Theorising backlash politics: Conclusion to a special issue on backlash politics in comparison
| Published date | 01 November 2020 |
| Author | Michael Zürn,Karen J Alter |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148120947956 |
| Date | 01 November 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Symposium on Backlash Politics in Comparison |
947956BPI0010.1177/1369148120947956The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsAlter and Zürn
research-article2020
Special Issue Article
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
Theorising backlash politics:
2020, Vol. 22(4) 739 –752
© The Author(s) 2020
Conclusion to a special issue on
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backlash politics in comparison https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120947956
DOI: 10.1177/1369148120947956
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Karen J Alter1 and Michael Zürn2,3
Abstract
This conclusion to a special issue on backlash politics develops a proto-theory of backlash
politics. The special issue’s introduction defined backlash politics as a particular form of political
contestation with a retrograde objective as well as extraordinary goals or tactics that has reached
the threshold level of entering mainstream public discourse. While a sub-category of contentious
politics, we argue that backlash politics is distinct and should not be understood as ‘regressive
contentious politics’. Drawing from the contributions to this special issue, we discuss the causes
of backlash politics, yet we argue that the greatest theoretical advances may come from studying
backlash dynamics and how these dynamics contribute to different outcomes. We develop a
proto-theory of backlash politics that considers causes for the rise of backlash movements,
how frequent companions to backlash politics – emotive politics, nostalgia, taboo breaking, and
institution reshaping – intensify backlash dynamics and make it more likely that backlash politics
generate consequential outcomes.
Keywords
backlash politics, contestation, emotional politics, taboo breaking, nostalgia, public discourse,
retrograde
The term backlash has been invoked in very different contexts: in discussions of reaction-
ary movements, anti-feminism, the pushback against LBGT rights, movements for local
autonomy, radical right-wing populism, when discussing policy reversals, rejections of
European and international institutions, and more. As this list reveals, backlash claims
occur on different political levels – local, national, and international – and they can be
issue-specific or generalised against a political order as a whole. One reason to focus on
backlash politics is its contemporary relevance. We are currently experiencing a wave of
backlash that is diffusing across the world. A second important reason is that backlash
politics can be contagious and mutating, and it can generate large and important political
transformations. Articles in this special issue have discussed the mutating and contagious
nature of backlash politics, explaining that local antifeminist politics have migrated to the
1Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
2Research Unit Global Governance, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany
3Department of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Corresponding author:
Michael Zürn, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, Berlin, 10785, Germany.
Email: michael.zuern@wzb.eu
740
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 22(4)
United Nations (UN); anti-gay backlashes arise in places where there are no gay-rights
victories to reverse; mobilisation against immigration can become a fundamental chal-
lenge to the procedural consensus of the political order; and anger-infused politics can
transmute into mutual indignation that deepens polarisation and targets bystanders who
may be uninvolved and mischaracterised.
Our introduction developed a composite definition of backlash politics that is concep-
tuality distinct and that captures specific dynamics and logics in backlash politics. We
defined backlash politics as a particular form of political contestation with a retrograde
objective as well as extraordinary goals or tactics that has reached the threshold level of
entering mainstream public discourse. All three features are necessary elements and
together they distinguish backlash from contentious politics.
We created a separate category of frequent companions that are not necessary elements
of the definition. Backlash politics – as we defined it – made the frequent companions
more likely. Retrograde aspirations increase the likelihood of nostalgic emotion-laden
appeals, and extraordinary claims and tactics increase the likelihood of taboo breaking,
emotive appeals, and institutional reshaping. When present, these frequent companions
intensify backlash politics and make it more likely that backlash politics generate conse-
quential outcomes.
Our conceptualisation is intentionally broad so as to capture commonalities across cul-
tures, political levels, and time. The definition can – like backlash itself – apply to both
democratic and authoritarian contexts, so long as the public sphere has some independence
from the power holders. Contributions to this special issue critically engaged with our
conceptualisation from the perspective of literatures that have affinities or are similar to
backlash politics (norm research, feminism, social movement theory, modernisation and
cleavage theory, etc) or they applied our framework to a specific case (populist parties,
Brexit, gay rights, UN family policy, international courts, foreign direct investment (FDI),
etc). Part 1 of this conclusion builds on the special issue’s contributions to draw a sharper
distinction between our backlash definition and the social movements and contentious
politics literatures. Part 2 begins to theorise about the interaction between causes, backlash
politics, frequent companions, and outcomes. We argue that the value-added of studying
backlash as a distinct category will come from focusing on these interactions and suggest
a proto-theory that puts the frequent companions that the introduction identified in the
centre. We also identify some questions that a focus on backlash politics generates.
Backlash as a special form of contentious politics
All contributors – including the editors – began this collaboration with the open question
of ‘is there such a thing as a politics of backlash?’ We immediately agreed that backlash
politics, if it is distinct, would be a variant of contentious politics and we sought to learn
from existing literatures and studies. Yet, we also wanted to begin anew to think about
backlash politics. In this part of the conclusion, we engage with conceptual questions that
are informed by the contributions to this special issue.
Is backlash simply regressive or right-wing contentious politics given
another name?
The common social science usage portrays backlash politics as a regressive form of con-
tentious politics. This portrayal also exists in the social movements literature, which often
Alter and Zürn
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invokes Jane Mansbridge’s categories of progressive movements (those that develop
inclusionary strategies) and regressive (those that develop exclusionary strategies). While
we agree with Della Porta (2020) that backlash movements are a sub-category of social
movements, we do not want to equate them with regression.
We eschew the progressive/regressive dichotomy, and deliberately avoid casting back-
lash as regressive. In our definition, the retrograde directionality makes backlash goals
distinct. The special issue’s introduction explained that the notion of retrograde (returning
to a prior social condition) is different from regressive (reversing civilisational achieve-
ments), avoiding the normativity and teleology that comes with the term regressive. In
line with this idea, Jack Snyder’s (2020) contribution shows how cultural revivalist move-
ments adopt the language of rights and modernity to suggest the emancipatory nature of
recovering local values and priorities. Meanwhile, Gest’s discussion of how different
societies have confronted demographic changes where minority groups surpass in num-
ber former majority groups notes that inclusionary political definitions of citizens and
nations helps ensure that demographic change is not politically or socially disruptive. Yet,
Gest does not suggest that exclusionary definitions are necessarily regressive. Instead, the
exclusive and inclusive strategies represent top-down political choices based on different
convictions, at least some of which may be normatively defensible (Gest, 2020). Canes-
Wrone et al. (2020) do not cast the reversal of Chinese foreign investment as regressive,
suggesting that it could be progressive in terms of supporting unionisation, and they find
that reversing levels of Chinese investment does not map onto left/right or democratic/
republican cleavages. Petersen’s (2020) discussion of the root causes of American ‘retro-
grades’ also suggests that valuing God and country is neither inherently regressive nor
progressive.
Of course, movements with retrograde goals can be and often are regressive. For
example, there are many reasons to believe, as Jelena Cupać, Irem Ebetürk, and Omar
Encarnación suggest, that antifeminist and anti-gay backlash is regressive (Cupać and
Ebetürk, 2020; Encarnación, 2020). Our point, however, is that movements with retro-
grade goals are not necessarily regressive. Hanspeter Kriesi’s contribution underscores
this point. Opposition to elements of the European integration project involve concerns
about European integration voiced by the political left and right, and the complaints
themselves can generate...
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