Thomas v Jones
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Date | 1921 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
Bastardy - Corroboration - Evidence of - Cumulative Effect of Facts which singly are not Evidence of Corroboration -
The appellant was charged on complaint preferred by the respondent with being the father of a bastard child of the respondent. The appellant was a farmer and a bachelor. The respondent was his housekeeper. On the morning of the birth, when the respondent was in labour, the appellant, who had no other female servant, lit a fire for her and took her some tea and brandy. He also sent for the doctor. After the birth he allowed her and the child to remain for five weeks and two days (until June 17) in his house. There was no evidence whether she was sufficiently recovered to have left at an earlier date. The appellant admitted that during those five weeks and two days he never asked the respondent who was the father of her child. The respondent in her evidence said that during that time (though she did not fix the date except that it was before June 16) she asked the appellant what he was going to do about the child, and he said that there was nothing for him to do but to pay. After the respondent had left his house she wrote him a letter charging him with being the father of the child, and asking if he meant to pay for its maintenance. To that letter he made no reply:—
Held, by Bankes and Atkin L.JJ. (Scrutton L.J. dissenting), that the above facts did not afford any evidence corroborating the evidence of the respondent in some material particular, as required by s. 4 of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872.
By Scrutton L.J.: The fact that the appellant allowed the respondent to remain in his house for five weeks and two days after the birth of the child was, in the circumstances, some evidence of corroboration.
APPEAL from the judgment of a Divisional Court upon a case stated by justices of the county of Radnor.F1
A complaint was preferred by Miriam Jones the respondent against the appellant David Thomas alleging that he was the father of a bastard child of which she was delivered on May 11, 1919. The justices adjudged the appellant to be the putative father of the child, but stated the following case for the opinion of the Court:—
“5. The following facts were proved by the evidence of the respondent:—
“(a) The respondent was a single woman aged twenty-five. (b) She was delivered of a female child on May 11, 1919,” at Llwynbeadd Farm. “(c) The appellant lives at Llwynbeadd Farm, Nantmel, in the county of Radnor, and is a bachelor aged 43 years. (d) The respondent went to work for the appellant as his servant and housekeeper in May, 1917, and was there until June 17, 1919, and during that time men, other than the appellant, lived and slept in the house. (e) The appellant had connection with the respondent the first time some time before the respondent had been at Llwynbeadd twelve months, but the respondent could not say when. Afterwards the appellant also had connection with the respondent, but the respondent could not say how often. (f) About July or August, 1918, the respondent went to a doctor, and he told her something about herself, and when she returned to Llywnbeadd she told the appellant that the doctor had told her she was in the family way. The respondent denied to everybody else, on being asked, that she was in the family way, because she did not want to tell her business to other people. (g) On the morning of May 11, 1919, when her child was born, the respondent was not well and was ill and moaning, and did not remember everything that happened. Early that morning the appellant made a fire and gave the respondent some brandy and tea in the kitchen. A doctor was sent for, and a Miss Evans came to the house. (h) The respondent remained in the appellant's house with the child until June 17, 1919. (j) On May 12, 1919, her time of service with the appellant at Llwynbeadd was finishing, and when the child was born on the previous day she had packed her box. (k) The appellant on being asked by the respondent what he was going to do about the child said: ‘There is nothing for me to do but to pay you a lump of money.’ Later (June 16, 1919) the appellant asked the respondent to take the child to be brought up by a Miss Mills, and that he would pay the money on the quiet. (l) After the respondent left the appellant's house she wrote him a letter on June 21, 1919, and another letter on July 14, 1919, and another on August 16, 1919. The letter of July 14 was as follows: ‘Mon. 14. Llangors, Pantydwr, Rhayader. Mr. Thomas. Dear Sir, I just take the priviledge of writing these few lines to you hoping that you are well as it leaves me at present. I should like to know what you intend doing in regard to the child. Do you intend paying or not? If not I must see further about it for it is useless waiting, it is not as if you are paying for another man's child as you know the child is yours and no one else. I should be pleased to know by return of post one thing or the other. I conclude, Your's truly, Miriam Jones.’ No reply to any of these letters was received by the respondent.
“6. The appellant was called by the respondent as a witness, and denied the paternity of the child, and all the allegations of the respondent connecting him with the paternity, and that he had ever had connection with her; and he stated that he did not know she was in the family way until the child was born, and that Miss Evans sent for the doctor; he did not.
“From the evidence of the appellant it was proved:—
“(a) That he knew the respondent went to a doctor in August, 1918, because he saw some medicine in the kitchen, and asked if she was not well, and she told him the doctor had made some impudent remarks about her. He did not ask her what they were. (b) That he made a fire in the kitchen and there gave her brandy on the morning the child was born. (c) That he did not ask the respondent who was the father of the child during the time she was in his house after her confinement; and that he had received only one letter from the respondent, which was in July, 1919, and is the letter set out in paragraph 5 hereof, and did not reply to it because he thought it was blackmail. (d) That when she had the child he told her she must go.
“7. The respondent called John Price …. a farm servant, who proved the following facts:—
“(a) That he lived at the appellant's house while the respondent was housekeeper there. (b) On the day that the respondent was confined the appellant asked him to go to see Dr. Gordon Richardson.
“8. No evidence other than that of the respondent, the appellant, and the said John Price was called on behalf of the respondent, and at the close of the respondent's case the solicitor for the appellant submitted that the evidence of the respondent had not been corroborated in some material particular in accordance with the provisions of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872, and he contended that the complaint ought to be dismissed and quoted Burbury v. JacksonF2 and Wiedemann v. Walpole.F3 The solicitor for the respondent contended that the evidence of the appellant and John Price was sufficient corroboration. On behalf of the appellant it was proved that the respondent had denied she was in the family way.
“9. We the said magistrates were of opinion that the evidence of the respondent had been corroborated by the facts that the appellant sent the witness John Price for the doctor on the morning of the birth of the child, that he allowed the respondent and the child to remain in his house from the birth of the child until June 17, 1919, and did not during that time ask the respondent who was the father of her child, and did not answer the letter of July, 1919, which he stated he had received, and by the demeanour of the witnesses and the way the evidence was given by the respondent.
“10. The question upon which the opinion of the said Court is desired is whether we, the said justices …. upon the above statement of facts came to a correct determination and decision in point of law, and if not what should be done in the premises.”
In the Divisional Court, the Lord Chief Justice and Roche J. held that the facts relied upon by the justices (except “the demeanour of the witnesses and the way the evidence was given by the respondent,” as to which they expressed no opinion), when looked at together amounted to evidence of corroboration, and they dismissed the appeal. Avory J. dissented, holding that there was no evidence of corroboration.
The appellant appealed.
Artemus Jones K.C. and Roome for the appellant. None of the facts relied upon by the justices afford any evidence corroborating the evidence of the mother in a material particular within the meaning of s. 4 of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872. The face that the appellant sent for a doctor is not evidence of corroboration. It was only the act of a humane man. Nor can the demeanour of the witnesses and the way the respondent gave her evidence be corroborative evidence. Dawson v. M'KenzieF4 and M'Whirter v. LynchF5 do not support the respondent's contention upon this point. The observations of the judges in those cases were founded upon Macpherson v. LargueF6, which shows how they ought to be read. There remain the facts: (a) that the appellant allowed the respondent and the child to remain in his house for five weeks and did not during that time ask her who the father was; and (b) that the appellant did not answer the letter of July 14 from the respondent stating that the child was his child, and asking him what he was going to do in regard to it. As to (a), the justices apparently did not accept the respondent's evidence that she charged the appellant with being the father, and therefore his act of kindness in...
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