100200305 |
| Author | Zachariah Kay |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
168
THE
U.N.
FORCES
IN
KOREA
AND
SINAI
SOME
THOUGHTS
IN
RETROSPECT
ZACHARIAH
KAY
A N
INTERNATIONAL
FORCE
might
be
considered
a
useful
device
for
mitigating
an
international
crisis ;
even
to
the
point
of
bringing
about
a
d6tente.
In
a
sense
the
United
Nations
and
its
Sinai
Force
managed
to
achieve
these
results
to
at
least
a
limited
degree.
It
did
not,
however,
succeed
in
bringing
about
a
rapproche-
ment
between
the
disputants,
nor
did
it
aid
in
the
solution
of
the
Palestine
and
Suez
Canal
problems.
Similarly,
the
United
Nations
action
in
Korea
did
not
solve
the
problem
of
a
divided
Korea.
It
merely
halted
an
overt
act
of
agression.
These
two
examples
have
given
us
some
insight
into
the
problems
related
to
the
establishment
and
employment
of
international
Forces ;
and
their
usefulness
as
&dquo;
Fire-Brigades
&dquo;
in
the
troubled
areas
of
the
world.
What
candidly
can
be
learned
from
the
Korean
and
Sinai
experiments ?
The
purpose
of
this
paper
is
to
describe
these
episodes
and
attempt
to
derive
from
them
some
broad
general
rules.
Such
general
rules
as
we
shall
see,
can
only
be
of
an
&dquo;
ad
hoc &dquo;
nature
because
not
all
crises
lend
themselves
to
the
same
solution.
To
prescribe &dquo;
air-
tight &dquo;
rules
to
govern
future
United
Nations
Forces
would
be
useless
because
the
realities
of
power
politics
would
emasculate
them.
This
is
especially
true
if
the
rules
do
not
conform
to
the
various
political &dquo;
wills &dquo;
represented
in
a
widely
diversified
General
Assem-
bly.
A
brief
examination
of
the
salient
factors
in
the
Korean
case
will
show
some
of
the
difficulties
involved
in
the
use
of
an
International
Force.
In
retrospect,
the
Unified
Command
in
Korea
was
more
politically
significant
and
less
legally
valuable
than
the
United
Nations
Emergency
Force
in
the
Sinai.
This
significance
is
based
upon
the
fact
that
the
United
States
sent
its
forces
into
action
to
counter
the
agression
before
any
of
the
United
Nations
organs
had
acted.’-
The
legal
significance
of
the
Suez-Sinai
case
was
that
action
to
meet
the
crisis
was
initiated
by
the
General
Assembly,
and
carried
out
under
the
supervision
of
the
Secretariat.
Moreover,
the
creation
of
the
United
Nations
Emergency
Force
of
1956
was
agreed
upon
without
one
dissenting
vote
and
it
has
remained
responsible
to
the
General
Assembly
to
this
day.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Command
in
Korea
became
subject
to
the
political
will
of
the
American
Government
and
as
such
cannot
be
termed
a
truly
international
Force.
The
North
Korean
forces
launched
their
aggressive
war
against
South
Korea
on
June
25th,
1950.
The
following
day
President
1
When
the
Korean
hostilities
erupted
on
June
25th,
1950,
the
Security
Council
passed
a
substantive
Resolution
which
called
for
an
end
of
hostilities
and
a
withdrawal
of
North
Korea’s
forces.
Members
were
asked
to
refrain
from
giving
assistance
to
the
North
Korean
authorities.
169
Truman
ordered
American
Forces
into
action.
This
step
was
later
vindicated
by
the
Resolution
of
the
Security
Council
on
June
27th,
recommending
the
United
Nations’
members
to
&dquo; furnish
such
assistance
to
the
Republic
of
Korea
as
may
be
necessary
to
repel
the
armed
attack &dquo;.
This
Resolution
was,
of
course,
passed
in
the
absence
of
the
Soviet
Union-a
Permanent
Member
and
hence
possessor
of
a
veto-who
strongly
protested
against
both
the
action
and
its
legality.2
2
The
subsequent
Security
Council
Resolution
of
July
7th
authorized
the
United
States
to
establish
the
Unified
Command
and
appoint
the
Commander.
The
Command
and
Force
were
also
authorized
to
use
the
United
Nations
flag,
thus
giving
it
the
guise
of
an
international
Force.
The
dominance
of
the
American
role
in
Korea
raises
further
doubts
as
to
the
use
of
the
term &dquo;
International
Force &dquo;.
A
brief
survey
of
its
composition
shows
that
the
United
States
contributed
85 %
of
the
Naval,
93 %
of
the
Air
and
50 %
of
the
ground
forces ;
the
Republic
of
Korea-which
was
not
a
member
of
the
United
Nations-provided
7~ %
of
Naval,
5t
%
of
the
Air
and
40
%
of
the
ground
forces,
the
balance
being
contributed
by
the
other
United
Nations
members
who
took
part
in
the
action.
Such
overwhelming
American
preponderance
created
a
certain
amount
of
discord
when
it
came
to
deciding
the
policy
to
be
carried
out
by
the
Unified
Command.
Secretary-General
Trygve
Lie
suggested
that
the
United
Nations
create
an
Advisory
Committee
to
co-ordinate
assistance
to
Korea
in
which
he
would
have
served
as
Rapporteur,3
but
the
United
States
rejected
this
suggestion.
In
November
1950,
however,
the
State
Department
set
up
a
Com-
mittee
composed
of
all
sixteen
participating
States
through
which
they
were
kept
informed
of
operations
and
developments
in
Korea.
Another
important
factor
was
the
chain
of
command.
This
was
made
responsible
to
the
American
President
and
not
to
the
Secretary-
General,
Security
Council or
General
Assembly.
General
MacArthur
who
headed
the
Unified
Command
was,
in
the
first
instance
re-
sponsible
to
President
Truman
through
the
Chief
of
Staff,
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff,
and
the
Secretary
of
Defence.
When
the
control
of
such
a
force
rests
in
the
hands
of
one
govern-
ment
dangers
can
arise
which
might
easily
vitiate
the
operation.
An
example
of
such
danger
was
the
desire
of
the
Command
to
carry
the
conflict
beyond
the
38th
parallel
after
the
aggression
had
been
initially
repelled.
On
October
7th,
1950,
the
General
Assembly
had
passed
a
Resolution
which
purported
to
establish
an
independent,
democratic
and
unified
Korea.
One
could
therefore,
have
inter-
2
See
the
question
of
legality
discussed
by
H.
Kelsen
in
his "
Recent
Trends
in
the
Law
of
the
United
Nations "
London
(1951).
3
Trygve
Lie "
In
the
Cause
of
Peace"
New
York
11954
(pp.
333-34).
This
is
similar
to
the
U.N.E.F.
Advisory
Committee
which
serves
the
Secretary-
General
in
an
advisory
capacity.
See
General
Assembly
Resolution
1001
ES-1,
November
7th,
1956.
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