Two Arguments for Child Enfranchisement
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00940.x |
| Published date | 01 December 2012 |
| Date | 01 December 2012 |
| Author | Joanne C. Lau |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
Two Arguments for Child Enfranchisementpost_940860..876
Joanne C. Lau
The Australian National University
The right to vote is fundamental to democratic citizenship; it is one of the most important badges of political and legal
equality. However, we deny it to children, generally without discussion. After exploring conceptions of ‘political
capacity’, I launch two arguments. The first is the Symmetry Argument: whatever level of capacity we use for the
disenfranchisement of children should be used in symmetrical fashion to disenfranchise the elderly. The second is the
Argument from Domains: if we attr ibute responsibility to children in the legal domain, we should also attribute it to
them in the political domain. If we do not actually disenfranchise the elderly, we must find a good reason why we
displace that symmetry.I discuss such objections and show why they can be refuted or disregarded.
Keywords: enfranchisement; children; voting age; political capacity; symmetry
Political capacity is generally accepted to be something that adults have, and children do
not.1We assume that children should not be enfranchised because they lack political
capacity, but it is unclear what ‘capacity’ actually means for these purposes. We think that
‘since all adults are entitled to vote, they are obviously all capable of voting; hence, it is
somehow assumed unnecessary to inquire into what it is they are all capable of doing’
(Schrag, 1975, p. 445). Then, when a child becomes an adult, he or she somehow attains
the relevant capacity. Notice, though, that capacity eventually wanes with age, but we do
not disenfranchise the elderly on those grounds. This article will explore the issue of
symmetrical disenfranchisement between children and the elderly on the grounds of
capacity.
The first section outlines a confused practice of treating children as lacking capacity in
the political arena. We often suppose that children have a socially and politically distinct
status from adults, but this may not be as clear-cut as we think. The second section surveys
three possible meanings of ‘political capacity’. Theorists have applied the term inconsis-
tently, resulting in confusion. In the third section, I introduce the Symmetry Argument as
the first argument in my title: for any lower age boundary we have for enfranchisement,we
ought to have an upper one where the old are disenfranchised on the basis of a same lack
of capacity as the young. The fourth section offers my second argument: the age of legal
responsibility may provide an appropr iate lower boundary on the basis of consistent
treatment of children across domains. Finally, I reply to some objections to the Symmetry
Argument before concluding.
I will not be arguing for any particular age for the enfranchisement of children, nor will
I be arguing for any particular form of enfranchisement. An actual blueprint for what a
theory of child enfranchisement should look like warrants further empirical study and is
beyond the scope of this article. All that I wish to do here is unsettle the existing convictions
for the asymmetrical treatment of the young and the old when it comes to allowing those
with the same levels of capacity the right to vote.
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00940.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012 VOL 60, 860–876
© 2012The Author.Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
A Confused Practice
Just as adulthood is associated with work and responsibility, so childhood is traditionally
perceived to be ‘synonymous with innocence’ (Alston et al., 1992, p. 56). Perhaps the
argument for child disenfranchisement is simply that we ought not to burden children with
the difficulties of casting a responsible vote.2However, we should be suspicious of this
argument, as the same kinds of considerations were histor ically offered against enfranchising
women (Brownson and Brownson, 1885). Calling someone ‘innocent’ is often a covert
form of oppression; it is a failure to take him or her seriously as a political agent. If we use
the same argument of innocence against children, we are not taking them seriously as
political agents.
The failure to take agents seriously goes to the issue of respect. John Rawls claims that
civil liberties are necessary for citizens to have self- and social respect, and voting is the
vehicle by which this occurs.3That is,the franchise is symbolically valuable: those who hold
the right to vote are seen to be sufficiently independent and competent to contribute to the
decision-making process.4Indeed, Judith Shklar notes that the possession of that right to
vote is symbolically significant to providing political standing:
To be a voter was thus as much a condition as a call to action, and those who do vote today
are still celebrating the civic estate for which so many generations of excluded men and
women have fought so energetically ... Not the exercise, only the right [to vote], signified
deeply (Shklar, 1991, pp. 27–8).
What motivates this discussion is the idea that political participation is crucial to full
membership in the democratic state. But how do we decide who has the franchise?
Norman Daniels suggests that what it means truly to enjoy democracy is that we cannot be
constrained in having the franchise, except in cases of competence or maturity (Daniels,
1996, p. 268). If we adopt such an inclusive conception of democracy, our starting point for
enfranchisement is the inclusion of everyone,regardless of age, gender,race and social status
(Olsson, 2008,p. 57). This is distinct from an exclusive conception of democracy, where the
addition of groups to the political community (such as women or racial minorities) had to
be justified. Instead, on the inclusive conception, we assume that everyone is to be in the
political community, and we justify the exclusion of children if they are seen to be an
exception to universal suffrage.
But are they?The idea of childhood innocence is relatively outdated. Nowadays, children
are given partial aspects of adult citizenship: there is an age range where we afford children
rights to drive,5have consensual sex,6smoke cigarettes7and consume alcohol.8Even though
these activities are more often than not associated with adult behaviour, we (somewhat)
readily afford children these social rights. However, in most countries, we insist on
withholding their political rights until they are eighteen.9So although we engage children
socially, the opportunity to participate politically as a logical step is usually not considered.10
I will survey some suggested meanings of political capacity below. I will not advocate any
particular one of them. Instead I will simply note one remarkable fact: applied symmetri-
cally, all conceptions of political capacity would lead to the disenfranchisement of the
elderly if children are disenfranchised.
TWO ARGUMENTS FOR CHILD ENFRANCHISEMENT 861
© 2012The Author.Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012, 60(4)
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