Unpacking Party Unity: The Combined Effects of Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection Methods on Legislative Attitudes and Behavioural Norms
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Author | Reuven Y Hazan,Reut Itzkovitch-Malka |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321716634094 |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716634094
Political Studies
2017, Vol. 65(2) 452 –474
© The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0032321716634094
journals.sagepub.com/home/psx
Unpacking Party Unity:
The Combined Effects
of Electoral Systems and
Candidate Selection Methods
on Legislative Attitudes
and Behavioural Norms
Reut Itzkovitch-Malka1 and Reuven Y Hazan2
Abstract
This article analyses the effect of electoral systems, candidate selection methods and the interplay
between them on individual legislative attitudes and behavioural norms, specifically on two facets
of party unity: party agreement and party loyalty. Our main argument is that one must take into
account the effect of inter- as well as intra-party competition, and the interaction between the two,
in order to explain individual legislative attitudes and norms. Using data from 34 European parties
across 10 countries, we show that under exclusive candidate selection methods, there are large
differences between proportional representation and single-member district electoral systems in
their effect on party agreement and party loyalty. Under inclusive candidate selection methods,
however, such differences are much less apparent. In other words, the candidate selection method
conditions the influence of the electoral system on legislative attitudes and behavioural norms.
Keywords
electoral systems, candidate selection, party unity
Accepted: 14 January 2016
Introduction
This article empirically tests the combined effect of electoral systems (inter-party compe-
tition) and candidate selection methods (intra-party competition) on legislative attitudes
and behavioural norms. We focus on two facets of party unity: party agreement – defined
as the extent to which co-partisans share similar policy preferences with one another
1The Open University of Israel, Ra’anana, Israel
2The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Corresponding author:
Reut Itzkovitch-Malka, The Open University of Israel, 1 University Road, POB 808, Ra’anana 43537, Israel.
Email: reutim@openu.ac.il
634094PSX0010.1177/0032321716634094Political StudiesItzkovitch-Malka and Hazan
research-article2016
Article
Itzkovitch-Malka and Hazan 453
when voting on legislation – and party loyalty – defined as the extent to which legislators
subscribe to the norm of party unity in the absence of such shared preferences. The aca-
demic literature has yet to address this two-dimensional approach empirically, moving
beyond explanations of legislative attitudes and behaviour that only rest on the influence
of electoral systems. We argue that the candidate selection method conditions the effect
of the electoral system on legislative attitudes and behavioural norms. Under exclusive
candidate selection methods, we will see substantial differences in party agreement and
loyalty between legislators elected by proportional representation (PR) electoral systems
and those elected by plurality/majority single-member district (SMD) electoral systems.
On the contrary, under inclusive candidate selection methods, such differences will shrink
and legislators elected by both systems will resemble each other much more regarding
party agreement and party loyalty.
Using attitudinal data from the PARTIREP1 project on elected representatives in 15
countries, combined with data collected on candidate selection methods in 34 European
parties in 10 countries (for a full list of the countries and parties included in this research,
see Appendix 1), we are able to show that the candidate selection method and its charac-
teristics condition the effect of the electoral system on party agreement and loyalty. More
specifically, when the party leadership controls legislators’ chances for reselection, we
find substantial differences in the effect of the electoral system on party agreement and
loyalty: legislators elected by party-focused PR electoral systems demonstrate higher lev-
els of party agreement and loyalty compared to legislators elected by candidate-based
SMD systems. However, when the party leaders do not control the nomination process,
the type of electoral formula has a much smaller influence on legislative attitudes and
behavioural norms.
Party unity is conceptualised in this article as an end result of the legislators’ sequential
decision-making process. That is, we do not examine the final outcome – legislators’ vot-
ing behaviour – but rather focus on legislators’ pre-floor attitudes: party agreement and
party loyalty. By doing so, we follow an increasing number of scholars and studies who
adopt the attitudinal approach to the study of party unity (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011;
Kam, 2009; Krehbiel, 1993). The reason for this is first and foremost theoretical: party
unity can be the result of many different mechanisms, which cannot be bound together in
a uniform way (which is what we do when we only look at the final outcome). Unity can
be the result of legislators’ shared preferences (party agreement), of a voluntary subscrip-
tion to the norm that legislators should toe their party line even when they personally disa-
gree with it (party loyalty) or of the use of involuntary disciplinary instruments by the party
leadership (party discipline). While the end result in all of these cases is the same voting
unity, the intra-party dynamics leading to it can vary dramatically. Clearly, the dynamics in
a party where there is high party agreement is different from the dynamics in a party whose
legislators lack party agreement but possess high levels of party loyalty; and these dynam-
ics are very different from those in a party whose legislators lack both party agreement and
party loyalty, thus requiring discipline. This changes the atmosphere within the party, the
dynamics between co-partisans and, most importantly, the nature of the relationship
between the party leadership and its members of parliament (MPs). Therefore, it is impor-
tant to flesh out these processes and analyse the factors affecting them. Following that, we
cannot claim that institutions, such as the ones studied in this article, affect party unity
directly. On the contrary, we claim that institutions do not affect voting behaviour directly;
rather, they influence the legislators’ decision-making process in determining whether to
cast their vote with their party or against it.
To continue reading
Request your trial