Understanding Variation in Processes of Institutional Formation

AuthorVivien Lowndes,Maximilian Lemprière
Date01 February 2018
Published date01 February 2018
DOI10.1177/0032321717724325
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717724325
Political Studies
2018, Vol. 66(1) 226 –244
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321717724325
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Understanding Variation in
Processes of Institutional
Formation
Vivien Lowndes and Maximilian Lemprière
Abstract
The article asks why institutional reforms work in one place and not another and why old ways
of doing things can prove so resilient. It argues in favour of a concept of institutional formation,
which is different from ‘institutional design’ as a time-limited event or ‘institutional change’ as an
open-ended historical trajectory. Institutional formation is conceptualised as an animated, nested
and embedded process. A multi-level framework is developed that specifies the links between
institutional actors, institutional rules and institutional contexts. The model is elaborated with
reference to a case study of local government reform in England, specifically the devolution of
responsibilities from central government to voluntary collaborations of elected local authorities
(‘combined authorities’). The model is used to explain variation in the process of institutional
formation in two different city-regions, focusing on the role of leaders, legacies and localities.
Keywords
institutions, local governance, devolution, institutional change
Accepted: 22 June 2017
Introduction
Why do institutional reforms work in one place and not another? Why do some initiatives
never make it off the drawing board or have a limited life? Why do old ways of doing
things appear so resilient in the face of new designs? Such questions have great signifi-
cance, given the importance of institution building to tackle contemporary governance
challenges, whether through reforming established structures or setting up new arrange-
ments. To address these questions, we need to bridge two established academic literatures
– on institutional design and institutional change – which conventionally remain at a
distance from one another. This article argues in favour of a concept of institutional for-
mation, which is different from ‘institutional design’ as a time-limited event or ‘institu-
tional change’ as an open-ended historical trajectory. Institutional formation is
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Corresponding author:
Vivien Lowndes, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK.
Email: V.B.Lowndes@bham.ac.uk
724325PSX0010.1177/0032321717724325Political StudiesLowndes and Lempriere
research-article2017
Article
Lowndes and Lempriere 227
conceptualised as an animated, nested and embedded process. The article starts by devel-
oping a model of institutional formation, which specifies the links between institutional
actors, institutional rules (at different levels) and institutional contexts. The model is then
elaborated with reference to a case study of local government reform in England, specifi-
cally the devolution of responsibilities from central government to voluntary collabora-
tions of elected local authorities (‘combined authorities’). The model is used to explain
variation in the process of institutional formation in two different city-regions (Greater
Manchester and the West Midlands).
Conceptualising Institutional Formation
Our concept of institutional formation is grounded in a pragmatic epistemological posi-
tion that enables the crossing of theoretical boundaries (rather than spawning more
‘schools’ of institutionalism). The ‘institutional design’ literature expresses a rational
choice orientation in which actors are able to craft institutions to address collective action
problems, through the manipulation of rules, information and incentives (Kiser and
Ostrom, 1982). With its voluntaristic stance, such an approach can be seen as under-esti-
mating the limits to design and as displaying an excess of heroism. On the other hand, the
‘institutional change’ literature (associated with historical institutionalism) focuses on the
power of path dependency to undermine attempts at intentional institutional change,
either strangling them at birth or derailing them along the way (Pierson, 2004). With its
emphasis upon the constraining influence of existing structures, such an approach can be
seen as over-estimating the limits to design and as displaying an excess of modesty. By
bringing together insights from both literatures, our model provides a more nuanced
understanding. In fact, the two literatures show signs of moving closer together, although
this is not always acknowledged. Design approaches are reconsidering the role of contex-
tual factors, through the effect of repeated interactions over time and the role of cultural
norms (Ostrom, 2005: 27). Historical institutionalists increasingly argue for ‘bringing the
actor back in’, showing how actors’ interpretation of rules is itself a source of change,
however gradual (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Steinmo, 2008). The two literatures tend
to remain divided, however, by their level of analysis (micro/macro), timescale (long/
short) and their methodologies (modelling/case studies).
All ‘new institutionalists’ see political institutions as ‘more than’ organisations.
Institutions constitute the ‘rules of the game’, which shape the choices and behaviour of
individual and organisational actors. But while historical institutionalists see institutions
as entire policy systems, institutional design scholars focus on specific ‘action arenas’
within which actors encounter institutional rules. A distinguishing feature of new institu-
tionalist scholarship, from March and Olsen (1984) onwards, has been its recognition of
the role of informal elements in bolstering institutional regimes. And yet, historical insti-
tutionalists often argue that the informal remains outside their sphere of study (due in no
small part to the difficulty of researching this in historical perspective) (Streek and
Thelen, 2005: 10), while institutional design scholars concern themselves chiefly with
that which is more open to human intervention (i.e. formal rules and structures) (Kiser
and Ostrom, 1982). Helmke and Levitsky (2006) have studied the contradictory and con-
solidatory effects of separate formal and informal institutions within entire political sys-
tems (e.g. clientelism and representative democracy). This article argues, however, that
all institutional formations are characterised by a combination of formal rules (including
structures and processes) and informal conventions (established and routinised practices):

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