Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116520934865 |
| Author | Frank M Häge,Nils Ringe |
| Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Published date | 01 December 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Top-down or bottom-up?
The selection of shadow
rapporteurs in the
European Parliament
Frank M H€
age
Department of Politics and Public Administration, University
of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland
Nils Ringe
Department of Political Science, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
Abstract
Shadow rapporteurs play an important role in developing the European Parliament’s
collective policy positions and in defending them in inter-institutional negotiations. This
study sheds light on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of shadow rapporteur selection. Qualitative
insights from practitioner interviews and a quantitative analysis of shadow rapporteur
data from the 7th European Parliament (2009–2014) indicate that the appointment
process is primarily one of bottom-up self-selection by group members based on
their policy interests. The party group leadership, in the form of group coordinators,
plays an important coordinating role when there is competition for a shadow rappor-
teurship. However, the role of group coordinators is more akin to a third-party arbiter
of competing demands than a mechanism of top-down control by the leadership, as
suggested by principal-agent theory.
Keywords
Delegation, European Parliament, principal-agent theory, self-selection, shadow
rapporteurs
Corresponding author:
Frank M H€
age, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick, Foundation Building
F1-019, Limerick, Ireland.
Email: frank.haege@ul.ie
European Union Politics
2020, Vol. 21(4) 706–727
!The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116520934865
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Introduction
This study examines the selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European
Parliament (EP), who serve as their party groups’ primary negotiators of particular
legislative proposals, making them highly consequential political actors with dis-
proportionate influence over the content of legislation. Despite their important
role, however, little is known about the allocation of shadow rapporteurships.
We demonstrate, using both quantitative and qualitative data, that shadow rap-
porteurs are not selected in a top-down process by the party group leadership;
instead, shadow rapporteurships are allocated primarily through a bottom-up pro-
cess in which members of the EP (MEPs) self-select to become shadow
rapporteurs.
Each legislative proposal drafted by the European Commission is assigned a
rapporteur in the EP’s lead committee, who drafts its official report of proposed
amendments, shepherds the legislation through the law-making process, and serves
as Parliament’s main negotiator in inter-institutional bargaining. Rapporteurs are
selected in an ‘auction’ in which the leaders of each party group in the responsible
committee (who are called coordinators) bid on reports using ‘points’ they receive
according to the proportion of seats they hold, meaning that only one EP party
group can secure a rapporteurship. To avoid having a single partisan actor dom-
inate the legislative process, the other party groups may select one of their own to
monitor the work of the rapporteur and negotiate on their behalf. Together with
the rapporteur, these shadow rapporteurs ‘practically constitute informal sub-com-
mittees’ (Corbett et al., 2011: 159) that take the lead in negotiating particular pieces
of legislation in the responsible EP committee. As such, they have the capacity to
influence decision-making inside their party groups, the inter-party negotiations on
the content of the collective position of the EP, and the EP’s inter-institutional
bargaining process with the Council of Ministers.
Existing research recognises and highlights the influence of shadow rapporteurs
in EU law-making. Jensen and Winzen (2012) show that rapporteur and shadow
rapporteurs form the core of a highly hierarchical cooperation network in the EP.
Ripoll Servant and Panning (2019) demonstrate how meetings of the rapporteur
and the shadow rapporteurs are instrumental in developing and negotiating their
EP committees’ positions. Judge and Earnshaw (2011) reveal how a coalition of
shadow rapporteurs side-lined a recalcitrant rapporteur in inter-institutional nego-
tiations with the Council. Ringe (2010) shows that rapporteurs and shadow rap-
porteurs not only decisively influence the substance of legislation; they also shape
their party colleagues’ voting behaviour by framing its content and consequences.
Hence, it is no surprise that shadow rapporteurs are recognised by the Council
Presidency as important contacts to pursue and utilise in the EU legislative process
(Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015: 1156) and that observers of EP politics
recognise them as prominent actors with significant sway over policy outcomes
(e.g. Hurka et al., 2015).
H€
age and Ringe 707
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