The Ubiquity of State Fragility: Fault Lines in the Categorisation and Conceptualisation of Failed and Fragile States
| Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Published date | 01 December 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0964663920906453 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
The Ubiquity of State
Fragility: Fault Lines in
the Categorisation and
Conceptualisation of
Failed and Fragile States
Raza Saeed
University of Warwick, UK
Abstract
In the last three decades, the categories of fragile and failed states have gained significant
importance in the fields of law, development, political science and international relations.
The wider discourse plays a key role in guiding the policies of international community
and multilateral institutions and has also led to the emergence of a plethora of indices and
rankings to measure and classify state fragility. A critical and theoretical analysis of these
matrices brings to light three crucial aspects that the current study takes as its departure
point. First, the formulas and conceptual paradigms show that fragility of states is far
more ubiquitous than is generally recognised, and that the so-called successful and stable
states are a historical, political and geographical anomaly. Second, in the absence of an
agreed definition of a successful state or even that of a failed or fragile state, the indi-
cators generally rely on negative definitions to delineate the failed and fragile state. They
generally suggest that their reading is built on a Weberian ideal–typical state, which takes
the idea of monopoly over legitimate violence as its starting point. The third and final
point suggests that the indicators and rankings, misconstruing the Weberian ideal–typical
state, actually end up comparing fragile states against an ideal–mythical state. The article
argues that this notional state is not only ahistorical and apolitical, but it also carries the
same undertones that have been the hallmark of theories of linear development, colo-
nialism and imperialism.
Corresponding author:
Raza Saeed, Warwick Law School, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.
Email: raza.saeed@warwick.ac.uk
Social & Legal Studies
2020, Vol. 29(6) 767–789
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0964663920906453
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Keywords
Colonialism, development, failed state, fragile state, governance indicators, state sover-
eignty, state fragility, Weberian ideal–type
Introduction
In the last three decades, the categories of failed, fragile or weak states (broadly sub-
sumed within the idea of state fragility) have gained much importance in the fields of
law, development, peace and conflict studies, political science and international rela-
tions. At the heart of this discourse is a curious link between fragility and violence which
inverts our common understanding of these two terms. In common parlance, fragility and
violence are considered antithetical – proclamations of fragility (from Latin fragilis,in
turn from Proto-Indo-European frangere: ‘to break’) (Couldrey and Herson, 2013) are
reminders about the precariousness of equilibriums, instability of situations, vulnerabil-
ity of individuals or about the delicate nature of artefacts. Fragility demands that vio-
lence be kept at bay, for violence can reduce the stable into fragile and diminish the
fragile into non-existent. Assertions of fragility, then, do not invite violence, but are
reminders of treading with caution to prevent the breakdown of any (un)stable
equilibrium.
In matters of state fragility, however, the discourse assumes the reverse. Here, fragi-
lity is taken as foundational to violence and as a problem in its own right which at times
may even need to be violently corrected. Fragile states are considered the ‘breeding
ground for terrorism’ (Kaplan, 2008: 4), a cause of underdevelopment, and a ‘menace not
only to [their] own people, but also to their own neighbours, and indeed the world’
(Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan quoted in Grimm et al., 2014: 200). This
violent fragility, we are told, is to be treated and rooted out from the legal–political
sphere like a ‘degenerative disease’ (Hill, 2005: 148). State fragility is deemed not just a
symptom of social/legal/po litical problems, but as a prob lem in itself that invites a
diverse set of prescriptions. Development practitioners, aid organisations and interna-
tional donors suggest financial and technological aid, institution building, strengthening
of governance infrastructure or reinforcing the civil society as some possible solutions
(Gisselquist, 2017); international political actors recommend state-building through
incentives and penalties and, if needed in extreme cases, armed intervention and occu-
pation (Krasner, 2004).
There are three key normative ideas and assumptions on which this narrative of state
fragility rests. First is the rather obvious notion that the political entity called the state has
some responsibilities, the non-fulfilment of which implies that the state has become
fragile. While the formal- legal right to sovereignty ma y remain in many cases, the
effective authority, capability of governance and the ability or even the desire to cater
to citizens’ demands may be lacking (Thu
¨rer, 1999). Linked to this, the second assump-
tion suggests that state fragility, understood as th e absence of stability, will lead to
complete failure and collapse of the state in question if not addressed effectively and
immediately. This could then not only result in (more) violence and underdevelopment
for the state’s own citizens, but also threaten international peace and security and the
768 Social & Legal Studies 29(6)
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