Things That go ‘Boom’… or Not? Defining Explosive Substances and Pyrotechnic Effects in Under the Explosive Substances Act 1883
| Date | 01 February 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220183221079112 |
| Published date | 01 February 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
Things That go ‘Boom’… or Not?
Defining Explosive Substances and
Pyrotechnic Effects in Under the
Explosive Substances Act 1883
R v Margelis [2021] EWCA Crim 1215
Keywords
Explosive, pyrotechnic, lawful, object, device
The appellant, Ovidijus Margelis, was charged with the offence of making explosive substances contrary
to section 4(1) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 where it is an offence where without lawful
purposes:
Any person who makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any explosive substance.
Margelis was a 26-year-old university student who embarked upon a scheme to fraudulently obtain
money from the postal services. The plan was to send various packages in the post which contained
devices sealed in a plastic container and made up of material shaved from the heads of safety matches
which was connected to a battery-operated circuit on a timer. When the timer expired, the circuit
would complete and heat up, igniting the match heads. This would set fire to the address label on the
package causing the label to be destroyed and rendering the package undeliverable. Margelis would
then claim the value of the lost items from the carriers. Various items were sent between June and
September 2020. Two parcels were discovered in an Amazon warehouse in Dunfermline where the
devices had activated, causing holes to be melted into their lids as a result of the flames. Another
package was delivered to a residential address with the device having failed to ignite, causing alarm
and distress to the residents when the device was discovered.
A week before the original trial, an application to dismiss was made arguing that the devices did not
constitute an explosive substance under the definition of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 and there-
fore, under the principles set out in R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, there was insufficient evidence for
a jury to convict therefore there was no case to answer. Barklem J held that the device was an explosive
substance under the 1883 Act and indicated that should he be the trial judge he would direct the jury
accordingly. When Barklem J was later confirmed as the trial judge, he confirmed this earlier ruling
which resulted in the appellant changing his plea to guilty.
It is this ruling that was appealed where it was argued that the judge was wrong to rule that the devices
in question were explosive substances under the 1883 Act (ground 1). It was also argued that the judge
erred in not limiting his ruling as to whether the devices were capable of producing a pyrotechnic effect
and that he should have left the question as to whether they did produce a pyrotechnic effect to the jury as
a matter of fact (ground 2).
Key to this appeal was the question whether the match heads could be considered explosive sub-
stances. Counsel for the Appellant raised the argument that a safety match or a match head could not
fall into the meaning of an explosive substance under the 1883 Act because if this were the case,
Case Note
The Journal of Criminal Law
2022, Vol. 86(1) 46–50
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00220183221079112
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