Transformative agency and desistance from crime
| Author | Sam King |
| DOI | 10.1177/1748895812452282 |
| Published date | 01 July 2013 |
| Date | 01 July 2013 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Criminology & Criminal Justice
13(3) 317 –335
© The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/1748895812452282
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Transformative agency and
desistance from crime
Sam King
University of Derby, UK
Abstract
This article provides a discussion of human agency, conceptualized as a transformative aspect
of desistance from crime. It is argued here that existing conceptualizations of agency are vague
or underexplored, and that a framework based upon the work of Emirbayer and Mische (1998)
offers a more comprehensive overview of the manner in which individuals approach desistance.
This follows other recent work (for example, Paternoster and Bushway, 2009), in arguing that
desistance involves the envisioning of an alternative future identity, and that this is one aspect of
agency in the desistance process. However, it is argued here that the deployment of such agency
is conditioned by social context and that this delimits the range of future possibilities available.
This is illustrated with two cases as examples from recent research in this area.
Keywords
Agency, desistance, identity, individualization, reflexivity, strategies
Introduction
Many recent accounts have suggested that desistance from crime involves an interplay
between agency and the socio-structural context within which the individual lives
(Bottoms et al., 2004; Farrall and Bowling, 1999; Farrall and Calverley, 2006; Giordano
et al., 2002). However, despite this recent focus within the literature, accounts of agency
remain vague and under-explored (Healy, 2010), and there has been relatively little atten-
tion paid towards the effect of changing socio-structural contexts (Farrall et al., 2010).
Furthermore, the exact configuration and interaction of individual and structural factors
is uncertain. LeBel et al. (2008) outline three possible models to explain this interplay.
Within ‘strong-subjective’ models of desistance the emphasis is upon the motivation and
Corresponding author:
Sam King, School of Law and Criminology, University of Derby, Kedleston Road, Derby, DE22 1GB, UK.
Email: s.king@derby.ac.uk
452282CRJ13310.1177/1748895812452282KingCriminology & Criminal Justice
2012
Article
318 Criminology & Criminal Justice 13(3)
willpower of the individual concerned: ‘One need only decide to change and envision a
new identity for oneself in order to go straight’ (LeBel et al., 2008: 138). However, this
proposition suggests a concession to voluntarism, implying that individuals are capable
of transforming or reproducing their social environment with free will, which is not the
case (Elder-Vass, 2007: 26). On the other hand, ‘strong social’ models of desistance
emphasize the importance of life-course turning points, such as marriage or employment,
and ‘it is the arrival of these events, which are largely outside of an individual’s control,
that will best predict success … rather than the mindset of the individual’ (LeBel et al.,
2008: 139). Similarly, Farrall and Bowling (1999), drawing upon structuration theory,
argued that ‘critical situations’ can have an effect on providing the structural changes
which could precede desistance from crime. Several authors have argued that interac-
tional models of desistance may offer the most effective explanations of desistance (for
example Farrall, 2002; Maguire and Raynor, 2006; McNeill, 2003; McNeill and Whyte,
2007). LeBel et al. (2008) conclude by suggesting that a ‘subjective-social model’, offers
the best explanation of desistance from crime. They argue that ‘subjective changes may
precede life-changing structural events and, to that extent, individuals can act as agents
of their own change’ (2008: 155). In this regard it can be argued that human agency
includes qualities of ‘transformational power’ (Simmonds, 1989: 187), such that indi-
viduals can exert some degree of control over the future direction of their lives.
However, any account of human action needs to give proper consideration to agency,
but also needs to account for the role of structure in enabling or constraining that action
(Marshall, 2005: 69). Explanations of desistance should also incorporate an understand-
ing of both social and subjective factors. Indeed, McNeill and Whyte (2007) argue that
desistance will be more likely if there is correspondence between social and subjective
factors, each moving away from crime, but that desistance will be less likely if there is
dissonance between these areas. They suggest that the more common experience would
be some correspondence and some dissonance between each area (2007: 148). An indi-
vidual may be motivated and determined to move away from a criminal lifestyle, but
may lack employment opportunities or pro-social relationships at that time in their life.
Conversely, an individual may have access to potentially life-changing social bonds
(what Giordano et al. (2002) refer to as ‘hooks for change’), but may lack the necessary
attitudes or motivation to take advantage of these.
The central challenge for would-be desisters, therefore, is to develop the necessary
strategies that will assist them in developing their personal and social contexts in ways
that will enable them to move away from crime and (re)integrate into mainstream soci-
ety. This article proceeds from this starting point, and seeks to offer an explanatory
account of how individuals develop these strategies and the effect that this has upon the
actual behaviour that individuals enact. The article begins by exploring how it is possible
to conceptualize desistance from crime as beginning with particular intentions for the
future. These intentions may frequently entail the envisaging of a new identity, one
which is different from the past self. The article then proceeds to a discussion of the dif-
ficulties associated with agency in relation to processes of individualization within a
context of structural uncertainty. It is argued here that desistance from crime necessitates
a particular temporal orientation of agency which allows the individual to conceive of the
future in positive and efficacious terms. In order to achieve this, the article draws upon
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