To max or not to max
| Date | 01 January 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1462474509349010 |
| Published date | 01 January 2010 |
| Author | Roy D. King,Sandra L. Resodihardjo |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
To max or not to max
Dealing with high risk prisoners in the
Netherlands and England and Wales
ROY D. KING AND SANDRA L. RESODIHARDJO
University of Cambridge, UK and University of Leiden, the Netherlands
Abstract
Following a number of high profile escapes during the 1990s, policy makers in the
Dutch Prison Service and in the Prison Service of England and Wales faced stark choices
about how to house their highest risk offenders. They made those choices in the spot-
light of publicity and under pressure from politicians and the press. In this article we
seek to present the choices made in the light of the respective histories of the two
systems by using a framework drawn from the literature on public policy formation.
Our aim is not so much to develop or test hypotheses about policy formation, but
rather to try to understand two things: first, how these particular policies compare with
so-called supermax solutions developed in the United States and second, why policy
makers decided to choose one policy option rather than the other.
Key Words
control problems • escapes • learning • prison service • reform • supermax • third
order change
INTRODUCTION
In this article we consider the use of so-called supermax solutions to deal with high risk
prisoners. By high risk prisoners we mean both those who are prone to attempt escapes,
and who would thereby constitute a serious risk to the police, the public or the security
of the State, and those who, through their violent, subversive or persistently disruptive
behaviour in custody, may constitute a major threat to the stability and good order of
the prison system. Of course, some prisoners who, for example, take hostages with a
view to making an escape attempt fall into both categories. In particular we consider
two ostensibly similar scenarios, one in the Netherlands and the other in England
and Wales, in which prison escapes led to public outcry, official inquiries and reports
recommending major changes in prison policies. The eventual outcomes, however, were
very different: the Netherlands accepted the recommended supermax solution while
England and Wales rejected it. These decisions are important to understand for two
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DOI: 10.1177/1462474509349010
reasons. First, in light of the comparison of prison conditions in the two countries by
Downes (1988), these outcomes might seem counterintuitive, although in view of
Downes’ later work perhaps the Dutch decision was not so surprising (Downes, 1998).
Second, since politicians and prison administrators are notoriously absent minded when
it comes to penal history, it is important to document how and why decisions are
actually reached – if only to be better prepared the next time the same recommendations
are proposed.
The first scenario played out in Holland in 1992–3. After a series of dramatic escapes
from several types of prisons, including from some Special Security Units (SSUs), an
external inquiry concluded that the philosophy behind the SSUs was sound, but that
its execution had been poor. It recommended that two new SSUs should be built which
adhered more closely to the ideas laid down in a 1987 civil service report (Hoekstra,
1992). Correct implementation of the SSU philosophy would create prison units along
the lines of what had come to be called supermax facilities in the United States. Follow-
ing another series of escapes, junior Minister of Justice, Kosto, quickly accepted the
supermax solution. In the event the number of SSU prisoners remained limited, and
only one unit was created which finally opened in August 1997.
The second scenario played out in England between 1994–7. In September 1994,
six prisoners, including five IRA terrorists, escaped from the supposedly escape-proof
SSU at HMP Whitemoor. The report of the Woodcock inquiry (Home Office, 1994)
into the escape made many detailed recommendations to increase security and follow-
ing its publication the Home Secretary invited General Learmont to conduct a wider
ranging review of security policy. When a further escape by high security risk prisoners
took place in January 1995 from another dispersal prison at Parkhurst, the inquiry into
that escape was added to Learmont’s brief. Learmont endorsed Woodcock’s recommen-
dations and added some of his own, including the building of two new supermax
prisons, of 200 beds each – one for escape-prone prisoners and one for difficult and
dangerous prisoners who posed control problems (Home Office, 1995). Even before
the Learmont Report was published, a project team to consider the feasibility of
developing supermax facilities was established. It reported that building a supermax
facility would only be financially viable if one or more dispersal prisons were removed
from the high security estate. The inquiry team expressed grave doubts about the need
for a supermax to house control risk prisoners (King, 1999).1In the event, none was
built.
Stated baldly, the two scenarios appear almost identical. Indeed, the problem in
all its essentials – the escape of potentially dangerous prisoners from the most secure
facilities which had been specially designed for their detention – was identical except
in one regard, namely the taking of hostages. Conventionally, criminologists attempt to
explain late modern developments in prison policy in terms of the application of the
techniques of New Public Management (Ferlie et al., 1996) driven by a new penology
of control (Feeley and Simon, 1992; Cullen et al., 2000; Garland, 2001). Undoubtedly,
the emergence of New Public Management and of the new penology formed part of
the context in both our scenarios. But the contexts in which these scenarios were played
out also differed in crucially important ways. Our two-fold aim in this article is to try
to understand these events both in the historical context of the development of security
and control policies in the two prison systems and the political contexts in which these
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