The United States Supreme Court And Desegregation
| Author | Paul Hartman |
| Date | 01 July 1960 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1960.tb00611.x |
| Published date | 01 July 1960 |
THE
MODERN LAW REVIEW
Volume
23
July
1960
No.
4
THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT
AND DESEGREGATION
THE AFTERMATH OF
BROWN
v.
TOPEKA
MORE
than
six
years have passed since the United States Supreme
Court announced its historic decision declaring segregation
of
races
in public education unconstitutional. The ruling, which upset a
long-established pattern of community life in large areas of the
United States, created a controversy which is still raging with
unabated force. The Supreme Court became the primary target of
those bent
on
continuing the pattern of racial segregation in the
South, the hostile reaction ranging from academic protests to open
defiance.’ This article, taking the ruling
of
1954
as the starting
point, examines the extent to which
it
has been strengthened,
weakened
or
otherwise modified by subsequent decisions.
THE
FIRST
BROWN
DECISION
On
May
17, 1954,
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered for a
unanimous court the opinion in
Brown
v.
Board
of
Education
of
Topeka.2
Plaintiffs in the four cases covered by the opinion were
Negro children of elementary and secondary (high) school age, who
sought the aid
of
the courts in obtaining admission to public schools
reserved for white pupils under the segregation legislation
of
the
states in~olved.~ The issue was the constitutional validity of the
See Freund,
“
Storm Over the American Supreme
Court,”
21
M.L.R.
345.
The case, which gave the decision the name, originated in
Kansas. Three other cases covered by the opinion involved racial segregation
in public schools in Delaware, Virginia and South Carolina. All four cmes
are often referred to as the
School
Segregation Cases.
3
Each action was a
‘‘
class action,” the plaintiffs suing for themselves
“
and
on
behalf of persons similarly situated,” meaning other Negro pupils seeking
admission to “white
”
schools in the defending school district. This
is
reflected in the conclusion
of
the Supreme Court: see below, note 6. Class
actions are permitted under federal practice. However, it is not quite clear
whether
in
the instant type
of
class actions the
76s judiceta
effect extends
to persons who did not participate in the suit. See note in
1
Race Relations
Law Reporter,
991
et
seq.
2
347
U.S.
483.
353
VOL.
23
24
VOL.
23
354
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
‘‘
separate but equal
”
doctrine as applied in public education.
This doctrine holds that equality of treatment as required of the
states and state agencies by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is accorded when Negroes are provided
‘‘
substantially equal facilities with those granted to whites, even
though these facilities be separate for both races. The doctrine was
adopted by the Supreme Court in
1896
in
Plessy
v.
FergusonK
which did not involve racial segregation in education, but in trans-
portation. As the opinion in the
Brown
case states, the question
whether the doctrine of “separate but equal” can be reconciled
with the guarantee of equal protection ought not to be decided in
terms of the situation in
1868
when the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted,
or
in
1896
when
Plessy
v.
Ferguson
was decided,
but should be considered in the light of the role public education
plays in American life today. The crucial question is asked and
answered
:
Does segregation of children in public schools, solely
on
the
basis
of
race, even though the physical facilities and other
cc
tangible
”
factors may be equal, de rive the children
of
the
that
it
does
. .
.
To separate [children in grade and high
schools] from others
of
similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
minority groups of equal educationa
P
facilities
?
We believe
The court’s conclusion is that
in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate
but equal
’)
has
no
place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and
others similarly situated for whom the action has been brought
’
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived
of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.l
In
view of the
(‘
problems
of
considerable complexity
”
which the
formulation of decrees carrying out the decision presented, the Chief
Justice announced that the court would hear further argument
on
I‘.
.
.
nor shall
any
State
. .
.
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection
of
the laws.”
5
163
U.S.
637.
6
See above, note
3.
7
In
a
companion decision,
Bolling
v.
Shave,
347
U.S.
497,
the Supreme Court
struck down racial segregation in public education in the District of Columbia,
which
is
federal, not state, territory. Instead
of
the
Equal
Protection Clause
of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which does not bind federal authorities, the
court used as a
basis
of
its holding in
Bolling
v.
Sharpe
the Due Process Clause
of
the Fifth Amendment, under
whioh
a
federal authority
may
not
deprive
a
person
’*
of
life, liberty, or property, without due process
of
law.”
The court
stated that
“
(s)egregation in publio education
is
not reasonably related to
any
roper governmental objective, and thus it impoaes
on
Negro children of the
gistrict
of
Columbia a burden that constitutes
an
arbitrary deprivation
of
their liberty
in
violation
of
the
Due
Process Clause.”
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