DB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (DLA)
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Judge Gray |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] UKUT 205 (AAC) |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) |
| Subject Matter | Tribunal procedure,practice,practice - fair hearing,Gray,P |
| Date | 25 April 2016 |
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
DB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (DLA)
[2016] UKUT 0205 (AAC)
CDLA/1121/2015
DECISION OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Paula Gray
DECISION
This appeal by the claimant is dismissed.
Permission to appeal having been given by me on 29 April 2015 in
accordance with the provisions of section 12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and rule 40(3) of the Tribunals
Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 I do not set aside the decision of
the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Fox Court and made on 28 November 2014
under reference SC 242/14/04704. It does not contain a material error of
law, and it stands.
REASONS
Background
1. This appeal concerned only the appellant’s entitlement to the mobility
component of DLA. There was no dispute about entitlement to the
care component.
2. I granted permission to appeal saying
3 In this case the FTT was dealing with a decision refusing to supersede an
award of DLA to the appellant who had applied on 12 February 2014 for the
higher rate of the mobility component based upon a change of
circumstances. The FTT was of the view that, due to his current age the
applicant was required to show that his entitlement to that component would
have existed in 2004 prior to him turning 65. They saw this as the legal issue
and their function as being to analyse the evidence with a view to
establishing whether or not that was the case. They dismissed the appeal on
the basis that it was unlikely that the appellant was virtually unable to walk at
that stage.
4 The appellant had chosen not to attend an oral hearing, citing his being
“housebound” through disability as the reason. Contrary to the grounds of
appeal the FTT did not explicitly accept that this was so; their comment,
which is quoted rather out of context in the grounds of appeal, was to the
effect that the applicant said he was housebound and therefore could not
attend, and was not an assertion that this was in fact so.
5 Nonetheless it seems to me that given what the FTT perceived as the critical
issue in the case, and their view that contemporaneous documentary
evidence would be more valuable than the oral evidence of the appellant as
to his circumstances back in 2004, and given the limited amount of such
evidence in the tribunal bundle, there is an argument that the tribunal should
have considered adjourning for further oral evidence. I grant permission to
appeal on that basis, but I do not shut down the argument put forward as to
whether the FTT should have considered a domiciliary hearing to facilitate
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