A theatrical conception of power
| Author | Leonard Mazzone |
| Published date | 01 October 2022 |
| Date | 01 October 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1474885120922778 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article EJPT
A theatrical conception
of power
Leonard Mazzone
University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
Abstract
In this article I will combine Erving Goffman’s sociology with some of the main aspects
of Actor-Network Theory in order to outline a theatrical conception of social power.
My first aim is to try to summarize the sociological perspective introduced by Kenneth
Burke and then improved on by Erving Goffman to understand the face-to-face inter-
actions of everyday life. Secondly, I will try to use the theatrical metaphor underlying
this theoretical framework to describe power-over relations in everyday life. Thanks to
the combination of the dramaturgical theory proposed by Erving Goffman and the
‘object turn’ given to social theory by Actor-Network Theory, a theatrical conception
of power allows the episodic, dispositional and systemic dimensions of power relations
to be mapped respectively depending on the actors’ performances, their roles of power
and the institutionalized scripts. Moreover, this theatrical representation of power-over
relations is a defaced understanding of the phenomenon that enables us to investigate
not only its different directional forms (power-to, -over and -with), but also their
possible variants (empowerment, resistance, domination and solidarity).
Keywords
Actor-Network Theory, dispositional and systemic power, domination, Erving Goffman,
object turn, systemic
Introduction
Power has often been regarded as one of the basic concepts of social and political
philosophy and, more broadly, of the social sciences. According to Bertrand
Corresponding author:
Leonard Mazzone, Research Fellow in Social and Political Philosophy, Department of Sociology and Social
Research, University of Milano-Bicocca, Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1 - 20126, Milano, Italy.
Email: leonard.mazzone@unimib.it
European Journal of Political Theory
!The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1474885120922778
journals.sagepub.com/home/ept
2022, Vol. 21(4) 759–782
Russell, it is the fundamental concept in social science ‘in the same sense in which
Energy is the fundamental concept in physics’ (Russell, 2004: 4).
However, this comparison between social science and physics risks being quite
misleading: unlike the concept of energy, there is no shared definition of power
within the social sciences. The definition of power provided by Russell himself,
indeed, is not exempt from problems that would leave many unsatisfied: if power is
nothing more than the ‘production of intended effects’ (Russell, 2004: 23), it is
unclear how such a definition could account for unintentional forms of power
resulting from systemic constraints.
The lack of an uncontroversial definition is mainly due to the fact that power is
an ‘essentially contested concept’: it appears to be analytic, but it is inherently
evaluative (Lukes, 2005). Even though Lukes’ definition of power has itself been
contested because of its essentialist assumptions (Haugaard, 2010), it would be
very hard to deny that the literature on power is not shot through by constantly
conflicting interpretations about the best way to understand this concept. One of
the most important points of disagreement concerns the episodic or the disposi-
tional dimension of this social phenomenon and, hence, its understanding in terms
of an exercise of power over another person in asymmetrical relations or as an
ability or a capacity to act (power-to). As Amy Allen observes:
some of the theorists who analyze power as power-to leave power-over entirely out of
their analysis. [...] Others suggest that both aspects of power are important, but then
focus their attention on either power-over or power-to. Still others define power-over
as a particular type of capacity, namely, the capacity to impose one’s will on others.
(Allen, 2016)
Another point of disagreement in the philosophical literature on power con-
cerns the distinction between:
action-theoretical conceptions of power – that is, those that define power in terms of
either the actions or the dispositional abilities of particular actors – and broader
systemic or constitutive conceptions of power – that is, those that view power as
systematically structuring possibilities for action, or, more strongly, as constituting
actors and the social world in which they act. (Allen, 2016)
One of the main challenges of a theory of power is to keep the episodic (actions),
dispositional (capacities) and systemic dimensions of the phenomenon equally in
view. Such a theoretical challenge has deep political implications: underestimating
the systemic constraints which assign differentials of dispositional power to agents
and enable them to exercise power over others risks overestimating individual
agency and capacities and leads to their undue responsibilization; on the other
hand, overestimating the structuring power of systemic constraints risks depriving
the agents of responsibility for their actions.
760 European Journal of Political Theory 21(4)
To continue reading
Request your trial