The Voting Power Approach
| Published date | 01 March 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116504040449 |
| Date | 01 March 2004 |
| Author | Max Albert |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
Forum Section II
The Voting Power Approach
Unresolved Ambiguities
Max Albert
Saarland University, Germany
This article contains my replies to the responses of Felsenthal and Machover,
Leech and List (all in Felsenthal et al., 2003) to Albert (2003). It mainly
addresses new controversial points. For this reason, my replies to Leech and
List are short.
Reply to Felsenthal and Machover
Felsenthal and Machover (henceforth FM) find two of my criticisms worthy
of detailed answers. First, I had argued that the voting power (VP) approach,
or the Penrose theory as they call it, is a part either of mathematics or of
political philosophy, but not of political science. FM counter this argument
by coming up with a prediction. Secondly, I had attacked the principle of
insufficient reason (PIR), which is the basis of the VP approach when
considered as an approach in political philosophy. FM defend PIR, claiming
that I have misrepresented the literature on the subject.
The VP approach and political science
I had begun my analysis with the basic distinction between the formal
sciences, especially mathematics, and the factual sciences. ‘Factual’ is not the
same as ‘empirical’; a factual statement can be non-empirical (i.e. metaphys-
ical) because the relevant fact might, temporally or permanently, not be in the
range of possible experiences.1
139
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116504040449
Volume 5 (1): 139–146
Copyright© 2004
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
07 040449 (to/d) 9/1/04 11:49 am Page 139
To continue reading
Request your trial