To use the whip or not: Whether and when party group leaders use disciplinary measures to achieve voting unity
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512116676907 |
| Published date | 01 March 2018 |
| Author | Stefanie Bailer |
| Date | 01 March 2018 |
International Political Science Review
2018, Vol. 39(2) 163 –177
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512116676907
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To use the whip or not: Whether
and when party group leaders use
disciplinary measures to achieve
voting unity
Stefanie Bailer
University of Basel, Switzerland
Abstract
Party group leaders seemingly use a variety of disciplinary measures to achieve unified voting behavior in
party groups. However, there is little systematic knowledge about the nature of such disciplinary measures
and the interaction between leaders and group members remains a black box. Most studies of party voting
concentrate on institutional variables such as electoral systems and take disciplinary measures as a given.
This study presents a new way to measure party discipline, based on data from semi-structured interviews
with 76 party group leaders and experts from five European parliaments. The discipline index provided here
is the first to consider in a systematic way the means available to reprimand or reward party group members.
In a second step, the study shows that disciplinary measures can compensate for a leader’s lack of control
over candidate selection processes, and relate to group composition or size.
Keywords
Political parties, party group discipline, party group leaders, voting unity, cohesion
Introduction
When the German parliamentary party leader Volker Kauder threatened to dismiss his Christian
Democrat colleagues from their committees after they refused to vote with their party group in a
contested vote concerning the Eurocrisis, a heated debate developed regarding how frequent and
usual such disciplinary measures are.1 Allegedly, party leaders exert such pressure by means of
various instruments in order to achieve the highest voting unity possible when party group mem-
bers are in conflict with the party position when voting.2 These instruments encompass threats
(such as losing a parliamentary seat) or promises (such as being offered an attractive position).
Apart from such anecdotes, we have very little systematic knowledge regarding the degree to
which parliamentary party leaders use disciplinary measures to ensure voting unity3.
Corresponding author:
Stefanie Bailer, University of Basel, Bernoullistrasse 14/16, CH-4056 Basel, Switzerland.
Email: stefanie.bailer@unibas.ch
676907IPS0010.1177/0192512116676907International Political Science ReviewBailer
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