Under the shadow of the giants: The ASEAN in search of a common strategy in a fluid and perilous Indo-Pacific region
| Date | 01 June 2022 |
| Author | Renato Cruz De Castro |
| Published date | 01 June 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/20578911211014598 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles on Southeast Asian Politics |
Under the shadow of the giants:
The ASEAN in search of a
common strategy in a fluid and
perilous Indo-Pacific region
Renato Cruz De Castro
De la Salle University, Philippines
Abstract
This article examines how the ASEAN is managing the quintessential security challenges of the
21st century, particularly China’s emergence as a regional power, its expansive territorial claim in
the South China Sea, and the US–China strategic rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region. As an organi-
zation tackling these security concerns, the ASEAN lacks the essential mechanism for conflict
resolution, operates through informal diplomacy and moral suasion, and relies on consensus in
making decisions. As a result, China has effectively divided the association during the talks on the
peaceful settlement of the South China Sea dispute. China is currently formulating with the ASEAN
a Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. All the same, China has made sure that any
future agreement with the ASEAN imposes no constraints on its expansionist moves in the
contested waters, and contains provisions that benefit its interests in the long run. Meanwhile, US–
China strategic competition has prompted the ASEAN to think of ways to deal with this potential
security threat. However, the association has failed to come up with a common strategy. In
conclusion, this article argues that China’s emergence as a regional power, its maritime expansion
into the South China Sea, and the US–China geopolitical contest are testing both the capacity and
the limits of the ASEAN in resolving these security issues.
Keywords
ASEAN, Indo-Pacific, South China Sea, Southeast Asian states, US–China strategic competition
At present, the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) are
confronted with their most serious security challenge since this regional grouping was formed in
1967—US–China strategic competition. Since 2004, the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy
Corresponding author:
Renato Cruz De Castro, De la Salle University, 2401 Taft Avenue, National Capital Region 0922, Manila, Philippines.
Email: renato.decastro@dlsu.edu.ph
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/20578911211014598
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2022, Vol. 7(2) 282–301
Research Articles on outheast Asian Politics
(PLAN) has placed a greater emphasis on open seas defense to protect its burgeoning maritime
interests in the South and East China Seas. During the second decade of the 21st century, the PLAN
conducted several exercises on large-scale naval battles and island captures. These moves but-
tressed China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, as evidenced by its official maps marked
with the ambiguous “nine-dash line” that includes approximately 85%of the sea, as well as the
Spratly and Paracel island groups and other land features such as the Scarborough Shoal. China’s
extensive claims overlap with those of the four Southeast Asian littoral states—Brunei, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Vietnam.
These overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea are generating tensions between the
claimant states. This maritime dispute has also created problems for American decision-makers
since it affects the conduct of American diplomacy, the use of US forward- deployed forces, and
the management of Washington’s security commitments in Southeast Asia. Although not a clai-
mant state, to safeguard its interests the US has no choice but to: a) ensure the free and unimpeded
flow of commerce along some of the world’s busiest sea lanes of trade and communication; b)
secure the US Navy’s ability to conduct naval operations in these waters; c) protect American
companies that operate in the region; and d) manage its formal treaty alliances with states involved
in the dispute (Dolven et al., 2014). In November 2011, former President Barack Obama
announced a strategic reba lancing to Asia, which he desc ribed as a “deliberate and str ategic
decision” to emphasize Asia’s importance in US policy (Przystup and Saunders, 2017). From the
US perspective, Southeast Asia is an important region because of its geography (i.e. its location in
the middle of the Indo-Pacific region astride the strategically and commercially vital sea lane
routes) and its vulnerability to Chinese economic inducements, diplomatic pressures, and growing
naval presence (Singh, 2018).
Into its fourth year, the Trump Administration accused China under the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) of exploiting the free a nd open rules-based order and attemp ting to reshape the
international system in its favor (Glaser and Flaherty, 2020: 25–26). For Washington, authoritarian
Beijing under the CPP leadership poses a threat to the US and other democracies around the world
because of its ideology and its defiance of international norms (Glaser and Flaherty, 2020: 26).
However, instead of integrating, changing, or containing China, the Trump Administration focused
on protecting US interests and bolstering its influence to counter Chinese efforts to undermine
liberal-democratic values and the rules-based global order.
Washington’s pursuit of these goals is reflected in its growing concern over the South China Sea
dispute. The US is worried that Chinese maritime expansion in the disputed waters could threaten
the US Navy’s (USN) ability to conduct naval operations as well as the maritime states of South-
east Asia (Wuthnow, 2017: 128–130). So far, the USN has launched several freedom of navigation
operations (FONOPs) patrols and, more significantly, has conducted major naval exercises. On
July 4, 2020, two USN aircraft carriers, the U.S.S. Nimitz and the US Ronald Reagan, joined forces
to conduct maneuvers in the South China Sea (Sutter and Huang, 2020: 64). This massive naval
show of force is proof of US commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific despite Chinese naval
presence in the area. Earlier, on July 1, China carried out a live fire exercise near the Paracel
Islands. The PLA, for the first time, tested its intermediate-range carrier-killer DF-21D and DF-26
missiles in the waters between Hainan and the Paracel Islands. Accordingly, this was considered to
be China’s first ballistic missile test in the South China Sea. This, in turn, creates a strategic
scenario where Chinese ballistic missiles could threaten the freedom of navigation in the disputed
waters (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2020). These developments squarely placed
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