The United States Canadiana Constellation, I: Washington DC
| Author | Roger F. Swanson |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070207202700203 |
| Published date | 01 June 1972 |
| Date | 01 June 1972 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ROGER
F.
SWANSON
The
United States
Canadiana
constellation,
I:
Washington
DC
In
examining
the
formulation
and
implementation
of
United
States policy
toward
Canada,
it
is
tempting
to
conclude
that
the
United
States
government
per
se
does
not
exist.
The
United
States
policy
process
is
heterogeneous,
not
homogeneous.
It
is
decen-
tralized,
not
centralized.
Instead
of a
highly
efficient,
monolithic
planning-programming-budgeting
system,
there
is
a
neo-feudal
collection
of
loosely
interconnected
components,
each
having
an
organizational
life
-
and
sometimes
death
-
all
its
own.
An
understanding
of
this heterogeneous
United
States
intra-
action
is
essential
in
understanding
the
United
States-Canadian
inter-action.
The
United
States
operates
in
the
interaction,
not
as
a
unitary
government
but
through
a
"Canadiana
constellation"
-
a
number
of
loosely
allied
organizational components,
arbitrarily
considered
as
a
grouping,
which
have
functional
or
geographical
responsibilities
in
matters
directly
or
indirectly
affecting
Canada.
Thus,
there
is
a
United
States
policy
process
toward
Canada
only
to
the extent
that
this
Canadiana
constellation
acts;
that
is,
as
the
organizational
components
responsible
for
Canadian
matters
per-
form
their
routine
duties.
Just
as
the
United
States-Canadian
interaction
is
made
operable
and
stabilized
by
a
system
of
treaties
Charter
member and assistant
professor,
The
Johns
Hopkins
University
SAiS
Center
of
Canadian
Studies;
co-author
(with
Dale
C.
Thomson)
of
Canadian
Foreign
Policy:
Options
and
Perspectives
(1971)
and
author
of
the forthcoming
The Informal
Alliance: An
Analysis
of
the
United
States-Canadian
Defence
Interaction;
member
of
the
State
Department
European
Advisory
Council.
Appreciation
is
extended
to
some dozen
United
States
officials
for
their
assistance
and
to my
research
assistant Mr.
Larry
Kohler.
This
paper
is
not
intended
to
represent the
views
of
any
governmental
official
or
department.
It
was
written
for
and
is
dedicated
,to my
Canadian
and
American
graduate
students.
186
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
and
agreements,
individual United
States
and
Canadian
organiza-
tional
mechanisms
(eg,
Departments
of
State
and
External
Affairs),
and
joint
United
States-Canadian
organizational
mechanisms
(commissions
and
committees),
the
Canadiana constellation
is
made
operable and
stabilized
by
a
system
of
(i)
accepted
areas
of
responsi-
bility,
(2)
agreed
budgetary
splits,
and
(3)
established conventional
practices
and routines.'
The
purpose
of
this
paper
is
to
identify
tentatively
the
major
components
of
the
Canadiana
constellation
in
Washington,
DC,
to
define
their
functional
and
geographical
responsibilities
regarding
matters
affecting
Canada,
and
to
evaluate
briefly
their
effectiveness.
In
addition
to
a
brief
mention
of
Congress,
this description in-
cludes
the
president,
six
executive
offices,
two
independent
agen-
cies,
and nine
executive
departments.
A
second
paper
(to
be
pub-
lished
in
the
International
Journal)
will
examine the
Canadiana
constellation
as
it
functions
through
the
United
States
embassy
and
consulates
general
in
Canada
and
attempt
an
evaluation
of
the
en-
tire
policy
process.
2
I
In
the
United
States
system of
separation
of
powers,
the
executive
branch
and,
more
specifically,
the
president
obviously
has
a
formu-
lative
and
implementative centrality
in
the foreign
policy
process
(vis-4-vis
its
two
counterparts,
the
legislative
and
judicial
compo-
nents).
This
centrality
is
derived
from
such sources
as
constitutional
authority,
congressional
grants
of
power,
"inherent
powers"
through
decisions
of
the
Supreme
Court,
and the
president's
role
as
national
political
leader.
3
The
role
of
Congress
in
the
foreign
policy
process
is
essentially
reactive.
The
Senate, of course,
has
the
twofold
constitutional
i
See
Graham
T.
Allison,
"Conceptual
Models
and
the
Cuban
Missile
Crisis,"
American
Political
Science
Review,
Lxu
(September
1969),
701,
698.
2
Editors'
note:
the
sequel to
Dr
Swanson's
paper
will
appear
in
the
issue devoted
to
United
States
foreign
policy
to
be
published
in
the
spring
of
1973.
3
See
any
source
on
the
foreign policy
process.
This
general
discussion
is
from
Charles
0.
Lerche,
Jr,
Foreign
Policy
of
the American
People
(2nd
ed;
Engle-
wood
Cliffs,
NJ,
9g6i),
pp
60,
77-8.
THE
CANADIANA
CONSTELLATION
-
WASHINGTON
187
authority
to
approve treaties
and
confirm
appointments,
while
the
legislative
power
regarding
the
appropriation
of
funds
needs
no
elucidation.
Nor
should
such
functional
roles
as
legislation,
investi-
gation,
and
resolutions
be
ignored.
Thus,
although
the
legislative
branch
lacks
a
foreign
policy
centrality,
a
distinction
must
be
made
between
the
finite
nature
of legislative
power
and
the
theoretically
infinite
nature
of
legislative
influence
(eg,
the
treaty
power
as
op-
posed
to
influence
stemming
from
public
opinion).
With
respect
to
Canada,
suffice
it
to
say
that
the
legislative
focal
points
are
the
Senate's
Committee on
Foreign
Relations
and
the
House
Committee
on Foreign
Affairs,
each
committee
having
approximately
ten
con-
sultative
subcommittees.
In
the
Senate
Foreign
Relations Commit-
tee,
the
Subcommittee
on
Western
Hemisphere
Affairs
deals
with
Canada.
(A
subcommittee
on
Canada
terminated
in
1969,
after
a
decade
of
existence,
for
lack
of
work.)
And
in
the House
Foreign
Affairs
Committee,
the
Subcommittee
for
Europe
deals
with
Can-
ada. However,
like
the
United
States
policy
process
as
a
whole,
matters
affecting
Canada
are
permeative,
being
discussed
from
the
floor
of
the
Senate
and
House
and
in
the
respective
committees
on
agriculture,
defence,
foreign
commerce,
marine
and
fisheries,
just
to
mention
a
few.
Indeed,
evidence
suggests
that
of
the
approxi-
mately forty
Senate
and
House committees,
at
least
half
at
some
time
have
handled
issues
directly
affecting
Canada.
The
president,
as
administrative
head
of
the
executive
branch,
is
situated
above
some fifteen
organizational
units in
the
Executive
Office
of
the
President
(ranging
from
the
White
House
Office
to
the
National
Security Council),
eleven
executive
departments
(ranging
from
State
to
Transportation),
and
thirty-three
independent
offices
and
establishments
(from
the
Atomic
Energy
Commission
to
the
United
States
Information
Agency).
The
cabinet,
a
creature
of
cus-
tom
and
tradition,
functions at
the
discretion
of
the
president,
ad-
vising
him
on
those
matters
regarding
which
he
wishes
advice.
It
does
not
constitute
a
collective
decision-making
body.
The
cabinet
consists
of
the
heads
(secretaries,
and
attorney
general
in
the
case
of
the
Justice
Department)
of
the
eleven
departments
(State;
Treas-
ury;
Defense;
Justice;
Interior;
Agriculture;
Commerce;
Labor;
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