A Theory of the Incentives Facing Political Organizations
| Published date | 01 April 1986 |
| Author | Mancur Olson |
| Date | 01 April 1986 |
| DOI | 10.1177/019251218600700205 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
165
A
THEORY
OF
THE
INCENTIVES
FACING
POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Neo-Corporatism
and
the
Hegemonic
State
MANCUR
OLSON
There
is
a
widespread
(and,
in
the
literature
of
neo-corporatism,
a
particularly
urgent)
need
for
a
theory
of
the
incentives
facing
political
and
partly
political
organizations.
This
article
develops
such
a
theory,
drawing
particularly
upon
the
concepts
of
encom-
passing
and
of
narrow
coalitions
for
collective
action,
and
on
the
analysis
of
bargaining
in
bilateral
monopolies.
Unified
political
parties
in
political
systems
with
some
"winner-
take-all"
characteristics
are
found
likely
to
have
an
encompassing
character,
and
therefore
to
have
some
incentive
to
act
broadly
in
accordance
with
one
general
conception
or
another
of
the
social
interest.
Hegemonic
powers
in
an
international
system
also
have
relatively
constructive
incentives.
Narrow
distributional
coalitions
will,
by
contrast,
face
uniquely
perverse
incentives.
With
the
aid
of
this
theory
of
the
incentives
facing
political
organizations
neo-corporatism
can
be
raised
to
the
theoretical
level
and
shown
to
have
some
potential
for
reducing
the
social
costs
of
distributional
struggle.
The
long-term
dynamics
of
neo-corporatist
organizations
are,
however,
likely
to
lead
to
antisocial
developments,
so
this
aspect
of
the
matter
especially
needs
further
research.
The
literature
of
neo-corporatism
offers
a
convenient
starting
point
for
the
new
theoretical
argument
I
shall
offer
here.
This
is
partly
because
Professor
von
Beyme,
while
doing
me
the
great
favor
of
taking
the
argument
in
my
book
on
The
Rise
and
Decline
of
Nations
so
seriously,
finds
it
odd
that
I
never
mentioned
neo-corporatist
policies
in
that
book.
That
omission
will
be
corrected
here.
It
is
natural
to
deal
with
neo-corporate
policies
in
view
of
the
favorable,
if
brief,
account
of
neo-corporatism
in
Professor
von
Beyme’s
contribution
(1985,
and
AUTHOR’S
NOTE:
I
am
grateful
to
Gudmund
Hernes,
Franz
Lehner,
Gerhard
Lehm-
bruch,
Assar
Lindbeck,
Preben
Munthe,
Fritz
Scharpf,
Phillippe
Schmitter,
and
Wolfgang
Streek
for
helpful
conversations
or
correspondence
on
this
subject
in
recent
years.
But
because
there
has
not
been
time
enough
to
send
them
drafts
of
this
article,
it
is
important
to
emphasize
that
they
may
not
agree
with
it
and
that
I
am
solely
respon-
sible
for
all
shortcomings.
166
this
issue,
p.
115).
Though
it is
not
his
main
point,
Professor
von
Beyme
seems
to
suggest
that
neo-corporatist
policies
would
be
useful
&dquo;as
a
kind
of
compromise.&dquo;
Specifically,
he
suggests
they
offer
a
useful
middle
ground
between
a
neopluralist
acceptance
of
mild
forms
of
anarchy
and
a
possible
solution
to
which
I
had
pointed-a
wider
and
better
public
understanding
of
the
process
of
institutional
sclerosis
that
I
had
de-
scribed,
which
would
make
policies
to
reverse
this
process
politically
feasible. He
also
points
approvingly
to
the
tendency
of neo-corporatists
and
others
to
find
&dquo;a
common
meeting
ground&dquo;
in
&dquo;policy
analysis
on
the
basis
of
some
typologies
of
state
functions.&dquo;
Praise
for
the
literature
of
neo-corporatism
is
not
in
any
way
a
prob-
lem
for
me.
In
this
literature
there
are
many
exceptionally
erudite
com-
parative
studies
of
many
different
political
systems.
I
have
profited
from
reading
some
of
these
rich
and
comprehensive
studies
and
ad-
mired
the
learning
of
their
authors.
There
is
also
a
good
deal
to
be
said
in
the
early
phases
of
research
for
offering
new
typologies
and
terminologies,
as
the
neo-corporatists
have.
I
must
admit
that
the
ter-
minological
and
historical
associations
of
neo-corporatism
with
the
substantial
evils
and
comic
bungling
of
Mussolini’s
corporatism,
and
with
Franco
and
other
fascist-corporatist
dictatorships,
do
not
mix
well
with
my
antifascist
and
prodemocratic
prejudices.
But
my
preference
for
a
different
terminology
is
purely
aesthetic
and
does
not
detract
in
any
way
from
the
scientific
value
of
the
neo-corporatist
literature.
Science
attempts
to
go
beyond
descriptions,
histories,
terminologies,
and
typologies
to
genuine
hypothetico-deductive
theory.
Schools
of
scientific
thought
that
fail
to
develop
deductive
theories
resting
on
tested
hypotheses
never
last.
The
history
of
political
science,
for
ex-
ample,
is
full
of
examples
of
tendencies
and
terminologies
that
were
once
fashionable,
but
that
failed
to
generate
cumulative
research
and
have
now
been
partly
or
wholly
abandoned.
The
role
of
&dquo;pluralism&dquo;
in
American
political
science
will
serve
as
an
example.
The
&dquo;analytical
pluralism&dquo;
of
Bentley
(1908)
and
Truman
(1958)
has
largely
passed
away,
and
later
forms
of
pluralism
are
usually
said
to
have
been
displaced
or
refuted
by
neo-corporatism.
The
rhetoric
of
neo-
corporatism
will
also
fade
away
if
it
does
not
eventually
pass
from
description
and
typology
to
authentic
theory.
I
hope
this
article
will
be of
some
use
to
neo-corporatists
in
making
this
indispensable
advance..
What
is
needed,
not
only
for
neo-corporatism
but
for
other
pur-
poses
as
well,
is
a
theory
of
the
incentives
confronting
organizations
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