Third-party knowledge and success in civil war mediation
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148120930674 |
| Published date | 01 February 2021 |
| Date | 01 February 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120930674
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2021, Vol. 23(1) 3 –21
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1369148120930674
journals.sagepub.com/home/bpi
Third-party knowledge and
success in civil war mediation
Krista Wiegand1, Erin Rowland2
and Eric Keels3
Abstract
Within this article, we explore how third-party knowledge of ongoing conflicts shapes the ability
of mediators to successfully end conflicts through negotiated settlements. Since the primary role
of mediators is to share information, and combatants have incentives to misrepresent information,
contextual knowledge about the conflict and actors is critical. We argue that experienced
diplomats with greater knowledge of the civil war state, close knowledge of the combatants,
and connections with civil society are less vulnerable and more effective in mediation efforts.
We propose that third parties seeking a diplomatic solution to ongoing conflicts may be more
successful when they maintain strong diplomatic knowledge of the disputants as well as knowledge
of the processes by which previous mediation efforts have attempted to resolve the dispute. Using
a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model on peace agreements from 1989 to 2005, we find
strong support that diplomatic knowledge matters significantly.
Keywords
bargaining, civil war, diplomacy, information, knowledge, mediation
Introduction
As the Syrian civil war approaches its ninth year, the international community is once
again launching renewed efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table to settle the
dispute. At the same time, regional partners and international organisations are restarting
talks between the South Sudanese Government and the rebel forces, Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). The new talks in the South Sudanese
civil war are being revived in the shadow of the failed 2015 peace process, which opened
a new chapter of instability in the world’s youngest country. The stakes are high for inter-
national mediation efforts. Though the international community has many tools to man-
age ongoing conflicts, mediation represents one of the most attractive options (Regan
et al., 2009). Diplomatic interventions are relatively inexpensive as compared with
1Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Knoxville, TX, USA
2Department of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL, USA
3One Earth Future Foundation, Broomfield, CO, USA
Corresponding author:
Eric Keels, One Earth Future Foundation, Broomfield, CO 80021-8233, USA.
Email: erickeels@gmail.com
930674BPI0010.1177/1369148120930674The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsWiegand et al.
research-article2020
Original Article
4 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(1)
military interventions or economic sanctions. Understanding what makes mediators
effective is therefore a highly pertinent question for scholars and policymakers to address.
Much of the past literature agrees that mediators are successful in large part due to their
ability to credibly transfer information during negotiations (Kydd, 2003; Regan and Aydin,
2006; Regan et al., 2009; Savun, 2008). Past studies generally assume that information
operates as a one-way street, where mediators offer information gleaned prior to, and dur-
ing, negotiations, and it is either accepted or ignored by combatants. While true, this body
of work largely makes an implicit assumption that mediators receive accurate information
from the combatants. At the same time, much of the previous work on bargaining and civil
war dynamics notes that combatants often have incentives to misrepresent information
during the war so as to gain leverage in disputes (Fearon, 1995; Mattes and Savun, 2010;
Thomas et al., 2016; Walter, 2009). If both rebels and the government have incentives to
provide misinformation to one another, it stands to reason that belligerents may also offer
misinformation to mediators as a way to garner international support during the dispute. If
belligerents make disingenuous demands during the negotiation process, how can media-
tors parse bluster from the actual reservation point(s) of each side?
One way that mediators may overcome this challenge is by maintaining strong knowl-
edge of one or both sides prior to the beginning of negotiations. We posit that mediators
that have close, or inside, knowledge of combatants and the context in which the conflict
is occurring are more effective at resolving armed conflicts as compared with mediators
that are removed from the conflict. As noted by Savun (2008), outside of the mediator’s
relative bias, international actors may have key information about the conflict that assists
with their ability to convince belligerents to come to an agreement. Reid (2017) notes that
mediators may have key contextual leverage over disputants, where their intimate knowl-
edge of the dispute allows them to craft more durable settlements. Building on this work,
we posit that effective mediators may have strong knowledge of one or both sides, as well
as a strong familiarity with past efforts to resolve the dispute. This diplomatic knowledge
and process knowledge allows international mediators to better identify disingenuous
claims from the true reservation point of each side.
To assess these claims, we provide a brief overview of previous research and offer a
novel theory that emphasises the key role of mediator knowledge of the disputants and
past processes of settling the dispute. We then assess the accuracy of this theory by statis-
tically examining the success of all mediation attempts in intrastate conflicts from 1989
to 2005. The results largely confirm that both diplomatic and process knowledge held by
the mediator significantly increase the likelihood that conflicts will end in a peace agree-
ment. Finally, this article concludes with policy recommendations and avenues for future
research.
Previous research
Much of the previous research on civil war dynamics and conflict resolution has been
defined by the bargaining approach to disputes, emphasising the importance of commit-
ment problems in stymieing negotiations and prolonging disputes (Fearon, 1995; Hartzell
and Hoddie, 2003; Walter, 2002). Specifically, given an incentive for parties (primarily
for the government) to defect from any agreement, it is difficult for either side to credibly
commit to a settlement. The bargaining process during civil war is also complicated by
issues of information asymmetry. As noted by Walter (2009), rebel groups often have
numerous incentives to misrepresent information throughout the conflict. As inherently
To continue reading
Request your trial