Two Approaches To Disarmament : the Legalist and the Structuralist
| Published date | 01 June 1967 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336700400205 |
| Date | 01 June 1967 |
| Author | Johan Galtung |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
TWO
APPROACHES
TO
DISARMAMENT :
THE
LEGALIST
AND
THE
STRUCTURALIST*
By
JOHAN
GALTUNG
International
Peace
Research
Institute,
Oslo
1.
Introduction
A
basic
and
well-known
factor
in
con-
temporary
international
politics
is
the
lack
of
correspondence
between
steps
towards
disarmament
and
the
number
of
disarma-
ment
conferences.’
The
latter
is
increasing,
sometimes
quickly,
sometimes
slowly;
but
disarmament
is
not
increasing.
In
some
periods
the
rate
of
growth
of
the
level
of
armament
is
decreasing
or
kept
stable,
but
it is
difficult
to
discover
any
disarmament
as
a
result of
the
conferences.
This
leads
to
the
question
why,
and
at
this
point
there
may
be
several
schools
where
the
answer
is
concerned:
The
insincerity
theory -
the
conferences
are
never
intended
to
lead
to
disarma-
ment,
they
are
shows
put
on
to
lure
the
gullible
in
one’s
own
party,
the
other
party
and
the
public
at
large.
Hence
con-
ference
behavior
is
carefully
calculated
to
demonstrate
acceptance
of
the
value
of
dis-
armament
yet
never
arrive
at
agreement.
The
powerlessness
theory
-
even
if
the
participants
are
sincere
and
reach
an
agreement,
the
coupling
between
the
ma-
chineries
for
armament
and
for
disarma-
ment
and
for
disarmament
is
so
weak
that
agreements
will
not
be
implemented.
Since
the
parties
know
this
there
is
mutual
in-
terest
in
avoiding
agreement.
The
difficulty
theory
-
even
if
the
partici-
pants
are
sincere
the
problems
involved
are
so
difficult
that
even
with
the
best
of
minds
and
the
best
of
will
it
becomes
dif-
ficult
to
arrive
at
a
solution.
The
communication
theory
-
the
partici-
pants
are
not
interested
in
disarmament
but
in
communicating
postures
and
points
of
view
that
may or
may
not
have
a
stabilizing
effect
on
the
total
armament
situation.
Hence
there
is
much
and
meaningful
talk,
but
no
agreement.
The
disagreement
theory
-
the
parties
do
not
arrive
at
a
solution
simply
because
they
disagree
too
much.
This
disagree-
ment
may
have
semantic
components
in
addition
to
underlying
conflicts
of
interest.
Clearly,
these
theories
do
not
exclude
each
other -
they
may
all
be
true
or
all
be
false
for
that
matter;
and
there
may
be
other
theories.
Since
we
do
not
have
the
kind
of
data
that
perhaps
might
lay
a
basis
for
a
choice
between
the
theories
or
for
appropriate
weighting
of
them
we
shall
have
to
proceed
by
assumptions.
Briefly
stated,
our
assumptions
are
that
participants
are
by
and
large
sincere;
that
the
problem
is
difficult
but
not
more
diffi-
cult
than
many
other
problems
mankind
has
faced;
that
an
agreement
once
arrived
at
could
be
implemented;
that
the
con-
ferences
are
used
for
other
purposes
as
well
but
that
this facilitates
rather
than im-
pedes
steps
towards
disarmament.
How-
ever,
disagreements
are
as
real
or
more
real
than
the
common
interests
in
ob-
taining
agreement.
But
from
this
it
does
not
follow
that
disagreement
East-West
is
necessarily
the
only
fruitful
point
of
de-
parture
for
the
analysis
of
the
disarma-
ment
debate.
There
is,
of
course,
also
the
fundamental
controversy
between
three
groups:
armers,
the
status
quo
people
and
the
disarmers.2
But
we
are
only
concerned
with
the
latter,
i.e.
with
people
who
for
some
reason
want
a
reduction
in
military
capabilities.
At
the
surface
of
the
debate,
some
clear
de-
marcation
lines
can
be
seen:
162
absolutists
vs.
(disarmament
in
all
countries
of
all
weapons,
as
quickly
as
possible)
unilateralists
vs.
(one
side
starts
disarmament
uncondi-
tionally)
inspection first
vs.
(inspection
first,
then
disarmament,
gradually)
confidence first
vs.
(build
up
mutual
trust,
then
disarm)
explicit
agreement
vs.
(disarm
according
to
plan
made
public
and
agreed
upon)
Other
dividing
principles
could
have
been
mentioned,
some
of
them
subdivisions
of
the
principles
above
(particularly
by
looking
more
closely
at
the
inspection/con-
trol
issue),
and
some
of
them
independent
of
the
issues
above.
On
some
of
these
issues
East
and
West
agree,
on
some
of
them
they
disagree;
the
principles
above
have
a
quite
complicated
relationship
to
the
East-West
axis.
An
analysis
of
that
pattern,
however,
lies
outside
the
scope
of
this
paper.
For
we
are
concerned
with
still
another
dividing
line
that
claims
less
of
a
focus
of
attention,
one
that
nevertheless -
in
our
opinion -
is
of
crucial
importance
both
in
understanding
why
disarmament
nego-
tiations
tend
to
fail,
and
in
understanding
why
they
will
probably
continue
to
fail
for
a
long
time
to
come.
We
are
thinking
of
a
distinction
between
two
camps
we
shall
refer
to
as
the
legalists
and
the
struc-
turalists,
respectively.
They
will
be
defined
in
the
following,
and
it
will
be
pointed
out
that
on
this
issue
East
and
West
have
a
tendency
to
come
out
on
the
same
side in
a
kind
of
unholy
alliance
impeding
serious
steps
towards
disarmament.
In
conclusion,
a
plea
for
a
compromise
is
made,
and
some
suggestions
as
to
how
such
a
compromise
may
be
institutionalized
are
put
forward.
2.
Definitions
of
legalists
and
structuralists
The
difference
we
are
referring
to
is
approximated
empirically
by
the
difference
between
the
lawyer
trained
in
Roman
Law
gradualists
(reduction
of
some
weapons,
in
some
countries,
with
all
deliberate
speed)
multilateralists
(both
sides
follow
each
other
in the
disarmament
process)
disarmament first
(disarmament
first,
then
inspection,
gradually)
disarmament first
(disarm,
and
build
up
trust
by
means
of
that)
tacit
agreement
:
(disarm
according
to
plan
which
is
not
both
public
and
agreed
upon)
and
the
applied
social
scientist
trained
in
the
positivistic
tradition.
But
we
shall
prefer
to
use
the
terms
’legalist’
and
’struc-
turalist’
with
attempts
to
define
them
precisely
below.
It
then
becomes
an
em-
pirical
question
to
what
extent
these
two
styles
of
thought
are
approximated
by
particular
people
or
the
holders
of
particu-
lar
positions,
or
by
people
who
have
undergone
particular
types
of
training.
Our
assumption
is
that
the
approximation
mentioned
above
is
a
relatively
good
one,
as
long
as
it
is
kept
in
mind
that
many-
non-lawyers
may
have
a
more
legalist
frame
of
thinking
(in
the
sense
to
be
de-
fined
below)
than
many
lawyers,
who
on
their
side
may
have
absorbed
a
good
deal
of
structuralist
thinking
and
amalgamated
it
with
their
legalist
models.
Both
perspectives
deal
with
human
be-
havior,
both
are
concerned
with
the
man-
agement
of
human
behavior
in
general
and
human
conflict
at
several
levels
in
particular.
The
difference
is
that
the
legalist
does
this
by
means
of
prescription/
proscription
and
the
structuralist
by
means
of
positive
and
negative
prediction.3
We
shall
subsume
the
two
under
the
general
heading
of
a
’standard’,
which
we
shall
define
as
a
trichotomy
of
human
behavior
(Table
1 ) .
Thus,
standards
are
rules
for
the
regis-
tration
of
events,
in
casu
human
behavior,
and
there
are
two
different
traditions
(that
could
also
be
referred
to
as
normative
vs.
163
Table
1.
Standards
in
general,
and
two
special
types
of
standards
descriptive)
when
it
comes
to
what
the
three
classes
of
events
should
be
called.
The
legalist
registers
behavior
as
right
or
wrong,
the
structuralist
as
true
or false -
the
former
according
to
his
norms,
the
latter
according
to
his
hypotheses.
How-
ever,
since
both
the
legalist
and
the
struc-
turalist
are
concerned
with
future
be-
havior,
right
behavior
is
often
referred
to
as
’prescribed’,
wrong
behavior
as
’pro-
scribed’,
true
behavior
as
’positively
pre-
dicted’
and
false
behavior
as
’negatively
predicted’.
So
far
this
is
only
a
completely
formal
game
of
words
and
we
could
have
re-
stricted
ourselves
to
the
three
terms
used
for
standards
in
general.
The
significant
dif-
ferences
between
the
legalists
and
the
structuralists
appear
most
clearly
when
negative
human
behavior
is
observed,
i.e.
when
there
is
a
dissonance
between
the
standard
and
the behavior.
To
the
legalist
this
is
a
case
of
wrong
or
deviant
behavior;
to
the
structuralist
a
case
of
’false’
be-
havior,
behavior
that
was
negatively
pre-
dicted ;
only
that
it
is
customary
to
apply
the
term
’false’
to
the
hypothesis
or
pre-
diction,
not
to
the behavior.
Since
both
of
them
want
consonance
between
standards
and
behavior,
or
at
least
want
to
avoid
dissonance,
observation
of
dissonant
be-
havior
serves
for
either
as
a
flash
of
red
light
to
initiate
action :
for
the
legalist
it
is
a
signal
to
change
behavior,
to
the
struc-
turalist
a
signal
to
change
standards.
Both
of
them
will
know
that
nothing
can
be
done
about
the
past
registration
of
dis-
sonance
(unless
one
tries
to
’explain
it
away’
by
invoking
theories
about
errors
of
measurement,
faked
reports,
etc.)
so
the
efforts
to
obtain
consonance
or
at
least
to
avoid
dissonance
will
have
to
be
directed
towards
the
future.
As
mentioned,
the
legalist
will
try
to
influence
future
be-
havior
so
as
to
make
it
con, form
to
the
standards.
The
structuralist
will
try
to
change
his
standards
so
that
they
can
be
confirmed
by
the
future
behavior.
Thus,
the
difference
between
the
two
is
a
difference
in
what
they
consider
as
changeable
and
what
they
consider
as
unchangeable
aspects
of
the
world
around
them:
the
standards
to
the
legalist,
the
behavior
to
the
structuralist.
Put
in
this
way
both
of
them
must
be
regarded
as
pure
types,
for
the
distinction
that
has
been
used
here
to
define
them
and
to
keep
them
clearly
apart
can
also
be
used
to
define
all
kinds
of
mixtures
between
these
two
pure
types
so
that
they
are
seen
as
the
extreme
points
along
a
continuum,
not
as
an
unbridgeable
dichotomy.
A
person
may
have
observed
dissonance
and
want
to
avoid
it
for
the
future:
he
may
do
this
by
changing
the
standards
a
little
and
by
stimulating
changed
behavior
a
little.
Thus,
there
is
a
predictive
element
in
the
prescription
and
a
prescriptive
element
in
the
prediction,
but
we
shall
not
elaborate
this
theme
but
rather
stick
to
the
analysis
of
the
pure
types.4
Differences
and
similarities
can
now
be
clarified
by
means
of
a
paradigm
(Table
2).
Thus,
we
conceive
of
the
legalist
and
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