Theorizing the behavioral state: Resolving the theory-practice paradox of policy sciences
| Author | Michael Howlett,Ching Leong |
| DOI | 10.1177/0952076720977588 |
| Published date | 01 April 2022 |
| Date | 01 April 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
2022, Vol. 37(2) 203 –225
Article
Theorizing the
behavioral state:
Resolving the theory-
practice paradox of
policy sciences
Ching Leong
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University
of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
Michael Howlett
Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University,
Burnaby, Canada
Abstract
Traditionally, the policy sciences exhibited a paradoxical relationship to public behavior:
arguing in theory that it was rational in a utilitarian sense and could be modelled as such
while at the same time recognizing its irrational nature in practice without attempting
to reconcile this contradiction. A recent behavioral turn among policy scholars has
broken the discursive hegemony of traditional hedonic compliance-deterrence models,
however,placi ng informal institutions such as norms, irrationalities and collective action
at the center of the policy research agenda. To date there has been little theorizing of
the implications of this turn for the policy-making nature of the state, as well as its
extent and nature. Addressing these gaps we conduct a bibliometric review, which finds
that the number of behaviorally-oriented articles on policy instruments have been
increasing in number and relevance. This provides evidence of a behavioral turn in
policy studies as well as documenting the emergence of a behavioral state, that is
one which is more inclined to reconcile policy-making theor y and practice by embrac-
ing the irrationalities of policy actors, through the creation of nudge and behavioral
units across a wide range of domains, a shift in emphasis from the supply of policy to the
demands of policy targets. However, the study shows the impact of this turn is
Corresponding author:
Ching Leong, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore.
Email: ching@nus.edu.sg
Public Policy and Administration
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204 Public Policy and Administration 37(2)
geographically and sectorally uneven and will become more generalized in the future
only if more states embrace this ‘turn’.
Keywords
Behavior, bibliometrics, blame avoidance, compliance, nudge, policy design
Introduction: The paradox of behavioral assumptions in the
policy sciences
Within the policy sciences community, policy-making was traditionally portrayed
as taking place in a reasonably well-ordered universe in which the intentions of
state actions are clear, and the policy target’s behavior in response to them is
‘rational’ in a utilitarian or self-interested and self-maximizing sense. In this
view, policy targets are typically assumed to act as hedonic rational-utility max-
imizers, calculating their gains and losses in response to policy incentives and
disincentives, upon which their happiness, pleasure or pain depend; in short, to
act in their own best interest when responding to government actions (Stokey and
Zeckhauser, 1978). In this perfect policy world, state actors (policy-makers) adopt
packages of measures intended to alter target behavior in the direction they prefer
by rewarding compliant behavior and punishing non-compliance. They maintain
legitimacy by allowing targets to make decisions within these constructed environ-
ments that maximize their well-being.
Working within this simple vision of policy targets, which takes for granted the
fixed nature and source of their motivation, much work in the policy sciences was
able to largely focus upon the supply-side of policy-making. That is, it focused
upon the effective use of resources to attain policy ends without devoting a great
deal of attention to the demand-side or the behavioral characteristics of policy
publics (Shafir, 2012). Policy-making was thus commonly conceived of as an activ-
ity focusing on the calibrations of policy tools – such as the size of penalties or
rewards – rather than upon considerations of the nature of the tools themselves
and the mechanisms they activate within the target populations, or whether the
appropriate type or mix of tool is being used to match the nature of compliance
and cooperation required by a design situation (Capano et al., 2019; Howlett,
2018).
Somewhat paradoxically, the limitations of this approach have long been rec-
ognized within the field, as rational-agent models often failed to accurately predict
people’s actual behavior (Simon, 1955). Hence, even while professing a belief in,
and creating models of policy behavior based on rational utility maximization, the
irrationality of publics and its implications for the scientific ambition of policy
analysts have been noted from the earliest days of the policy sciences (Tribe, 1972).
Banfield (1977: 20) stated it bluntly over 40 years ago: “Even if the policy scientist
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