Unity in Action: Explaining Alignment Behavior in the Middle East
| Author | James H. Lebovic |
| Date | 01 March 2004 |
| Published date | 01 March 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343304041778 |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
167
Introduction
Stephen Walt’s (1987) The Origin of Alliances
is the most comprehensive, theoretically
informed, and widely cited study to date of
Middle East alignment behavior during and
after the turbulent ‘Arab cold war’ period
(Kerr, 1970) of the 1950s and 1960s. But
Walt may have exaggerated the discordant
character of inter-Arab behavior when he
concludes that Arab states ‘balance’ (‘allying
with others against the prevailing threat’)
more than they ‘bandwagon’ (allying ‘with
the source of danger’ [Walt, 1987: 17]). His
inferences are called into question by his
theoretical assumptions and methodological
practices. Through an ‘event data’ analysis, I
establish that, into the 1970s, the divisions
implied by Walt never fully overshadowed
the unity in opposition to Israel that was
found among parties on the front lines of
that confrontation. I maintain that the
strength, duration, and ultimate imperma-
nence of these regional alignments indicate
that they had a more important basis in
ideology than Walt supposes.
To develop and test my arguments, I focus
on the behavior of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and other Palestinian
groups. Because of their physical capability,
regional participation, and/or strong Middle
© 2004 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 41, no. 2, 2004, pp. 167–189
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
DOI: 10.1177/0022343304041778 ISSN 0022-3433
Unity in Action: Explaining Alignment Behavior
in the Middle East*
JAMES H. LEBOVIC
Department of Political Science, George Washington University
Stephen Walt’s The Origin of Alliances is the most comprehensive, theoretically informed, and widely
cited study to date of Middle East alignment behavior during and after the turbulent ‘Arab cold war’
period of the 1950s and 1960s. But Walt may have overstated the discordant character of inter-Arab
behavior when he concludes that Arab states ‘balance’ more than they ‘bandwagon’. This study argues
that the strength, duration, and ultimate impermanence of regional alignments against Israel indicate
that they had a more important basis in ideology than Walt presumes or that realists can accept.
Through a graphical portrayal of the results of a factor analysis performed on COPDAB (Conflict and
Peace Data Bank) data for the 1948–78 period, and WEIS (World Event Interaction Survey) data for
the 1966–93 period, this study establishes that, into the 1970s, the divisions implied by Walt never
fully overshadowed the unity in opposition to Israel that was found among parties on the front lines
of that confrontation. More specifically, it finds that concordance rather than division prevailed in
relations among Israel’s principal adversaries, that concordance had an important basis in conflict with
Israel, and that, by the late 1970s, regional politics were far less orderly. It supports a constructivist
perspective by concluding that, as a focal point of Arab nationalism, the conflict with Israel imposed
normative constraints upon the behavior of Arab leaders.
*An early version of this article was presented at the 43rd
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association,
New Orleans, LA, 24–27 March 2002. I wish to thank Dalia
Dassa Kaye, Lee Sigelman, Stacy Haldi, and the editors and
referees from JPR for their helpful comments. The data used
in this study are found at http://home.gwu.edu/~lebovic.
The author can be reached at lebovic@gwu.edu.
90T 03 041778 (ds) 3/2/04 1:11 pm Page 167
Eastern identity (on the latter, see Barnett,
1996; Jentleson & Dassa Kaye, 1998), these
actors are regarded as members of the Middle
East core in the writings of regional scholars
and policy specialists. I analyze these actors’
behavior in the period that commenced with
the creation of Israel in 1948 and ended in
the years that followed the (1991) Gulf War
because this long period affords some useful
evidence and contrasts. The years between
the 1956 and 1967 wars provide much of the
evidence that leads Walt to conclude that
states balance against threat, and yet, in that
same period, ideological issues appear to
have dominated the regional agenda.
Moreover, in the years between the 1967 war
(between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan)
and 1991 (when coalition forces pushed Iraq
from Kuwait), regional beliefs appear to have
changed in fundamental respects (Barnett,
1998).
I proceed as follows. First, I discuss
possible effects on regional alignment of
ideology that impugn Walt’s argument that
Arab states rallied, in the main, to oppose
each other. Second, I present the data that I
employ: the COPDAB (Conflict and Peace
Data Bank) data, which cover the 1948–78
period, and WEIS (World Event Interaction
Survey) data, which cover the 1966–93
period. I also discuss the factor analysis that
I use to disclose regional alignment patterns.
Third, I graph the results of that analysis. I
then offer conclusions.
The Sources of Alignment
To his credit, Walt separates himself from
Waltz (1979) and other realists (e.g. Mor-
genthau & Thompson, 1985: 227–228;
Wolfers, 1962: 117–131) by insisting that
states balance against threat, not power. He
argues that these threats are determined by
the capabilities and aggressive intentions of
other states. Equally compelling is his
argument that states respond to threat in one
of two ways: they either appease it (band-
wagoning) or they oppose it (balancing).
Given problems in his thinking about threat,
however, Walt overstates the usefulness of
balancing and bandwagoning as behavioral
contrasts and understates the impact of
ideology on alignment. As a consequence,
Walt fails to appreciate the centrality in
regional politics of the Arab–Israel dispute.
Threat and Ideology
The concepts of balancing and band-
wagoning have been subject to a good deal
of critical theoretical commentary (Chris-
tensen & Snyder, 1990; Jervis & Snyder,
1991; Schweller, 1994; Vasquez, 1997).
Schweller (1994: 74), for instance, notes that
‘the concept of bandwagoning has been
defined too narrowly – as giving in to threats
– as if it were simply the opposite of balanc-
ing’. Schweller argues, though, that states
can bandwagon with the ‘expectation of
gain’. He also speculates that states band-
wagon with stronger coalitions when believ-
ing them to represent the ‘wave of the
future’, for ideological or psychological
reasons. Such criticisms do not go far enough
toward acknowledging the effects on align-
ment of an ideational context that ‘construc-
tivists’ associate with norms, principles, and
identities (Barnett, 1993, 1996, 1998;
Checkel, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Hopf,
1998; Wendt, 1992, 1999).1Realists have
these basic beliefs about cause and effect,
roles, and obligations loosely in mind when
they dismiss or grudgingly acknowledge the
effects of ‘ideology’ (a term I use in deference
to Walt).
True, realists can incorporate ideology
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 41 / number 2 / march 2004
168
1Although I am indebted here to constructivist writings, I
do not claim to test a constructivist argument. Construc-
tivism subsumes an assortment of epistemological and
ontological arguments, might preclude an approach that
relies on standardized event collections and weights (dis-
cussed below), and requires elaborate, and still un-
developed, methods that suit its ontology (Checkel, 1998:
335).
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