JH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Judge Hemingway |
| Neutral Citation | [2017] UKUT 487 (AAC),[2017] UKUT 487 (AAC) |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) |
| Subject Matter | Personal independence payment – general,Revisions,supersessions,reviews,reviews - other,Hemingway,M |
| Date | 08 December 2017 |
| Published date | 02 January 2018 |
JH v SSWP (PIP) [2017] UKUT 487 (AAC)
CPIP/2013/2017 1
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL Case No. CPIP/2013/2017
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER
Before: M R Hemingway; Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Decision: Since the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (which it made at Fox Court in
London on 23 January 2017 under reference SC242/16/10054) involved the
making of an error of law it is set aside. The Upper Tribunal remakes the
decision in the following terms: The claimant is entitled to the standard rate of
the daily living component and the standard rate of the mobility component of
personal independence payment from 2 March 2015 to 20 June 2021.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1. This decision of the Upper Tribunal is brief because there is now little (if indeed there is
any) meaningful dispute between the parties. It concerns the claimant’s appeal to the
Upper Tribunal, with my permission, from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the tribunal”)
of 23 January 2017.
2. The claimant suffers from various health problems and first made a claim for a personal
independence payment (PIP) on 24 June 2013. Initially that application was refused but on
15 May 2014, after a mandatory reconsideration, it was decided that she was entitled to the
standard rate of the daily living component only from 24 June 2013 to 16 September 2016.
3. On 21 July 2015 the Secretary of State decided (or at least this was the date it was
communicated to the claimant) that there was entitlement to the standard rate of the daily
living component and the standard rate of the mobility component of PIP from 2 March 2015
to 20 June 2021. Since that decision interfered with the terms of the original award during its
intended currency it was a supersession decision. It is not clear to me whether the supersession
was carried out on the initiative of the Secretary of State or whether it stemmed from a request
made by the claimant. But for the purposes of this appeal it makes no difference.
4. The claimant, although better off under the terms of the 21 July 2015 decision, sought to
challenge it by way of mandatory reconsideration but, on 3 September 2015, she was informed
that the decision was to be maintained. She did not subsequently mount any further challenge.
However, on 1 February 2016 she successfully appealed against a decision refusing her
employment and support allowance (“ESA”). It is notable that the tribunal which allowed her
appeal considered her to be entitled to 15 points under activity 1 within Schedule 2 to the
Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 which is concerned with mobilising.
Fortified by that success she put it to the Secretary of State that she should now be entitled to
the enhanced rate of the mobility component of PIP rather than the standard rate. Pursuant to
that she attended (not for the first time) a “face-to-face” assessment conducted by a health
professional. A report of 7 June 2016 was produced. The Secretary of State then went on to
decide, on 12 July 2016, that she remained entitled to the standard rate of the care component
and the standard rate of the mobility component of PIP but that the period of the award would
now be from 12 July 2016 to 6 June 2020. So, again, that was a supersession decision albeit
that the only aspect of the previous awarding decision (the one of 21 July 2015) interfered with
was the period of the award. The claimant remained dissatisfied and since an application for a
mandatory reconsideration did not result in any alteration to that decision she appealed to the
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