The Utility of Consent in John Locke's Political Philosophy
| Published date | 01 March 1984 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1984.tb00165.x |
| Date | 01 March 1984 |
| Author | John Zvesper |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Political
Studies
(1984),
XXXII,
55-67
The Utility
of
Consent in John Locke’s
Political Philosophy
*
JOHN
ZVESPER
University
of
East Anglia
This paper argues that the interpretation
of
Locke’s doctrine
of
political consent
is
best built on ground between and above the extremes
of
voluntarism (deriving
legitimacy from the form of actual consent) and utilitarianism (basing legitimacy on
the proper end
of
hypothetical consent). Locke’s characteristic combination
of
voluntarism and utilitarian considerations is illustrated by looking at his thoughts
on religious toleration and property. Finally, some of the outstanding difficulties in
Locke’s account
of
consent are reviewed in the light of these reflections on the
intention of his doctrine.
John Locke is generally regarded as a ‘classic consent theorist’ even though his
account of what constitutes consent and what is implied by consent is held
almost universally to be less than satisfactory. Even sympathetic commen-
tators complain that Locke is vague and contradictory on this subject, and
critics
of
liberal theory here find Locke (and liberalism) guilty at best of a
logical flaw and at worst of a fraudulent attempt to hide the illegitimate power
of the liberal state behind a cloud of deceitful rhetoric. Without dismissing the
existence
of
rhetorical purposes in Locke’s doctrine
of
consent, or solving
all
of the puzzles of that doctrine and removing all
of
its vagueness, Locke’s
doctrine can be understood more clearly than many of his admirers and critics
have understood it, if more attention is paid to the supporting role which it
plays to the larger purposes
of
his political philosophy.
Interpretations
of
the importance
of
consent in Locke’s political thought
tend to form a bimodal distribution. One group of interpreters stress Locke’s
voluntarism, and argue that Locke intended that consent should play a
decisive role in the determination of legitimate political authority and
obligation. The most thoughtful members of this group find themselves
confronted with certain difficulties which lead them to conclude that Locke
failed to understand the meaning of consent, or to establish the connection
between consent and government. Not that these failures diminished the
influence
of
Locke’s writings. Only
50
years after the publication
of
Locke’s
Two
Treatises
of
Government,
David Hume, the leading member
of
this
*
This paper has benefited from the discussion
of
an earlier version
of
it during the session on
John Locke at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association at Canterbury in April
1982.
Particularly helpful were the comments of the Chairman of that session, Professor Geraint
Parry.
0032-3217/84/01/0055-13/$03.00
0
1984 PoliticalStudies
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