Torture and the limits of democratic institutions
| Author | Will H Moore,Courtenay R Conrad,Daniel W Hill |
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343317711240 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Regular Articles
Torture and the limits of democratic institutions
Courtenay R Conrad
Department of Political Science, University of California, Merced
Daniel W Hill Jr
Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia
Will H Moore
Department of Political Science, Arizona State University
Abstract
What are the limits of democracy’s positive influence on human rights? In this article, we argue that contested
elections and powerful courts provide leaders with different incentives with regard to hiding torture. Because
government torture is generally targeted at individuals that voters find threatening, institutions that reflect public
opinion – like electoral contestation – are associated with higher levels of government abuse that leave scars on the
victim’s body. Other institutions – like powerful courts – protect the rights of political minorities. Leaders in
countries with powerful courts prefer plausible deniability of rights violations and consequently employ higher levels
of clean torture, which leaves no scars. We test our hypotheses using data from the Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT)
Data Collection Project that distinguish between Amnesty International (AI) allegations of scarring and clean torture.
We employ an undercount negative binomial that accounts for AI’s (in)ability to obtain information about torture.
The model assumes that some incidents of torture go unreported and allows the extent of underreporting to vary
across countries/years. Estimates from the model yield considerable statistical and substantive support for
our hypotheses.
Keywords
courts, elections, human rights, institutions, torture
Introduction
Although democratic institutions limit government coer-
cion (e.g. Poe & Tate, 1994; Landman, 2005; Daven-
port, 2007b,a), one form of abuse – government torture
– remains common across autocracies and democracies
(Amnesty International, 2014b: 6). The word torture
invokes images of medieval horrors, but the reality of
government violations of the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture (CAT) is more banal; beating is the
most common form of abuse.
1
Our study focuses on two
distinguishable forms of torture: scarring techniques,
which leave marks on the victim’s body, and clean tactics
that do not leave marks on the victim. This distinction
has theoretical value for illuminating the Madisonian
tension between majority rule and securing the rights
of minority political factions from tyranny of the major-
ity (Dahl, 1963).
2
Why? Because scarring techniques
limit the government’s ability to plausibly deny abuse
Corresponding author:
cconrad2@ucmerced.edu
1
Consider, for example, the well-known police beatings in the
United States of Rodney King and Abner Louima or the Homans
Center abuses recently settl ed by the city of Chicago. We define
torture to explicitly include such violations of the CAT below.
2
See, especially, Dahl’s (1963: 13) sixth hypothesis: ‘frequent
popular elections wil l not provide an external check sufficient to
prevent tyranny’. Madison proposes h is well-known separation of
powers via parchment institutions to address the tyranny problem
while still preserving majority rule.
Journal of Peace Research
2018, Vol. 55(1) 3–17
ªThe Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343317711240
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