Towards a liberalisation of standing conditions for individuals seeking judicial review of Community acts: Jégo‐Quéré et Cie SA v Commission and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council
| Date | 01 January 2003 |
| Published date | 01 January 2003 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.6601007 |
| Author | Marie‐Pierre Granger |
Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for
Individuals Seeking Judicial Review of Community
Acts: Je
´go-Que
´re
´et Cie SA vCommission and Unio
´n
de Pequen
˜os Agricultores vCouncil
Marie-Pierre Granger
n
Background
The concept of ‘individual concern’, the main admissibility requirement for actions
brought by individual applicants for the annulment of Community acts not
addressed to them under Article 130 EC, has traditionally been inter-
preted restrictively by the Community courts, thereby constituting a nearly
insurmountable obstacle for individuals seeking judicial review of Community acts
of general application. In a recent decision, the CFI, referring to the newly adopted
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 47 on the right to an effective judicial
remedy), proposed a new and more liberal interpretation of that requirement,
thereby widening access to judicial review for individuals, companies and
representative groups. The Court of Justice has not followed up, but seems to leave
the door open for further developments towards a liberalisation of standing
conditions.
Standing issues in a Communaute
´de Droit
The rules regulating the standing of individuals for challenging the validity of
Community acts of general application (ie regulations or directives), as they result
from Article 230 (4) of the EC Treaty and from its restrictive interpretation by the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (Court of Justice) and the Court of
First Instance (CFI), have made it virtually impossible for private applicants
(ie natural and legal persons) to contest the validity of such administrative or
legislative acts.
1
Commentators have overall been critical of this situation,
2
but
n
Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Exeter.
1 Community law does not distinguish between legislative and administrative acts. While directives
are usually considered as legislative instruments, and decisions as individual administrative
measures, regulations, for example, can be either legislative or administrative in nature or even
hybrid documents, both administrative and legislative (Advocate General Warner’s Opinion in C-
113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd & Others v Council and Commission; C-120/77 Koyo Seiko Co
Ltd & Others v Council and Commission and C-121/77 Nachi Fujikoshi Corporation v Council [Ball
bearing cases] [1979] ECR 1185, 1245–1246).
2 See inter alia H. Rasmussen, ‘Why is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private Plaintiffs?’ (1980) 5
ELRev 112; A. Arnull, ‘Private applicants and the action for annulment under Article 173 of the
EC Treaty’ (1995) CMLRev 7 and ‘Private applicants and the action for annulment since
Codornı
´u’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 7; D. Walbroeck and A.-M. Verheyden, ‘Les conditions de
recevabilite
´des recours en annulation des particuliers contre les actes normatifs communautaires:
a
`la lumie
`re du droit compare
´et de la Convention des Droits de l’Homme (1995) CDE 399;
Vandersanden, ‘Pour un e
´largissement du droit des particuliers d’agir en annulation contre les
actes autres que les de
´cisions qui leur sont adresse
´es’ (1995); C. Harding, ‘The Private Interest in
Challenging Community Action’ (1980) 5 ELRev 354; C. Harlow, ‘Towards a Theory of Access
for the European Court of Justice’ (1992) 12 YEL 213; N. Neuwahl, ‘Article 173 paragraph 4 EC:
The Modern Law Review [Vol. 66
124 rThe Modern Law Review Limited 2003
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