The WTO in Nairobi: The Demise of the Doha Development Agenda and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System
| Author | Rorden Wilkinson,Erin Hannah,James Scott |
| Date | 01 May 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12339 |
| Published date | 01 May 2016 |
The WTO in Nairobi: The Demise of the Doha
Development Agenda and the Future of the
Multilateral Trading System
Rorden Wilkinson
University of Sussex
Erin Hannah
King’s University College, University of Western Ontario
James Scott
King’s College, London
Abstract
This article offers a full-length evaluation of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) decisive December 2015 Nairobi ministerial
conference. It examines the dynamics of the meeting, the emergence of a new negotiating mode, and the contestations
between key developing and developed members; it explores the substance of the deal negotiated; and it reflects on the
future capacity of the WTO to serve as a means of securing trade gains for developing and least developed countries. Three
arguments are advanced. First, the use of a new mode of negotiating brought participation and consensus into the core of
the Nairobi talks, but it also resulted in an agreement that moves away from the pursuit of universal agreements to one
wherein more narrowly focused piecemeal deals can be brokered. Second, the package of trade measures agreed continues
an established pattern of asymmetrical trade deals that favour developed members over their developing and least developed
counterparts. Third, Nairobi alters fundamentally the likely shape of future WTO deals with significant consequences for devel-
oping country trade gains. The likely result is that while Nairobi will energise the multilateral system it will do so in a way that
is of questionable value to developing and least developed countries.
In mid-December 2015, World Trade Organization (WTO)
members gathered in Nairobi, Kenya for the organisation’s
10th ministerial conference (MC10 –see Table 1). Their aim
was to resolve a stalemate that had emerged over the pur-
pose and focus of the WTO’s negotiating function and the
continued viability of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA,
or more commonly Doha round). With the help of two
through-the-night negotiations MC10 saw members reach
an agreement that marks the beginning of a new phase in
the evolution of the multilateral trading system, the role
developing countries will play therein, and the likely gains
they will accrue as a result.
Three aspects mark Nairobi out among WTO ministerial
conferences. First, the agreement reached transforms funda-
mentally the framework for conducting trade negotiations
for the first time in the WTO’s history moving it away from
one targeted at broad-based universal deals via a ‘single
undertaking’to something more lithe and multi-faceted
(commonly understood as ‘variable geometry’). This transfor-
mation is widely seen as rekindling faith in the organisa-
tion’s negotiating function and an important counter to the
growing prominence of ‘mega regional’trade deals such as
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). However, reinvigo-
rating the WTO’s negotiating function came at the expense
of the DDA and a 14-year effort to agree to a wide-ranging
multilateral deal on trade measures for development that
has been a key demand of developing countries and which
has been crucial to securing their participation in the multi-
lateral trading system.
Second, Nairobi saw members utilise a new mode of
negotiation. This new mode builds consensus through a
complex multi-layered series of bilateral processes in
behind-the-scenes meetings targeting the least contentious
issues first, thereby generating willingness and capital
before moving on to thornier topics. Dubbed ‘critical mass’
because of the broad-based participatory and consultative
approaches that are key components, this method targets
blockages in negotiations by encouraging counter-proposals
and dialogue with opponents. It was universally praised at
the meeting and was seen as crucial in helping bridge the
significant pre-ministerial gaps that had existed between
members as well as to the conclusion of an agreement. Ele-
ments of this approach have been used before, and older
more familiar small group and power-political methods were
deployed in the closing stages of MC10. Nonetheless,
Global Policy (2016) 7:2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12339 ©2016 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 7 . Issue 2 . May 2016 247
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