Transitional Justice as Elite Justice? Compromise Justice and Transition in Tunisia
| Author | Hannah Pannwitz,Christopher K. Lamont |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12291 |
| Published date | 01 May 2016 |
| Date | 01 May 2016 |
Transitional Justice as Elite Justice?
Compromise Justice and Transition in Tunisia
Christopher K. Lamont
University of Groningen
Hannah Pannwitz
University of Oxford
Abstract
This article reflects upon the ways in which transitional justice debates and processes impacted Tunisia’s transition. It explores
key questions such as what demands for justice emerged in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution? Did Tunisia’s transitional
justice process reflect these demands? And, did international norms of transitional justice, which emerged from a field of prac-
tice that draws heavily upon European, Latin America and Sub-Saharan experiences, but has largely excluded the Arab Middle
East, serve to mediate between competing demands for justice in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution? It will be argued
that transitional justice demands in Tunisia reflected a breakdown in the state–society socioeconomic bargain, which had
maintained autocratic regimes since independence in 1956; however, due to the elite-centred nature of transitional justice dis-
courses, many transitional justice demands never resonated into mainstream transitional justice discourse. We will argue that
international transitional justice entrepreneurs’attempt to import a normative framework that was ill suited to grapple with
the complex legacies of socioeconomic marginalization, resulted in a growing disillusionment and disengagement from the
state driven transitional justice process on the part of Tunisian society.
Tunisia’s 2011 revolution, which witnessed the ouster of Zine
al-Abidine Ben Ali, is commonly heralded as the Arab Spring’s
singular success story in the context of ongoing conflicts in
Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, a counterrevolutionary coup in
Egypt and continuing repression in Bahrain. However, despite
having successfully held national parliamentary elections in
October 2014, and a final round of presidential elections in
December 2014, Tunisia’s turbulent transition bore witness to
an elite instrumentalization of transitional justice, resulting in
stalled attempts to deal with the legacy of past abuses and
polarization among competing political projects that advance
disparate visions of a post-Ben Ali state. We argue the political
instrumentalization of transitional justice, which was also
observed by Subotic in the former Yugoslavia (2009), is symp-
tomatic of transitional justice constituting an elite discourse.
And furthermore, this elite discourse is in turn framed by an
international normative and legal framework that finds diffi-
culty in giving voice to the marginalized communities that
transitional justice aspires to empower.
At the same time, Tunisia’s transition has also been
marked by a considerable degree of intra-elite compromise
between previously repressed opposition movements, such
as the Islamist Ennahdha party, and elites within the former
ruling party, the Rally for Constitutional Democracy (RCD).
Paradoxically, it is this intra-elite compromise, which both
explains the apparent success of Tunisia’s largely nonviolent
political transition and the failure to address many of the
grievances, such as unemployment, that brought about the
2011 revolution in the first place.
This article will reflect upon on how transitional justice
debates and processes impacted Tunisia’s transition. Ques-
tions that will guide this essay include: What demands for
justice emerged in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution?
Did Tunisia’s transitional justice process reflect these
demands? And, did international norms of transitional jus-
tice, which emerged from a field of practice that draws
heavily upon European, Latin America and Sub-Saharan
experiences, but has largely excluded the Arab Middle East,
serve to mediate between competing demands for justice in
the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution? Here we will argue
that transitional justice demands in Tunisia emerged from a
breakdown in the state-society socioeconomic bargain,
which had buttressed Tunisia’s autocratic regimes since
independence in 1956; however, due to the elite nature of
transitional justice discourses, many transitional justice
demands never resonated into mainstream transitional jus-
tice discourse. To be sure, we will argue that international
transitional justice entrepreneurs’attempt to import a nor-
mative framework that was ill suited to grapple with the
complex legacies of socioeconomic marginalization (Arbour,
2007, pp. 1–27) coupled with elite compromises that served
to weaken transitional justice, resulted in a growing disillu-
sionment and disengagement from the state driven transi-
tional justice process on the part of Tunisian society.
©2016 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2016) 7:2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12291
Global Policy Volume 7 . Issue 2 . May 2016
278
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