The varieties of thoughtlessness and the limits of thinking
| Author | Jacob Schiff |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885111430616 |
| Published date | 01 April 2013 |
| Date | 01 April 2013 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
12(2) 99–115
!The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885111430616
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Article
The varieties of
thoughtlessness and the
limits of thinking
Jacob Schiff
Oberlin College, USA
Abstract
This article explores problems of thoughtlessness through a critical engagement with
Hannah Arendt. Thoughtlessness was more complicated for Arendt than her inter-
preters have acknowledged. She described it as the failure of conscience; as ideology;
and as an everyday condition that sustains ideology. While the first has been widely
acknowledged, the latter two have been virtually ignored. Arendt identifies the cultiva-
tion of everyday thoughtfulness as a remedy for failures of conscience, but this provides
no defence against ideological and everyday thoughtlessness, which can actually rein-
force failures of conscience. To address them Arendt turns to storytelling. But narra-
tives can combat and reinforce thoughtlessness. To confront thoughtlessness we need
to attend to narrative production and reception. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur I call for
deeper engagement between political theorists, literary critics and philosophers of lit-
erature on the roles of narrative in promoting or undermining thinking in contemporary
politics.
Keywords
Arendt, conscience, ideology, narrative, thinking, thoughtlessness
The varieties of human suffering are staggering: From spectacular eruptions of
genocide to the traumatic violence of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, to the exploi-
tation of sweatshop labour and the all-too-human consequences of the global eco-
nomic crisis, suffering is a persistent feature of our global political landscape.
Responding productively to suffering demands that we think about how we, as
citizens and members of a world community, are implicated in it. That is a pre-
requisite for apprehending and assuming responsibility for our world. If our
responses to global suffering require thought, then thoughtlessness poses a serious
Corresponding author:
Jacob Schiff, Department of Politics, Oberlin College, 10 N. Professor St., Oberlin, OH 44074, USA.
Email: j.schiff@utoronto.ca
problem. It has thus far received insufficient attention,
1
and my purpose here is to
give thoughtlessness some thought. Accordingly, in this article I ask three ques-
tions. What is thoughtlessness, and how does it implicate us in others’ suffering?
What forms does it take? How might we begin respond to it? I address these
questions through a critical engagement with Hannah Arendt, who is perhaps
the theorist of thoughtlessness. Arendt herself did not associate the problem of
thoughtlessness with suffering as such. Indeed, she worried about politicizing suf-
fering because she was suspicious of the introduction of pity into politics.
2
But
suffering need not evoke pity. In what follows, I turn to Arendt to show how
suffering might provide opportunities for responsive thought, and how thought-
lessness can undermine those opportunities.
The problem of thoughtlessness is more complicated – and was more compli-
cated for Arendt – than her readers have allowed. Attending to this complexity
helps us not only to understand Arendt better, but also to offer an Arendtian
diagnosis of a constellation of pathologies that persistently afflict contemporary
political life.
3
Arendt describes thoughtlessness in three importantly different ways:
as a failure of conscience; as a product of ideology; and as an everyday condition
that sustains ideology. The first section of this article takes up the first of these. In
Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt famously identified Eichmann’s thoughtlessness as
a failure of conscience that enmeshed him in the Holocaust. As genocides and other
acts of violence continue to stain the globe, this account of thoughtlessness remains
relevant today. Arendt suggests that the best remedy for a lack of conscience in the
face of extraordinary evil is to cultivate thoughtfulness in everyday life. This
remedy, however, provides no defence against a second sort of thoughtlessness,
which I take up in the second section. In The Human Condition Arendt criticized
what I call ‘ideological thoughtlessness’, the unthinking promulgation and accep-
tance of political mantras that obscure our implication in others’ suffering. From
the perspective of ideological thoughtlessness, the discourse surrounding the war
on terror threatened to lull citizens into complacency about the infringement of
civil liberties at home and the official sanctioning of brutality both at home and
abroad. Some reactions to the global economic and financial crisis posed a similar
threat. Ideological thoughtlessness, finally, is enabled and sustained by everyday
thoughtlessness, such as that which attends our implication in the suffering of
sweatshop workers. I take up this sort of thoughtless in the third section. In
‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, Arendt identified everyday thoughtlessness
as a symptom of being confronted daily with so much to think about. Such
thoughtlessness supports ideological thoughtlessness by short-circuiting the think-
ing that might otherwise undermine it. The persistence of ideological thoughtless-
ness further complicates Arendt’s remedy for thoughtlessness as a failure of
conscience by suggesting that our consciences can become distorted not just in
extraordinary circumstances, but in everyday life.
Arendt gestures towards storytelling as a response to everyday thoughtlessness,
and scholars who have focused on her account have justly emphasized the criti-
cal, transformative potential of stories. However, in the final section I argue that
100 European Journal of Political Theory 12(2)
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