Ultimatums, bargaining, and the duty to preserve alternatives to war
| Author | Thomas M. Dolan |
| DOI | 10.1177/13540661221077172 |
| Published date | 01 June 2022 |
| Date | 01 June 2022 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661221077172
European Journal of
International Relations
2022, Vol. 28(2) 495 –510
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/13540661221077172
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E
JR
I
Ultimatums, bargaining,
and the duty to preserve
alternatives to war
Thomas M. Dolan
University of Central Florida, USA
Abstract
When can states justly make ultimatums? How should the recipients of ultimatums
respond to them? This manuscript argues that because bargaining behavior like
ultimatums and redlines causes war by generating bargaining failure, these behaviors
should be scrutinized in the same ways that overtly aggressive acts like invasion are
examined. It then argues that parties have a general duty to avoid eliminating alternatives
to war. Ultimatums can only be justified if they satisfy the just war criteria of just cause,
necessity, and proportionality. Likewise, the decisions to reject ultimatums can impair
later claims that a state is fighting justly if they do not reflect the same criteria.
Keywords
Jus ad bellum, rationality, normative theory, state of war, International Relations, self-
defense
War initiation decisions are a central focus of Just War Theory, but Just War Theorists
have approached the question of when war begins too narrowly. Michael Walzer’s (1977)
seminal account of Just War Theory, for instance, identifies the “crime of aggression”—
an attack or imminent threat of attack as the beginning of a war and the first decision
subject to just war scrutiny. Influenced by insights from bargaining theories of war initia-
tion, I argue that Just War Theorists should pay more attention to states’ pre-war deci-
sions about what they demand and what they concede. In particular, Just War Theorists
should scrutinize bargaining behaviors like ultimatums and “redlines” that inject the pos-
sibility of war into a dispute if that party does not get what they want. Although clearly
distinct from Walzer’s “crime of aggression,” these decisions can cause war by
Corresponding author:
Thomas M. Dolan, University of Central Florida, 4297 Andromeda Loop N, Howard Philips Hall, Room 302,
Orlando, FL 32816-1356, USA.
Email: thomas.dolan@ucf.edu
1077172EJT0010.1177/13540661221077172European Journal of International RelationsDolan
research-article2022
Article
496 European Journal of International Relations 28(2)
eliminating alternatives to war, and like the threats and attacks that Walzer discusses,
they present the other party with the coercive choice between their rights or their lives.
While not all ultimatums lead to war, they are a common diplomatic method and
many have lead to war (e.g. Austrian ultimatum during the 1914 July Crisis; NATO’s
1999 demand that Serbia accept the Rambouillet Agreement; the United States’ 2003
demand for regime change in Iraq). Given their causal relationship with war, I argue that
they merit careful scrutiny using the jus ad bellum criteria. Likewise, rather than offering
a presumption that resistance against an ultimatum is just, I argue that decisions about
concessions and redlines (i.e. refusals to make certain concession) should also be subject
to scrutiny. On this basis, and consistent with the more general duty to avoid war unless
doing so meets just war conditions, I argue that states in a dispute have a duty to (1) avoid
making demands that implicate war (be they ultimatums or redlines) and (2) avoid reject-
ing justly made demands unless those actions are justifiable in terms of the jus ad bellum
criteria. When decisions to make ultimatums or to declare redlines are inconsistent with
the Just War criteria of just cause, necessity, and proportionality, they should impair the
claims of states which later resort to war that they are acting justly. Likewise, just war
theory may, at times, mandate concessions to ensure a just peace.
This argument is an innovation in just war theory because, while just war theorists
have sometimes made references to pre-war diplomacy, a few have addressed bargaining
behavior itself as a basis of responsibility for war in a theoretically informed, structured
way.1 While this approach increases the complexity of just war theory and extends its
sphere of analysis, doing so can have a powerful payoff. Just war theory has traditionally
endeavored to limit war by identifying illegitimate reasons for resorting war. Engaging
the literature on the processes that lead to war initiation holds the promise of a creating
normative incentive structures that discourage behaviors that can eventually lead to war.
Where do wars come from?
Walzer’s crime of aggression
In Walzer’s (1977) account, aggression initiates war: it “sets the process [of war] going”
(p. 23); it “break[s] the peace of the society of states” (p. 59). Aggression is the crime of
war, and any potentially aggressive act—even an act which is in truth a response to
imminent aggression—must be justified (Walzer, 1977: 83). Aggression, in his account,
is a moral wrong because it “forces men and women to risk their lives for the sake of their
rights. It is to confront them with the choice: your rights or (some of) your lives!”
(Walzer, 1977: 51).
Walzer identifies what happens when a state engages in aggression—it “interrupts . . .
peace with rights, a condition of liberty and security” (Walzer, 1977: 51) and makes clear
that the use of force or violence is the principal means by which this occurs (e.g. pp. 23,
59, 62). While he also notes that “aggression often begins without shots being fired or
borders crossed” (Walzer, 1977: 74), his discussion of threat—for Walzer, the principal
kind of aggression that occurs without the use of force—makes clear that threats only
qualify as acts of aggression when there is a clearly demonstrated intent to engage in an
imminent attack (Walzer, 1977: 80–81).
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