`Too many chiefs and not enough chief executives'
| Date | 01 August 2007 |
| Author | Les Johnston,Tom Williamson,Mark Button |
| Published date | 01 August 2007 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1748895807078869 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
287-306 CRJ-078869.qxd 2/7/07 4:05 PM Page 287
Criminology & Criminal Justice
© 2007 SAGE Publications
(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore)
and the British Society of Criminology.
www.sagepublications.com
ISSN 1748–8958; Vol: 7(3): 287–305
DOI: 10.1177/1748895807078869
‘Too many chiefs and not enough chief
executives’:
Barriers to the development of PFI in the police service
in England and Wales
M A R K B U T T O N , T O M W I L L I A M S O N * A N D L E S J O H N S T O N
University of Portsmouth, UK
Abstract
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has proved to be one of the most
controversial policies of the Labour government. Indeed, despite
opposition from core government support groups New Labour has
still been keen to promote PFI. In some parts of the public sector this
had led to substantial and radical projects being pursued. In the
police service, however, there have been relatively few projects and
most that have emerged have been relatively conservative, restricted
to new buildings with facilities management provision. This article will
examine some of the barriers to the expansion of PFI in the police
service. Central to this is the structure of the police service with
43 constabularies operating within a tripartite structure of governance.
On top of this are cultural issues specific to the police service and to
chief constables, combined with other general barriers. The article will
also examine the new financial prudential code and illustrate that this
may be the ‘final nail in the coffin’ for the PFI in the police service.
Key Words
policing • Private Finance Initiative • privatization
Introduction
In almost all industrialized countries over the last 30 years there have been
increasing pressures on public services to embrace market principles and
2 8 7
287-306 CRJ-078869.qxd 2/7/07 4:05 PM Page 288
288
Criminology & Criminal Justice 7(3)
‘new public management’ (NPM) (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1999). Across the
public sector in England and Wales this has led to increased marketization,
a multiplicity of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and most controversially
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (Horton and Farnham, 1999; Institute of
Public Policy Research, 2001). The PFI has proved to be one of the most
contentious policies under ‘New Labour’: a policy that despite its Conser-
vative origins has been expanded since 1997 against strong opposition from
some Labour backbenchers and trade unions. PFI now accounts for over
700 projects and amounts to over £47 billion in capital value (HM Treasury,
2006). In the police service, however, despite large and radical projects
elsewhere in the criminal justice sector, only 23 PFIs—most of them rela-
tively conservative in approach—have been pursued. Given that the police
service has been subjected to reforms such as Best Value and the Police
Reform Act 2002 which increase pressures for marketization of services
(Jones, 2003); and that the service has embraced many other aspects of the pri-
vatization and marketization agenda (Johnston, 1992; Bryett, 1996; Loader,
1997; Button, 2002; Grabosky, 2004), this article seeks to explain why PFI
has not flourished in the police. Primarily it argues that there are inherent
structural barriers to the PFI. These include the existence of 43 ‘independ-
ent’ constabularies rather than a single ‘police service’; and the unique tri-
partite structure of police governance, that with large-scale procurement of
capital, further inhibits the development of PFIs. Underpinning these struc-
tural factors are the cultures of police, in general and of chief constables, in
particular: cultures that emphasize a conservative approach to procurement
and a reluctance to take risks. These key factors, combined with other bar-
riers including the recent adoption of the Prudential Code for borrowing,
make further police PFIs unlikely unless constabularies are faced with no
alternative funding source. Before these issues are considered in more depth,
however, it is useful to outline the methodology used for this research and
then provide some background information on the emergence and growth
of PFIs, both generally and in the police sector.
Methodology
This article is based upon a larger two-year research project on the PFI in the
police service funded by Venson plc. The broad aim of the project was to
investigate the impact of PFI on the police service, with particular reference
to its penetration, success and implications for governance. The research
included 33 semi-structured interviews conducted with stakeholders in the
police service and in other organizations with an interest in the PFI. These
included chief constables; chief financial officers; police authority members;
police representative associations; trade unions; the National Audit Office
(NAO); Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary; think tanks; account-
ants, consultants and lawyers specializing in PFI among others. The research
also drew upon numerous primary and secondary documentary and other
287-306 CRJ-078869.qxd 2/7/07 4:05 PM Page 289
Button et al.—Barriers to PFI in the police service
289
sources including contracts, trade union documents, Treasury, Public Accounts
Committee and NAO reports, newspaper articles and academic papers. All
documentary items, together with the data from the 33 transcribed inter-
views, were subsequently coded and analysed.
The growth of PFI
The PFI is a policy whereby the public sector has been encouraged to pur-
chase capital items from the private sector. Typically this has encompassed the
private sector designing, building, financing and operating facilities based
upon public sector specifications and requirements. Under these schemes the
private sector contracts with the public sector, often for lengthy contracts
(25 years plus), and the latter commits to regular payments during this period.
The PFI was launched in 1992 by the then Conservative government across
all departments with the aims of increasing private investment in public ser-
vices, stimulating new ideas and creating stronger public–private partnerships
(Allen, 2003). Initially there was limited interest from both the public and pri-
vate sectors and by 1993 only 10 projects had been signed, most of which
were relatively small (Greenaway et al., 2004). In 1994 pressure for PFIs
increased with requirements by the Treasury for PFI to be considered as an
option before approval for capital expenditure was given. Despite increasing
pressure, particularly for the application of PFI in the health sector, there was
still substantial resistance and by May 1997 there had still been no PFI con-
tracts signed in the NHS (Greenaway et al., 2004). The election of ‘New
Labour’ in 1997 did not signal the end of PFI. On the contrary, it became a
central policy of the new Government with a further range of initiatives being
introduced to encourage it. Indeed as Table 1 illustrates, the capital value of
PFI contracts as of March 2006 amounted to over £47 billion; and in the
health sector alone under ‘New Labour’ there have been 149 projects signed
worth over £6.5 billion.
Table 1 also illustrates how PFIs have been concentrated in transport,
health and defence. In the Home Office only 42 PFI projects have been
signed off, of which only 23 relate to the police service. Table 2 shows
details of the current signed contracts for PFI projects within the police. The
nature of these projects ranges from building stock to public-face services
within individual constabularies. Nationally the police radio system is also
gradually being replaced by a more technically advanced, digital system
under a PFI-funded project known as ‘Airwave’.
Private initiative in the delivery of public police services has increased
substantially throughout many countries in the industrialized world and
has been the subject of increasing research (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1987;
Bryett, 1996; Forst and Manning, 1999; Gans, 2000; Grabosky, 2004). The
policy has ranged from the complete privatization of a police service
(O’Leary, 1994), to specific functions (Johnston, 1992) to charging fees for
services (Gans, 2000). The types of functions subjected to privatization
287-306 CRJ-078869.qxd 2/7/07 4:05 PM Page 290
290
Criminology & Criminal Justice 7(3)
Table 1. PFI signed deals by department as at March 2006
Department
Number of signed projects
Capital value (£m)
Transport
51
21,955.6
Health
149
6572
Defence
55
4570.5
Education & Skills
144
4111.9
Scotland
91
2745.4
Work & Pensions
11
1341
Home Office
42
1186.8
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
65
1110.7
Northern Ireland
39
709.4
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
14
650.9
HMRC
10
624.1
Wales
33
555
DCA
14
371.4
Cabinet Office
2
347.7
Culture, Media & Sport
13
212.1
HM Treasury
2
189
Trade & Industry
8
180.8
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
2
91
Crown Prosecution Service
1
26
Office of Government Commerce
1
10
Total 747
47,561.2
Source: HM Treasury (2006)
have been the topic of a number of classifications (see Chaiken and
Chaiken, 1987; Johnston, 1992; Button, 2002), but for the purposes of this
article the distinction drawn in the Posen Inquiry between ‘ancillary’, ‘outer
core’ and ‘inner core’ police functions will be used (Home Office, 1995).
According to Posen ‘inner core’ functions are those that require police powers
and can, therefore, only be delivered by sworn constables. By contrast,
‘outer core’ and ‘ancillary’ functions might be delivered by non-sworn staff
and could therefore be contracted out.
In Figure 1, police service PFI projects are plotted against the degree to
which...
Criminology & Criminal Justice
© 2007 SAGE Publications
(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore)
and the British Society of Criminology.
www.sagepublications.com
ISSN 1748–8958; Vol: 7(3): 287–305
DOI: 10.1177/1748895807078869
‘Too many chiefs and not enough chief
executives’:
Barriers to the development of PFI in the police service
in England and Wales
M A R K B U T T O N , T O M W I L L I A M S O N * A N D L E S J O H N S T O N
University of Portsmouth, UK
Abstract
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has proved to be one of the most
controversial policies of the Labour government. Indeed, despite
opposition from core government support groups New Labour has
still been keen to promote PFI. In some parts of the public sector this
had led to substantial and radical projects being pursued. In the
police service, however, there have been relatively few projects and
most that have emerged have been relatively conservative, restricted
to new buildings with facilities management provision. This article will
examine some of the barriers to the expansion of PFI in the police
service. Central to this is the structure of the police service with
43 constabularies operating within a tripartite structure of governance.
On top of this are cultural issues specific to the police service and to
chief constables, combined with other general barriers. The article will
also examine the new financial prudential code and illustrate that this
may be the ‘final nail in the coffin’ for the PFI in the police service.
Key Words
policing • Private Finance Initiative • privatization
Introduction
In almost all industrialized countries over the last 30 years there have been
increasing pressures on public services to embrace market principles and
2 8 7
287-306 CRJ-078869.qxd 2/7/07 4:05 PM Page 288
288
Criminology & Criminal Justice 7(3)
‘new public management’ (NPM) (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1999). Across the
public sector in England and Wales this has led to increased marketization,
a multiplicity of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and most controversially
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (Horton and Farnham, 1999; Institute of
Public Policy Research, 2001). The PFI has proved to be one of the most
contentious policies under ‘New Labour’: a policy that despite its Conser-
vative origins has been expanded since 1997 against strong opposition from
some Labour backbenchers and trade unions. PFI now accounts for over
700 projects and amounts to over £47 billion in capital value (HM Treasury,
2006). In the police service, however, despite large and radical projects
elsewhere in the criminal justice sector, only 23 PFIs—most of them rela-
tively conservative in approach—have been pursued. Given that the police
service has been subjected to reforms such as Best Value and the Police
Reform Act 2002 which increase pressures for marketization of services
(Jones, 2003); and that the service has embraced many other aspects of the pri-
vatization and marketization agenda (Johnston, 1992; Bryett, 1996; Loader,
1997; Button, 2002; Grabosky, 2004), this article seeks to explain why PFI
has not flourished in the police. Primarily it argues that there are inherent
structural barriers to the PFI. These include the existence of 43 ‘independ-
ent’ constabularies rather than a single ‘police service’; and the unique tri-
partite structure of police governance, that with large-scale procurement of
capital, further inhibits the development of PFIs. Underpinning these struc-
tural factors are the cultures of police, in general and of chief constables, in
particular: cultures that emphasize a conservative approach to procurement
and a reluctance to take risks. These key factors, combined with other bar-
riers including the recent adoption of the Prudential Code for borrowing,
make further police PFIs unlikely unless constabularies are faced with no
alternative funding source. Before these issues are considered in more depth,
however, it is useful to outline the methodology used for this research and
then provide some background information on the emergence and growth
of PFIs, both generally and in the police sector.
Methodology
This article is based upon a larger two-year research project on the PFI in the
police service funded by Venson plc. The broad aim of the project was to
investigate the impact of PFI on the police service, with particular reference
to its penetration, success and implications for governance. The research
included 33 semi-structured interviews conducted with stakeholders in the
police service and in other organizations with an interest in the PFI. These
included chief constables; chief financial officers; police authority members;
police representative associations; trade unions; the National Audit Office
(NAO); Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary; think tanks; account-
ants, consultants and lawyers specializing in PFI among others. The research
also drew upon numerous primary and secondary documentary and other
287-306 CRJ-078869.qxd 2/7/07 4:05 PM Page 289
Button et al.—Barriers to PFI in the police service
289
sources including contracts, trade union documents, Treasury, Public Accounts
Committee and NAO reports, newspaper articles and academic papers. All
documentary items, together with the data from the 33 transcribed inter-
views, were subsequently coded and analysed.
The growth of PFI
The PFI is a policy whereby the public sector has been encouraged to pur-
chase capital items from the private sector. Typically this has encompassed the
private sector designing, building, financing and operating facilities based
upon public sector specifications and requirements. Under these schemes the
private sector contracts with the public sector, often for lengthy contracts
(25 years plus), and the latter commits to regular payments during this period.
The PFI was launched in 1992 by the then Conservative government across
all departments with the aims of increasing private investment in public ser-
vices, stimulating new ideas and creating stronger public–private partnerships
(Allen, 2003). Initially there was limited interest from both the public and pri-
vate sectors and by 1993 only 10 projects had been signed, most of which
were relatively small (Greenaway et al., 2004). In 1994 pressure for PFIs
increased with requirements by the Treasury for PFI to be considered as an
option before approval for capital expenditure was given. Despite increasing
pressure, particularly for the application of PFI in the health sector, there was
still substantial resistance and by May 1997 there had still been no PFI con-
tracts signed in the NHS (Greenaway et al., 2004). The election of ‘New
Labour’ in 1997 did not signal the end of PFI. On the contrary, it became a
central policy of the new Government with a further range of initiatives being
introduced to encourage it. Indeed as Table 1 illustrates, the capital value of
PFI contracts as of March 2006 amounted to over £47 billion; and in the
health sector alone under ‘New Labour’ there have been 149 projects signed
worth over £6.5 billion.
Table 1 also illustrates how PFIs have been concentrated in transport,
health and defence. In the Home Office only 42 PFI projects have been
signed off, of which only 23 relate to the police service. Table 2 shows
details of the current signed contracts for PFI projects within the police. The
nature of these projects ranges from building stock to public-face services
within individual constabularies. Nationally the police radio system is also
gradually being replaced by a more technically advanced, digital system
under a PFI-funded project known as ‘Airwave’.
Private initiative in the delivery of public police services has increased
substantially throughout many countries in the industrialized world and
has been the subject of increasing research (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1987;
Bryett, 1996; Forst and Manning, 1999; Gans, 2000; Grabosky, 2004). The
policy has ranged from the complete privatization of a police service
(O’Leary, 1994), to specific functions (Johnston, 1992) to charging fees for
services (Gans, 2000). The types of functions subjected to privatization
287-306 CRJ-078869.qxd 2/7/07 4:05 PM Page 290
290
Criminology & Criminal Justice 7(3)
Table 1. PFI signed deals by department as at March 2006
Department
Number of signed projects
Capital value (£m)
Transport
51
21,955.6
Health
149
6572
Defence
55
4570.5
Education & Skills
144
4111.9
Scotland
91
2745.4
Work & Pensions
11
1341
Home Office
42
1186.8
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
65
1110.7
Northern Ireland
39
709.4
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
14
650.9
HMRC
10
624.1
Wales
33
555
DCA
14
371.4
Cabinet Office
2
347.7
Culture, Media & Sport
13
212.1
HM Treasury
2
189
Trade & Industry
8
180.8
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
2
91
Crown Prosecution Service
1
26
Office of Government Commerce
1
10
Total 747
47,561.2
Source: HM Treasury (2006)
have been the topic of a number of classifications (see Chaiken and
Chaiken, 1987; Johnston, 1992; Button, 2002), but for the purposes of this
article the distinction drawn in the Posen Inquiry between ‘ancillary’, ‘outer
core’ and ‘inner core’ police functions will be used (Home Office, 1995).
According to Posen ‘inner core’ functions are those that require police powers
and can, therefore, only be delivered by sworn constables. By contrast,
‘outer core’ and ‘ancillary’ functions might be delivered by non-sworn staff
and could therefore be contracted out.
In Figure 1, police service PFI projects are plotted against the degree to
which...
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