The United Nations after the Gulf War
| Published date | 01 June 1994 |
| Date | 01 June 1994 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209404900204 |
| Author | Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ELIZABETH
RIDDELL-DIXON
The
United
Nations
after
the
Gulf
War
On
2
August
199
o,
Iraq invaded
Kuwait
and
shortly
thereafter
declared
it
to
be
Iraq's
nineteenth
province.
The
ensuing
crisis
was
unique
in
that
responses
were
not
constrained
by
the
dog-
matic
positions
that
were
all
too
pronounced
during
the
Cold
War.
One
member-state
of
the
United
Nations
had
not
only
invaded
but
had
also
overrun and annexed
a
neighbour.
And
the
subsequent
war
was
waged
to
uphold
the
principle
of
state
sovereignty.
The
crisis
thus
offered
the
first
major
opportunity
in
the
post-Cold
War
era
for
the
United
Nations
to
implement
the
collective
security
measures
which
had
been
at
the
centre
of
its
foundation.
The
Security
Council,
for
its
part,
acted
quickly,
decisively,
and
with
an
unprecedented
degree of
unanimity.
But
in
retro-
spect
the
crisis
raises
many
questions
which
have
a
vital
impact
on
the
future operations
of
the
United
Nations.
How effective
was
it
in
handling
the
crisis?
What
precedents
were
set?
What
implications
did
the
handling
of
the
crisis
have
for
subsequent
United
Nations
operations
and
for
the
general
functioning
of
the
organization?
And,
finally,
what
lessons can be drawn
from
this
case?
This
paper
begins
with
a
brief
synopsis
of
the
United
Nations actions
with
respect
to
the
Gulf
crisis.
It
then
focuses
Associate
Professor
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Western
Ontario,
Lon-
don;
author
of
Canada
and
the
International
Seabed:
Domestic
Determinants
and
External
Constraints
(1989)
and
editor
(with
Mark
Chariton)
of
Crosscurrents:
International
Relations
in
the
Post-Cold
War
Era
(1993).
International
Journal
XLIX
SPRING
1994
254
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
on
the
implications
of
this
involvement
for the
evolution
of
the
organization
and
for
its
subsequent
operations.
These
implica-
tions
can
be
placed
in
five
categories, the
first
three
of
which
represent
deviations from the
United
Nations
Charter:
abdica-
tions
of
the
Security
Council's
prerogatives;
failure
to
assess
the
effectiveness
of
economic
sanctions; sovereignty
versus
human-
itarian
intervention;
decision-making
on
the
Security
Council;
and
the
credibility
of
the
United
Nations. This
discussion,
in
turn,
provides
the
basis
for drawing
four
lessons
for
future
United
Nations
operations:
(1)
the
United
Nations
needs
to
develop
a
far
more
effective
early
warning
system
to
detect prob-
lems
before
they
mushroom
into
a
crisis;
(2)
the
United
Nations
cannot
intervene
in
all
situations
and
its
decisions
to
intervene
must
therefore
be based
on
objective
criteria,
balancing
its
long-
term
goals,
its
capabilities,
and
human
need;
(3)
the
United
Nations
must
have
enhanced
capabilities
to
respond
to
threats
to
and
breaches
of
the
peace;
and
(4)
justice,
effectiveness,
and
longer
term
legitimacy
demand
greater
democratization
of
deci-
sion-making
in
the
United
Nations.
Throughout
the
discussion,
it
is
important
to
remember
that
the
Gulf
crisis
was
not
solely
responsible
for
some
of
the
broader
trends
examined
here,
although
it
did,
in
most
cases,
intensify
them. For
example,
attitudes
towards
the
United
Nations
have
undergone
a
radical
transformation,
from
disdain
in
the
early
i98os,
especially
on
the
part
of
the
great
powers,
to
the
expec-
tation
in
the
post-Cold
War
era
that
it
will
provide
a
panacea
for
all
the world's
ills.
Co-operation
among
the
permanent
members
of
the
Security
Council
predated
the
Gulf
crisis
as
did
the
existence
of
only
one
superpower.
It
was,
however, the
degree
of
collaboration among
the
permanent
members
and
the
extent
to
which
the
remaining
superpower
was
able
to
dom-
inate
which
represented
significant
departures
from
the
past.
THE
UN
AND
THE
GULF WAR:
SYNOPSIS
On
2
August
-
the
very
day
of
the
Iraqi
invasion
-
the Security
Council
adopted
resolution
66o
demanding
that
Iraq
'withdraw
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