Truth and Demeanour: Lifting the Veil
Date | 01 May 2014 |
DOI | 10.3366/elr.2014.0208 |
Pages | 254-259 |
Author | Donald Nicolson |
Published date | 01 May 2014 |
In September last year Judge Peter Murphy upheld a request by a Muslim female accused at Blackfriars crown court in London to be permitted to wear a niqab (a veil which shields all but the wearer's eyes) in court on the ground that her religion prevented her being seen by men in public. S Hickey, “Judge refuses to let Muslim defendant wear burqa in court”, The Guardian 23 August 2013, available at
Inevitably the decision led to much media comment and debate, with Kenneth Clarke MP lending his support to the judge, M Weaver, “Ban court witnesses from giving evidence in veil, says Ken Clarke”, The Guardian O Boycott, “Veils in court: judges to be given guidance, says lord chief justice” The Guardian 5 November 2013, available at Jeremy Browne MP. See “Lib Dem minister calls for debate on Islamic veil”, The Guardian 16 September 2013, available at
The idea that fact-finders need to observe witness demeanour is an ancient one
A Blumenthal, “A wipe of the hands, a lick of the lips: the validity of demeanor evidence in assessing witness credibility’ (1993) 72 Nebraska L Rev 1157 at 1158.
and underpins two central aspects of the Anglo-American procedural model. The first is the principle of orality, which requires all evidence to be spoken to live in court by a witness (which, in turn, partly explains the rule excluding hearsay evidence in criminal cases). The second is the idea that there should only be a very limited right of appeal on factual decisions from trial courts. As the House of Lords stated inUnreported (1911), cited in...
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