‘This man is my property’: Slavery and political absolutism in Locke and the classical social contract tradition
| Author | Laurens van Apeldoorn,Johan Olsthoorn |
| Published date | 01 April 2022 |
| Date | 01 April 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1474885120911309 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article EJPT
‘This man is my
property’: Slavery and
political absolutism in
Locke and the classical
social contract tradition
Johan Olsthoorn
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Laurens van Apeldoorn
Leiden University, The Netherlands
Abstract
It is morally impossible, Locke argued, for individuals to consensually establish absolute
rule over themselves. That would be to transfer to rulers a power that is not ours,
but God’s alone: ownership of our lives. This article analyses the conceptual presup-
positions of Locke’s argument for the moral impossibility of self-enslavement through a
comparison with other classical social contract theorists, including Grotius, Hobbes
and Pufendorf. Despite notoriously defending the permissibility of voluntary enslave-
ment of individuals and even entire peoples, Grotius similarly endorsed divine owner-
ship of human life. He could do so coherently, we show, because he denied that
despotic power gives rulers rights in the lives of their subjects. Masters do not own
slaves in the way we own material things (which we may destroy at will). Reworking
received Roman law categories, Grotius maintained that ‘perfect slavery’ consists in
masters having a personal right to the slave’s perpetual service; a condition equivalent
to what Locke called ‘drudgery’ and deemed permissible. Our analysis of this unpalat-
able set of ideas reveals that Locke’s argument is premised upon idiosyncratic con-
ceptions of slavery and absolutism, disavowed by prominent defenders of absolutism in
the classical social contract tradition. It is hence less powerful than commonly believed.
Corresponding author:
Johan Olsthoorn, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Mailbox 15578,
Amsterdam, 1001 NB, Netherlands.
Email: j.c.a.olsthoorn@uva.nl
European Journal of Political Theory
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885120911309
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2022, Vol. 21(2) 253–275
Keywords
Hugo Grotius, John Locke, liberalism, political absolutism, Roman law of property,
Samuel Pufendorf, slavery, social contract theory, Thomas Hobbes
The primary objective of John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1689) is to
show that no commonwealth can possibly be governed by an ‘Absolute, Arbitrary,
Unlimited, and Unlimitable Power’ (Locke, 1988a [hereafter FT]: §9). Political
power is necessarily restricted and fiduciary; the people cannot but retain the
right to hold government accountable. Locke’s (1632–1704) main negative argu-
ment for the moral necessity of limited government is two-pronged. Each prong
rejects a way in which absolute and arbitrary power can arise. The First Treatise
challenges the contention of Sir Robert Filmer (1588–1653) that sovereigns have
such extensive powers by divine right. The Second Treatise contends that absolute
rule cannot possibly have been established by agreement either.
The Two Treatises put forth myriad moral and prudential arguments in defence
of limited government. This article confines itself to scrutinizing one of Locke’s
main arguments: that the moral impossibility of self-enslavement precludes con-
tractually setting up absolute rule over oneself. This argument, linking political
absolutism with slavery, rests on a theological premise: divine ownership of human
life. Political absolutism, Locke contends, gives rulers ownership rights in their
subjects’ lives (as well as in their liberties and estates). Citizens cannot consensually
institute arbitrary government over themselves since it amounts to giving away
something that belongs not to them, but to God. ‘No Man can, by agreement, pass
over to another that which he hath not in himself, a Power over his own Life’
(Locke, 1988b [hereafter ST]: §24). Modern Lockean philosophers generally dis-
card the idea of divine ownership, replacing it with a less parochial explanation for
why the consensual establishment of absolute rule is illegitimate (e.g. Simmons,
1993: 137–145).
This article reveals that classical contract theorists could coherently endorse the
theological premise, already found in Plato’s (1997) Phaedo (62b-e), without
accepting Locke’s anti-absolutist conclusions. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) backed
contractual political absolutism despite similarly holding that ‘the Right over our
own Lives is not in ourselves, but in GOD’ (Grotius, 2005 [hereafter DJBP]:
2.19.5.4).
1
While natural reason suggests that the right to life may like any other
property title be transferred voluntarily to another party, the Gospel teaches us
that we have no such dominium over our life. Suicide is therefore impermissible: ‘no
Man’s Life is so entirely at his own Disposal, as that he may take it away himself,
or authorize another so to do’ (DJBP 2.21.11.2). Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694)
concurred: ‘life...must be regarded as a gift of God ...man certainly does not
have power over his own life to the extent that he may terminate it at his pleasure’
254 European Journal of Political Theory 21(2)
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