The United Nations On Golan: Peacekeeping Paradox?
| Author | Alan James |
| Published date | 01 April 1987 |
| Date | 01 April 1987 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/004711788700900106 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
64
THE
UNITED
NATIONS
ON
GOLAN:
PEACEKEEPING
PARADOX?*
ALAN
JAMES
ON
31
MAY
1974
Israel
and
Syria
signed
an
agreement
providing
for
the
disengagement
of
their
forces.
They
had
been
at
war
with
each
other
the
previous
October
and
since
then
the
cease-fire
between
them
had
been
very
unstable.
Now,
however,
on
the
basis
of
the
Disengagement
Agreement,
a
speedy
regroupment
of
their
forces
took
place
and
an
area
of
separation
was
established
between
them.
This
area
was
to
be
watched
over
by
a
small
UN
peacekeeping
group-the
UN
Disengagement
Observer
Force
(UNDOF).
Its
functions
were
agreed
upon
by
Israel
and
Syria
in
a
Protocol
to
the
Disengagement
Agreement,
and
the
Force
was
established
by
the
UN
Security
Council
only
hours
after
the
Agreement
was
signed.
It
has
remained
in
existence
since
that
date,
witnessing
an
extremely
calm
outward
relationship
between
the
forces
of
the
two
erstwhile
belligerents.
Israeli-Syrian
Relations
Following
the
promulgation
of
the
state
of
Israel
in
1948,
Syria
was
one
of
those
Arab
states
who
made
war
on
her.
An
Armistice
was
signed
in
1949,
but
it
could
not
prevent
continued
bickering
and
exchanges
of
fire,
and
within
two
years
the
Israeli-
Syrian
Mixed
Armistice
Commission
had
ceased
to
hold
regular
meetings.
The
immediate
problem
arose
from
Syria’s
commanding
strategic
position
vis
a
vis
the
extreme
north-eastern
corner
of
Israel,
where
the
upper
Jordan
(or
Hula)
valley,
in
Israeli
hands,
was
dominated
by
the
precipitously
rising
Golan
Heights,
which
were
part
of
Syria.
Syria
often
used
her
position
to
make
life
miserable
for
the
local
inhabitants,
and
on
a
wider
canvas
relations
between
the
two
states
were
always
poor.
After
the
mid
1960s,
they
got
even
worse,
with
the
accession
to
power
in
Syria
of
an
extremely
anti-Israeli
section
of
the
Ba’ath
Party.
It
was
increasing
tension
along
the
Israeli-Syrian
border,
together
with
rumours
of
an
Israeli
plan
to
invade
Syria,
which
precipitated
the
series
of events
which
gave
rise
to
the Six
Day
War
of
1967.
Israel
took
this
opportunity-although
it
was
an
*This
article
is
an
abbreviated
version
of
paper
published
in
August
1986
by
the
Norwegian
Institute
of
International
Affairs
(NUPI
Rapport
no.
100).
The
paper.
which
is
part
of
a
wider
study
of
International
Peacekeeping
chiefly
financed
by
the
Leverhulme
Trust
and
the
University
of
Keele,
was
based
on
documentary
research
and
a
visit
to
the
UN
Disengagement
Observer
force
in
September
1985.
65
immensely
difficult
one-to
scale
the
Golan
Heights
and
push
the
Syrians
off
the
Golan
plateau,
the
cease-fire
line
at
the
end
of
the
War
running
more
or
less
along
Syria’s
Raqqad
River,
which
is
generally
regarded
as
marking
the
eastern
boundary
of
the
Heights.
For
the
Israeli
forces
this
was
only
an
eastward
movement
of
about
26
kilometres,
but
it
transformed
the
strategic
situation.
For
now
Israel
was
both
figuratively
and
literally
on
top,
it
being
a
gentle
descent
over
60
kilometres
or
so
from
the
Israeli
front
line
to
the
Syrian
capital,
Damascus.
At
the
end
of the
Six
Day
War
Israel
and
Syria
agreed
that
UN
Military
Observers
from
the
UN
Truce
Supervision
Organisation
(UNTSO),
which
had
been
in
the
area
since
1948,
should
watch
over
the
new
cease-fire
line.
They
made
a
worthwhile
contribution
to
the
maintenance
of
calm.
But
Syria,
soon
under
President
Hafez
al-Assad,
was
determined
to
regain
the
Golan
Heights
and
was
closely
in
touch
with
the
Soviet
Union.
She
was
also
one
of
the
main
supporters
of
the
Palestine
Liberation
Organisation
(PLO)
which
had
been
established
in
the
mid
1960s.
It
is
not
surprising
that
Israel’s
Foreign
Minister
from
1966
to
1974
should
say
in
his
memoirs
that
during
this
period
no
Arab
state
&dquo;had
been
more
intense
in
its
struggle
against
Israel&dquo;
than
Syria.’
1
In
October
1973
Syria,
in
conjunction
with
Egypt,
launched
an
attack
on
Israel
which,
to
the
latter’s
surprise
and
great
psychological
hurt,
had
some
initial
success.
The
Israelis
were
thrown
back
some
eight
kilometres
across
the
Golan.
They
recovered,
however,
and
succeeded
not
only
in
regaining
the
lost
ground
but
also
in
pushing
forward
towards
Damascus
for
a
distance
of
about
20
kilometres,
so
creating
what
was
known
as
the
Saassa
salient.
Towards
the
end
of
October,
a
new
cease-fire
line
was
established
and
once
again
it
was
agreed
that
Observers
from
UNTSO
should
watch
over
it.
It
was,
however,
a
highly
unstable
situation.
Massive
artillery
duels
became
a
daily
occurrence
and
there
was
&dquo;a
constant
likelihood
that
war
would
erupt
again&dquo;.2
By
mid-January
1974,
however,
Dr.
Henry
Kissinger.
the
American
Secretary
of
State,
had
negotiated
a
disengagement
agreement
between
Egypt
and
Israel,
and
was
anxious
for
a
similar
success
in
relation
to
Israel
and
Syria.
Only
if
that
was
achieved
was
there
much
chance
of
being
able
to
persuade
President
Sadat
of
Egypt
to
consider
moving
on
to
a
further
round
of
disengagement,
as
he
would
then be
able
to
rebut
the
charge
of
abandoning
his
Syrian
ally.
An
agreement
in
relation
to
Syria
1
Abba
Eban,
An
Autobiography,
Futura,
London,
1979,
p.
544.
2
Ibid., p. 563.
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