Unions on the Board
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/eb055018 |
| Date | 01 May 1983 |
| Published date | 01 May 1983 |
| Pages | 2-4 |
| Author | Eric Batstone,Anthony Ferner,Mike Terry |
| Subject Matter | HR & organizational behaviour |
Unions on the
Board
by Eric Batstone,
Nuffield College, University of Oxford
Anthony Ferner and Mike Terry
ESRC Industrial Relations Research
Unit, University of Warwick
Introduction
In the mid to late 1970s, the deliberations of the Bullock
Committee on industrial democracy led to a set of pro-
posals for "worker directors" on the boards of large
private companies. The proposals generated strong par-
tisan reactions, and many of the current views of political
parties, employers and trade unions were shaped during
this period. Recently, the trade unions and the Labour Par-
ty have reaffirmed their commitment to the Bullock
prin-
ciples in their election programme pledges to develop the
planning of industry through an extension of industrial
democracy. By contrast, the continuing hostility of the
Conservative Party and many employers to the extension
of workers' participation through legislation has been
shown by the coolness with which they have received the
so-called "Vredeling" proposals from the European Com-
mission on workers' rights to consultation and company
information.
Yet the remarkable thing is that these various positions
have been adopted on the basis of virtually no direct ex-
perience, for the Bullock proposals were never im-
plemented,
and, thus, there has never been an opportunity
to discover if the supposed consequences, beneficial or
damaging,
actually happen in practice. Now, however,
that can be partly remedied, thanks to the publication of
research findings on an experiment in industrial democracy
carried out in the Post Office between the beginning of
1978 and the end of 1979 [1]. The Post Office experiment,
although it was negotiated and introduced independently
of the Bullock proposals, bore a close resemblance to
them.
Its outcome points strongly to the general conclu-
sion that both the strong advocates and the equally
diehard opponents of such schemes may have over-
estimated their practical impact.
The importance of this conclusion is amplified by recogni-
tion that the Bullock proposals — and the Post Office ex-
periment that closely approximated them — represented
arguably the "strongest" form of industrial democracy
short of full workers' control either proposed or enacted in
the industrialised West. Unions and managers held equal
numbers of seats, with a smaller number going to "in-
dependent" members — the "2X + Y" formula of the
Bullock Committee. All the "worker directors" were
nominated or elected by the unions — the so-called
"single channel" of representation. If such a scheme pro-
duced such small effects, might it indicate a need to start
revising some opinions?
In looking at the Post Office experiment, the first point to
make an impression is the importance of the political en-
vironment. Both the generally supportive political climate
and direct government intervention were crucial in per-
suading a reluctant management. Following the election of
the Labour Government in 1974, unions in both public and
private sectors were being encouraged to explore ways of
increasing their role and influence. In April of that year,
Tony Benn, then Secretary of State for Industry, asked
Post Office management and unions to consider possible
means of extending industrial democracy. The Post Office
unions, particularly the Union of Post Office. Workers
(UPW) and the Post Office Engineering Union (POEU),
both with traditions of support for industrial democracy
and workers' control, came up with a scheme for industrial
democracy based around union representation on the na-
tional Post Office Board and at regional and area levels.
After negotiations between management and unions, with
the Minister intervening from time to time to break
deadlocks, arrangements based on the 2X + Y formula at
the national Board were agreed. Seven
"union-nominated" Board members were to sit on the
Post Office Board alongside seven management members,
including the Board Chairman. The two largest unions, the
POEU and the UPW, had two nominees each, and the
other three nominees represented the six remaining Post
Office unions between them. There were five "indepen-
dent" Board members, nominated by the Minister (rather
than by the two "X" groups as in the Bullock proposals).
These included a company director, a trade unionist, an
academic and two consumer representatives, these last
being part of the price exacted by the Liberals in Parlia-
ment for their support for the necesary legislation.
The final scheme was far more radical than any proposal
initially seen as acceptable by Post Office management.
Managers argued that it was too unwieldy and that it
would polarise the Board into opposing union and
management groups. Finally, however, they recognised
that political circumstances made continuing resistance
futile.
So, in January 1978, the first meeting of the
"democratised" Board took place. The unions, with
political assistance, had won the first round.
What Happened at the Board
From the outset, the union nominees' trade union
backgrounds and experience, combined with their conti-
nuing close involvement with their unions, were reflected
in their overwhelming interest in traditional industrial rela-
tions issues.
The more closely an issue was concerned with industrial
relations, the more likely were the union nominees to
couch their arguments in the language of trade union in-
2 ER 5,5 • 1983
To continue reading
Request your trial