The war powers of the British parliament: What has been established and what remains unclear?
| Published date | 01 February 2018 |
| Date | 01 February 2018 |
| Author | James Strong |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148117745767 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
research-article2018
Special Issue Article
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
The war powers of the
2018, Vol. 20(1) 19 –34
© The Author(s) 2018
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British parliament: What has
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117745767
DOI: 10.1177/1369148117745767
been established and what
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remains unclear?
James Strong
Abstract
Britain’s parliament has historically lacked formal war powers. Since 2003, however, MPs have
voted five times on military action, including famously vetoing intervention in Syria in 2013. A
new convention developed that—regardless of the legal position—governments should permit
the House of Commons the opportunity to veto certain military deployments. This article
explores what we now know—and what we do not—about the British War Powers Convention.
It identifies apparent exceptions, including non-combat, Special Forces and drone operations.
It highlights areas lacking clarity: for example, who decides what constitutes an ‘emergency’? It
argues that most governments probably will allow the House of Commons to have its say before
using force abroad, that a government politically able to bypass MPs without punishment need not
fear involving them, while one unable to win support will be punished for avoiding a vote. Finally,
the article considers the implications, both positive and negative, of parliamentary war powers for
Britain.
Keywords
convention, military action, parliament, UK, war powers
As is common in Westminster-style democracies, Britain’s parliament has historically
lacked formal war powers (Joseph, 2013; Wagner et al., 2010). Despite this ambiguity,
British members of parliament (MPs) approved the invasion of Iraq, intervention in
Libya, two rounds of action against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), otherwise
know as Da’esh, and rejected intervention in Syria in 2013. Through these votes, a new
political convention developed that—regardless of the legal position—governments
should permit the House of Commons the opportunity to veto certain military deploy-
ments (Strong, 2015a).
Queen Mary University of London, London, UK
Corresponding author:
James Strong, School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End
Road, London E1 4NS.
Email: j.strong@qmul.ac.uk
20
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20(1)
Although the notion that some sort of British War Powers Convention exists is reason-
ably well established, much about it remains unclear. Strong (2015b) observed that the
Syria veto depended on immediate political circumstances that might not recur. Kaarbo
and Kenealy (2016, 2017) noted how analogies to Iraq coloured subsequent debates.
Lagassé (2016) identified how institutional and contextual factors interact in the British
case, while Mello (2017) showed that different types of deployment attract different lev-
els of scrutiny. Each contribution added detail to our emerging understanding of what the
British War Powers Convention means. Each acknowledged that uncertainty remains.
This article attempts to specify what we know, and what we do not, about the British
parliament’s involvement in military deployment decisions. It considers two dimensions
addressed by this Special Issue: the opportunity structures for parliamentary involvement
in security policy and the implications of parliamentary involvement for security policy
(Mello and Peters, 2018). It attempts to draw broader lessons relevant to other states,
principally those rooted in the Westminster tradition, and potentially to democracies more
generally. It builds on the existing literature by adopting a systematic approach and con-
sidering recent operations against Da’esh. It proposes four distinct political scenarios that
a future government contemplating the use of force might face, derived from the interac-
tion of two variables: how able the government believes itself to be to win a House of
Commons vote and how able it feels to bypass MPs. On the basis of this discussion, it
concludes that future British governments will probably permit and win parliamentary
votes before launching major combat operations, but that some uncertainty is unavoida-
ble. Both conclusions have implications for Britain’s broader security stance.
The constitutional position
Westminster-style democracies—Britain, plus former British colonies—generally lack
formal constitutions. Instead, they distribute political power through an informal patch-
work of written laws and unwritten conventions (Bagehot, 2001: 178–199). Conventions,
although not legally binding, nevertheless set clear limits on legitimate political conduct.
They can and do constrain behaviour. Constitutional states like the United States and
Germany have supreme courts capable of adjudicating disputes. Conventional powers
remain contestable, however widely accepted they become (Bono, 2005; Kaarbo and
Kenealy, 2016; Mello, 2017). Because they are socially constructed rather than written
down, conventions can change surprisingly quickly and easily compared to formal rules
(Foley, 2004; Heffernan, 2005b; Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2017; Select Committee on the
Constitution, 2006).
Britain’s War Powers Convention is a good illustrative example. Successive govern-
ments unintentionally granted MPs influence over military deployments. A series of inde-
pendent decisions collectively added up to fundamental change. British MPs had no say
over military deployments before 2003 (Bowers, 2003). Prime Minister Tony Blair
granted them a vote on Iraq as a one-off concession—a ‘remarkable exception’ (Wagner
et al., 2010: 100)—to shore up support among rebellious Labour MPs (Judge, 2004;
O’Malley, 2007). Blair’s move took on greater significance under Prime Minister David
Cameron. Cameron called a vote on Libya to differentiate himself from Blair’s ‘presiden-
tial’ style. He was then trapped by his own rhetoric into permitting a further vote on Syria
and lost. In accepting defeat, he further cemented the new convention.
These developments are reversible. Cameron’s Cabinet Manual confirmed that ‘the
House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter … before troops
Strong
21
[are] committed’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: 44). Such documents can be rewritten or ignored.
Cameron himself called parliament’s involvement in military deployments ‘a good con-
vention’ (Cameron, 2014: c1265). He is no longer Prime Minister, nor even an MP. Public
opinion supports consulting MPs (YouGov, 2013). Public opinion can shift. Most politi-
cal elites seem to accept a Convention exists. But some—especially within the
Conservative Party—think it places the government under intolerable constraint. Foreign
Secretary Boris Johnson, for example, declared that the convention ‘needs to be tested’
during the June 2017 election campaign (Johnson, 2017). Downing Street rejected
Johnson’s statement (MacAskill, 2017). However, Prime Minister Theresa May lost her
majority, raising questions about how long she would remain in office and what views her
successor might hold.
Britain’s War Powers Convention developed against a backdrop of growing parlia-
mentary influence. British governments have historically conducted international nego-
tiations and called general elections as they saw fit. Theresa May, however, required
parliamentary approval to begin the ‘Brexit’ process and to call the June 2017 election,
although the bases for these shifts differed. MPs got to vote on ‘Brexit’ because the
Supreme Court ruled that it meant abolishing statutory rights, something only parliament
can do. The Court reaffirmed the government’s right, in principle, to make and break treaties.
May needed a two-thirds supermajority of MPs to approve the June 2017 election because
that was the threshold laid down by the Fixed Term Parliaments Act. Parliament’s power
over elections is established by statute and enforceable by the courts. Its involvement in
the Article 50 decision (to begin negotiations on United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the
European Union) was similarly subject to judicial enforcement, but it was also a one-off.
Its say in military deployments is a general rather than a specific power, but it is not
guaranteed by law.
This situation looks unlikely to change. Parliamentarians have unsuccessfully tried to
pass a British War Powers Act. The problem is simple. Legislation would not necessarily
improve, and might even weaken, parliament’s position. Parliaments cannot bind their suc-
cessors. Whatever legislation one parliament passed, a future parliament could repeal
(Bagehot, 2001; Taylor and Kelly, 2008). A government powerful enough to ignore the
War Powers Convention could probably undo a War Powers Act. The calculations involved
would be the same.
Legislation could, furthermore, reduce MPs’ freedom to pursue more or less influence
over individual deployments. Parliamentary pressure forced Foreign Secretary William
Hague to guarantee a vote before Britain supplied weapons to Syrian rebels, something
he was under no legal obligation to do. An Act would implicitly limit parliament’s power,
making and obtaining similar concessions difficult. Parliament decides for itself whether
government actions comply with political conventions and punishes non-compliance
...
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