United States Technology Transfer Policy toward China: Post-Cold War Objectives and Strategies
| Published date | 01 June 1996 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209605100206 |
| Date | 01 June 1996 |
| Author | Jing-Dong Yuan |
| Subject Matter | Article |
JING-DONG
YUAN
United
States
technology
transfer
policy
toward
China:
post-Cold
War
objectives
and
strategies
Technology
transfer
policy
has
served
as
an
important
instrument
to
advance
the
national
security
and
foreign
policy objectives
of
the
United
States.
The
promise
to
transfer,
the
threat
to
withhold
or
withdraw,
and
the
outright
denial
of
advanced technologies
can
all
be
used
deliberately
to
influence
policies
of
a potential
target
state,
to
punish
certain behaviour,
or
simply
to
register
disap-
proval.
The
extent
to
which
such
'economic
statecraft'
has
a
chance
of
success
or
even
of
being
duly
executed
will
be
deter-
mined
by
a
host
of
factors,
including
specific
policy goals,
domestic
consensus,
the
degree
of
international
co-operation,
and
target
vulnerability.
When
contemplating
the
use
of
technology
transfers
to
influence target
behaviour,
policy-makers
must
face
the
difficult
task
of
balancing competing
policy
goals.
That
domestic
and
inter-
national
support
may
not
always
be
forthcoming
and
that
the
tar-
get
country
can
turn
to
alternative sources,
or
simply
do
without,
should
suggest
that
technology
transfer
sanctions
may
be
of
lim-
ited
utility
and
questionable
efficacy.'
Postdoctoral
Fellow
at
the
Centre
for
International
and
Strategic Studies,
York
University,
and
at the
University
of
Toronto/York
UniversityJoint
Centre
for
Asia
Pacific
Studies.
The
author
would
like
to
thank
David
G.
Haglund
and
Kim
Richard
Nossal
for
helpful
comments
on earlier
drafts.
The
financial
support
of
Queen's
University
for
the field
research
is
gratefully
acknowledged.
i
See,
for
example,
David
A.
Baldwin,
Economic
Statecraft
(Princeton: Princeton
University
Press
1985):
Gary
Clyde
Hufbauer,
Jeffrey J.
Schott, and
Kimberly
Ann
Elliott,
Economic
Sanctions
Recansidered:
History
and
Current
Policy
(Washington
DC:
Institute for
International
Economics
199o):
and
David
Leyton-Brown,
ed,
The
Utility
of
International
Economic
Sanctions
(London:
Croom
Heln
1987).
InternationalJournal
LI
SPRING
1996
US
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER POLICY
TO
CHINA
315
This
article
examines
United
States
technology
transfer
pol-
icy
toward
China
since 1989.
It
discusses
the
evolution
of
that
policy
and
analyzes
the
various factors
that
have
informed
and
influenced
its
formulation
and
implementation.
With
the
end-
ing
of
the
Cold
War,
the
geopolitical
interest
shared
by
Wash-
ington
and
Beijing
(containing
Soviet
expansionism)
has
been
replaced
with
emerging
bilateral
differences
in
a
number
of
issue-areas
such
as
trade,
human
rights,
and
arms
proliferation.
Increasingly,
United
States
technology
transfer
policy
toward
China
has
tended
to
be
based
on
conflicts
of
interests
rather
than on
threat
and
security
considerations.
Since
the
sanctions
imposed
in
the
wake
of
the
Tiananmen incident
of
4June
1989,
particularly
in
weapons transfers, the
United
States
has
resorted
to
technology
denial and
selective
release
in
an
effort
to
influ-
ence Chinese
domestic
and
foreign
policies.
How
do
we
explain
United
States policy
toward
China
in
this
area?
To
what
extent
has
Washington
been
able
to
use
tech-
nology
transfers
as a
policy
instrument
and
how effective
has
their
application
been
in
achieving
specific
objectives?
I
argue
that
policy
has
been
affected
by
both
the
evolving
bilateral
rela-
tionship
and
the
changing domestic
and
external environments.
Tiananmen
and
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
brought
to
the
fore
overlooked
differences
and
conflicts
and
necessitated
debates
on if,
and
how,
a
Sino-United
States
relationship
could
continue
to
serve
the
national
security
and
foreign
policy
objectives
of
the
United
States.
Meanwhile,
the changing
domestic
and
exter-
nal
contexts
of
postwar
American
export
controls
have
had
an
impact
on
the
formulation
of
United
States
policy
and
the
effectiveness
of
its
application
in
the
China
case.
This
article
looks
at
how
the administration
of
President
George
Bush
han-
dled
the
Tiananmen
crisis
and
its
preference
for
placing
tech-
nology
transfers
within
the
broader
policy
framework
of
constructive
dialogue
and
engagement;
at
United
States
efforts
to
apply
selective
technology
denial/release
to
influence
Chi-
nese
weapons
transfer
policy
and
activities;
and
the changing
domestic
and
external environments
affecting
post-Cold
War
United
States
export
control
and
technology
transfer
policies.
To continue reading
Request your trial