Understanding the BRICS framing of climate change: The role of collective identity formation
| Author | Göktuğ Kıprızlı,Seçkin Köstem |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020221135300 |
| Published date | 01 June 2022 |
| Date | 01 June 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2022, Vol. 77(2) 270–291
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00207020221135300
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Understanding the BRICS
framing of climate change:
The role of collective identity
formation
G¨
oktu ˘
gKıprızlıand Seçkin K ¨
ostem
Bilkent University, Turkey
Abstract
This article explores how the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa) frame the issue of climate change. Based on constructivist insights, the article
argues that the formation of collective identity has fundamentally shaped the BRICS
framing of climate change. On the one hand, BRICS0connections to the developing
world explain why BRICS has given voice to the arguments of developing countries with
respect to climate change. On the other hand, BRICS0policy concepts, ideas, and
discourse reflect the attributes associated with the identity of emerging powers. This
article argues that emerging power status encourages the BRICS states to portray
themselves as responsible actors on the global scale and conceptualize a climate-
sensitive economic development model in contrast to the Western production
paradigm that is regarded as unsympathetic towards the needs of developing nations. In
this process, the perception of the developed world as the relational other supports
the sense of we-ness among the BRICS states, thereby shaping their policy formulations
with respect to climate change.
Keywords
BRICS, climate change, collective identity, emerging powers, developing world
Corresponding author:
G¨
oktu˘
gKıprızlı, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, Ankara, 06800, Turkey.
Email: goktug.kiprizli@bilkent.edu.tr
In 2001, Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC”—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—to
highlight the investment potential of these countries.
1
Unlike other ideas encapsulated
by catchy acronyms, the BRIC was able to transform itself from a mere concept into a
club with annual leaders’summits, ministerial meetings, and joint statements. Fol-
lowing the formal invitation in 2010, South Africa’s admission as the fifth member
extended the acronym to “BRICS,”and the creation of the New Development Bank
(NDB) in 2014, “with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and
sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing
economies,”accelerated its institutionalization process.
2
Although economic devel-
opment constitutes the main item of the BRICS partnership, the issues of environment
and climate change have been on the BRICS agenda since its formal inception in 2009,
and the environment ministers of the five BRICS countries have met and released joint
statements since 2015.
The BRICS states’involvement appeared as the key to success in global climate
change actions. Yet, several studies in the literature point out the varying commitments
rooted in their statuses within the climate change regime and their differing economic
structures and emissions profiles as the dynamics limiting the BRICS in formulating a
common vision and position in international climate negotiations.
3
However, the
BRICS states developed a cooperation agenda for climate change reflecting their shared
desire to conceptualize international climate governance, which harmonizes economic
growth with sustainable development models.
4
The cooperation and institutionalization
efforts within the BRICS platform hinted at a way for acquiring a position in the
international scene.
5
While the trust deficit between BRICS and the developed countries has explained
why the BRICS states refrained from taking bolder actions in reducing greenhouse gas
1. Jim O’Neill, “Building better global economic BRICs,”Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper no. 66,
30 November 2001.
2. “Sixth BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration,”Fortaleza, 15 July 2014, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/
docs/140715-leaders.html (accessed 29 June 2021).
3. Augusto L. Rinaldi and Patricia N. Martuscelli, “The BRICS on climate change global governance,”
Meridiano 47, no. 17 (2016): 1–10; Axel Michaelowa and Katharina Michaelowa, “BRICS in the in-
ternational climate negotiations,”in Soo YeonKim, ed., ThePolitical Economy ofthe BRICS Countries:
Volume 2: BRICS and the Global Economy (World Scientific, 2020), 289–305; Deborah Davenport,
“BRICs in the global climate regime: Rapidly industrializing countries and international climate nego-
tiations,”in Ian Bailey and Hugh Compston, eds., Feeling the Heat (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012), 38–56.
4. Xu Xiujun, “The BRICS countries and international cooperation on climate change,”in Xu Xiujun, ed.,
The BRICS Studies (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2020), 196–214.
5. Marco António Baptista Martins, “The BRICS commitment on climate change: Process towards an
effective approach in the path of sustainable development,”in Tiago Sequeira and Liliana Reis, eds.,
Climate Change and Global Development (Cham, CH: Springer, 2019), 175–187; Christian Downie and
Global Policy 9, no. 3 (2018): 398–407.
Kıprızlıand K¨
ostem 271
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