A theory of social programs, legitimacy, and citizen cooperation with the state
| Author | Abraham Aldama |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211042792 |
| Published date | 01 July 2022 |
| Date | 01 July 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
A theory of social programs, legitimacy,
and citizen cooperation with the state
Abraham Aldama
Center for Social Norms and Behavioral Dynamics, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Aid and social programs are commonly used to fight insurgencies. However, sometimes they fail to achieve their
goal of increasing citizen cooperation with the state. I propose a series of game-theoretic models that focus on the
strategic interaction between a state and a citizen in the face of a challenge to the state’s monopoly of power by an
insurgency. I argue that even if the provision of aid or social programs increases citizens’ intrinsic motivation to
cooperate with the state, it does not necessarily translate into more cooperation. I show that citizen cooperation
depends on whether the increase in the provision of aid is accompanied by an increase in the use of violent or hard
tools by the state, the citizens’ expectation of future rewards, and the insurgency’s response. The models thus
provide a rationale for why even if social programs increase state legitimacy, they may fail to increase citizen
cooperation.
Keywords
aid, game theory, hearts and minds, insurgency, legitimacy, state
Introduction
In any polity, people comply with authorities for one of
two reasons.Either (a) there is a benefit from compliance –
or, alternatively, a punishment from non-compliance – or
(b) they are motivated to comply because they view the
authority as having the right to create and enact laws
and regulations, that is, as being legitimate.Inthecase
of (a), people are extrinsically motivated to comply
with the authority and in the case of (b), they are
intrinsically motivated. Rewarding compliance (or pun-
ishing non-compliance) requires that authorities patrol
people’s behavior, which might be costly and in the
long run, ineffective. As Tyler (2006: 376) notes, ‘seek-
ing to gain influence over others based solely on the
possession of power is costly and inefficient. The use of
power, particularly coercive power, requires a large
expenditure of resources to obtain modest and limited
amounts of influence over others’.
As long as there are people, or citizens in the case of a
state, that do not view the authority, or the state, as being
legitimate, there is an opportunity for challengers to arise
to confront the authority. If there is a group of people for
which the extrinsic motivations are not enough to ensure
compliance, a state may face challenges from possible
dissidents. Challengers may come in the form of orga-
nized crime, insurgencies, or terrorist organizations, to
name a few examples. To focus the analysis, this article
will analyze of the case of an insurgency.
1
In the last decade, a burgeoning literature in eco-
nomics, political science, and security studies (e.g.
Beath, Christia & Enikolopov, 2013; Berman, Shapiro
& Felter, 2011; Bo
¨hnke & Zu
¨rcher, 2013; Crost,
Felter & Johnston, 2016; Sexton, 2016; Weintraub,
2016) has analyzed empirically whether the provision
of social programs and goods and services can win the
hearts and minds of people when the state faces an
Corresponding author:
aaldama@sas.upenn.edu
1
The US Army Counterinsurgency Manual clearly states the idea
that legitimacy is needed to avoid challenges from an insurge ncy:
‘Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the
government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting
the insurgency’ (United States Army and Marine Corps, 2008: 1–3).
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(4) 495–507
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433211042792
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