Theorising indirect coercion: The logic of triangular strategies
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117819836691 |
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| Author | Jan Ludvik,Michal Smetana |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117819836691
International Relations
2019, Vol. 33(3) 455 –474
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117819836691
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Theorising indirect coercion:
The logic of triangular
strategies
Michal Smetana and Jan Ludvik
Charles University
Abstract
This article deals with the concept of indirect coercion as a distinct type of coercive strategy
involving three actors. We introduce a taxonomy of triangular strategies commonly employed
in international politics: ‘hostage-taking’, ‘patron-client’ and ‘composite’ strategies. These three
types of indirect coercion cover different ways in how the coercer draws the intermediary actor
in the process of coercive bargaining to enhance his leverage over the target. For each type, we
conduct a plausibility probe to study these dynamics on short empirical case studies. We argue
that our conceptualisation of indirect coercion opens new avenues for research into deterrence
and compellence in contemporary world politics.
Keywords
alliances, compellence, deterrence, indirect coercion, triangular strategy
In international politics, states frequently employ coercive threats to make other actors
yield to their demands. Recently, we have had a chance to observe the development of
increasingly complex coercive dynamics in some of the world’s most volatile regions,
from East1 and South Asia2 to the Middle East3 and Ukraine.4 While International
Relations (IR) scholars have been attentive to the issue of coercion in international poli-
tics since the inception of the discipline, the recent wave of IR scholarship rightfully
claims that the existing concepts and theories may be inadequate and there is a need to
expand our analytical toolbox in order to fully understand the dynamics of coercion in
the world today.5
Corresponding author:
Michal Smetana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Smetanovo nabrezi 6, 110 01 Prague, Czech
Republic.
Email: smetana@fsv.cuni.cz
836691IRE0010.1177/0047117819836691International RelationsSmetana and Ludvik
research-article2019
Article
456 International Relations 33(3)
In this article, we aim to contribute to this debate by theorising indirect coercion, a
concept that has so far received scant scholarly attention. In contrast to traditional one-
on-one coercive bargaining, the concept of indirect coercion requires three independent
actors engaged in a specific dynamic, in which the strategic choices of a particular actor
are influenced by the threat of punitive action against a different actor. We conceptualise
and empirically probe three subtypes of indirect coercion strategies: hostage-taking,
patron-client and composite. This taxonomy provides a coherent analytical framework
for systematic empirical research into the dynamics of indirect coercion in international
affairs.
There are several reasons why indirect coercion deserves particular attention in both
the academic and policy-making spheres. First, from what we have found, indirect coer-
cion has been more common in international politics than it may appear. To give an
illustrative example, current events on the Korean Peninsula, one of today’s most press-
ing security issues, cannot be understood unless one takes into account two intertwined
dynamics of indirect coercion: North Korea deters US intervention by holding South
Korea and Japan hostage, while the United States threatens China in order to exert sec-
ondary pressure on North Korea. Second, indirect coercion has some unique features in
comparison with its direct variant; perhaps most importantly, when it comes to the moti-
vation of actors to alter their policies even when the threatened punitive action is not
directed towards themselves. Third, the logic of indirect coercion arguably has a wide
applicability in IR. While the prime focus of this article is on the dynamics of military
coercion, our concepts are plausibly applicable also in other areas of international coer-
cive bargaining that include non-military threats such as diplomatic6 or economic7 sanc-
tions – a case in point may be the logic of US secondary sanctions against companies
doing business with Iran.
In this article, we proceed as follows. First, we review the existing body of IR litera-
ture that deals with the issue of triangular coercive strategies. Second, we introduce the
general features of indirect coercion and elaborate on the employment of our plausibility
probes. In turn, we conceptualise the three aforementioned subtypes of indirect coercion
strategies – hostage-taking, patron-client and composite – and conduct a short empirical
probe for each of them. We conclude by summarising our findings and discussing pos-
sible avenues for future research.
Triangular coercion in international relations
In the existing IR literature on coercion, most scholars accept Thomas Schelling’s defini-
tion of ‘latent violence that can influence someone’s choice’, with a ‘threat of damage,
or of more damage to come’ expressed to achieve the target actor’s compliance with the
coercer’s demands.8 Often broken down to labels such as deterrence, compellence or
coercive diplomacy,9 there have been numerous attempts to create different taxonomies
of these strategies and further subtypes such as deterrence by punishment/denial,10 gen-
eral/immediate deterrence,11 homeland/extended deterrence12 or existential/post-existen-
tial deterrence.13
However, the IR literature has always been predominantly occupied with direct coer-
cive dynamics between two actors. In this direct logic, one actor issues the threat to the
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