Towards the Control of Private Acts by the European Court of Human Rights?
| Published date | 01 June 2006 |
| Date | 01 June 2006 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1023263X0601300203 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
TOWARDS THE CONTROL OF
PRIVATE ACTS BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS?
OLHA CHEREDNYCHENKO*
ABSTRACT
This contribution critically analyzes the current approach by the European Court of Human
Rights to the applicability of fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on
Human Rights to private acts. It explores the recent case law of the Court primarily through
the case of Appleby and Others v. The United Kingdom (Appleby)
1
and the case of Pla and
Puncernau v. Andorra (Pla)
2
, looking at its implications for the relationships between
private parties under the private law of the States parties to the Convention and, in
particular, the role of the doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’ in limiting the control of
private acts by the Court as to their compatibility with fundamental rights.
Keywords: European Court of Human Rights, Horizontal effect, Appleby,Pla
§1. INTRODUCTION
Originally, as an aspect of public law, fundamental rights were applicable only in vertical
relationships between individuals and the state. Being conceived as individuals’ defences
against the vigilant eye of the state, in principle, fundamental rights did not have any
effect on horizontal relationships between private parties governed by private law.
However, with the passing of time, it has become more and more difficult to draw a strict
line between the world of fundamental rights and that of private law, in the same way as it
has become increasingly difficult to draw such a line between public and private law in
13 MJ 2 (2006) 195
* LL. M. Magna Cum Laude, currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Molengraaff Institute for Private Law,
University of Utrecht, the Netherlands.
1
Appleby and Others v. The United Kingdom (2003), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-VI.
2
Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, Application no. 69498/01, Judgement of 13 July 2004.
196 13 MJ 2 (2006)
general. Gradually, horizontal relationships between private parties have begun losing
their immunity from the effect of fundamental rights. No longer viewed as a comple tely
closed autonomous system for governing relationships between private parties, private
law has been opened up to the far-reaching impact of fundamental rights or, in other
words, to its constitutionalization.
Until recently, the tendency towards the constitutionalization of private law has
primarily manifested itself in the national law of many countries as a result of the
readiness of their domestic courts to grant effect to fundamental rights embodied in
national constitutions and international human rights instruments in purely private law
disputes.
3
Thus, for example, under the guidance of the Federal Constitutional Court, in
Germany fundamental rights enshrined in the national constitution have had a profound
impact on purely private law relationships for more than half a century.
4
Yet, an
interesting perspective on the issue is also provided by international human rights law, in
particular, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which may impose its
own standards with regard to the way in which private law and fundamental rights are to
Olha Cherednychenko
3
Many authors have remarked upon the events that are taking place in this field and have speculated on
future developments. For the Netherlands, see, for instance, E.A. Alkema, De reikwijdte van fundamentele
rechten: de nationale en internationale dimensies: preadvies voor de Nederlandse Juristenvereiniging, 1995-I,
22 ff.; J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘De Constitutie van het burgerlijk recht’, 6 Rechtsgeleerd magazijn Themis 203
(2000); F.W. Grosheide, ‘Constitutionalisering van het burgerlijk recht?’, 3 Contracteren 48 (2001); C.
Mak, ‘Personality Rights in the Dutch and German Law of Obligations’, in M.W. Hesselink, C.E. du
Perrson, and A.F. Salomons (eds.), Privaatrecht tussen autonomie en solidariteit, (Den Haag: Boom
Juridische uitgevers, 2003), 169; J. Smits, Constitutionalisering van het vermogensrecht: preadvies
uitgebracht voor de Nederlandse Vereiniging voor Rechtsverhelijking’, (Deventer: Kluwer, 2003); O.
Cherednychenko, ‘The Constitutionalization of Contract Law: Something New under the Sun?’, 8:1
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (2004), http://www.ejcl.org/81/art81-3.html; T. Barkhuysen, M.L.
van Emmerik, and H.D. Ploeger, De eigendomsbescherming van artikel 1 van het Eerste Protocol bij het
EVRM en het Nederlandse burgerlijk recht: Preadviezen voor de Vereiniging voor Burgerlijk Recht,
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2005); S.D. Lindenbergh, ‘Constitutionalisering van contractenrecht. Over de
werking van fundamentele rechten in contractuele verhoudingen’, 6602 Weekblad voor Privaatrecht,
Notariaat en Registratie 977 (2004); B.J. de Vos, ‘Constitutionalisering: een overschat vraagstuk?’, in E.M.
Hoogervorst et al (eds.), Rechtseenheid en vermogensrecht, (Deventer: Kluwer, 2005), 287. For Germany,
see, for example, C. Starck, ‘Human Rights and Private Law in German Constitutional Development and
in the Jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court’ and A. Heldrich and G.M. Rehm, ‘Importing
Constitutional Values through Blanket Clauses’, in D. Friedmann and D. Barak-Erez (eds.), Human
Rights in Private Law, (Hart Publishing, 2001), 97, 113, with further references. For the UK, see, for
example, H. Beale and N. Pittam, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on English Tort and
Contract Law’ and R. Ellger, ‘The European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and German Private Law’, in Friedmann and Barak-Erez, 131, 161, with further references.
4
Since the famous pronouncement by the Constitutional Court in the Lu
¨th case (BVerfG 15 January 1958,
BVerfGE 7, 198, at 205), in which constitutional rights were held to constitute an objective system of
values, no rule of German private law may be in conflict with constitutional values, and all such rules
must be construed in a way that gives effect to these values. See also the famous pronouncements by the
Constitutional Court in the Handelsvertreter case (BVerfG 7 February 1990, BVerfGE 81, 242), and the
Bu
¨rgschaft case (BVerfG 19 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 214).
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