Campbell v Secretary of State

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
JudgeJudge Purchas QC,Judge Wikeley,Mr Justice Maguire
Neutral Citation[2018] UKUT 372 (AAC)
CourtUpper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber)
Date08 November 2018
Subject MatterTribunal procedure,practice,Information rights - Data protection,practice - lapsing of appeals,practice - tribunal jurisdiction,Three Judge Panel
Published date18 December 2018
Campbell v Secretary of State (3JP)
[2019] AACR 12
[2019] AACR 12
(Campbell v Secretary of State [2018] UKUT 372 (AAC))
Honourable Mr Justice Maguire
Judge Purchas Q.C.
Judge Wikeley
08 November 2018 GINS/5065/2014
Section 28(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998 - Data subject’s right of access following
death Tribunal Jurisdiction
On 10 July 2013 the Appellant, alo ng with two others, made a subject access request to the Public Record Office
of Northern Ir eland (PRONI) under section 7 of the Data Protection Act 1 998 (DPA) for documents relating to
their internment without trial in the 1970s. On 2 October 2014, the Secretar y of State issued a certificate under
section 28(2) of the DPA, certifying that exemption from the usual DP A rights was “required for the purpose of
safeguarding national security”. In due course P RONI responded to the Appellants’ s ubject access requests by
providing copies of the documents it held, but with cop ious redactions. On 17 October 2014 each of the
Appellants lodged an appeal . On 17 January 2015 Mr Campbell, the appellant in the instant appeal with case
reference GINS/5065/2014, died.
On 23 October 2014 the First-tier Tribunal (F-tT) tr ansferred Mr Campbell’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal (UT)
as required by rule 19(1A) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules
2009 (SI 2009/1976), as amended). The issue for the UT was whether in the context of section 28(4) of the Data
Protection Act 1998, a data subject’s right of access to his personal data and to bring an appeal against the
Secretary of State’s national security certificate could survive his death. The UT treated this as a preliminary
issue under rules 5(3)(e) and 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/2698).
Held, striking out the appeal, that:
1. applying the definition provided by Diplock LJ in Letang v Cooper, the appeal brought by Mr Campbell
under section 28(4) of the DPA was not a “cause of action”. It did not represent "a factual situation the
existence of which entitles one person to obtain fro m the court a remedy against another person."
Rather, the section 28(4) procedure is no more than a statutory appeal route, a proce dural mechanism,
for challenging the issue of a natio nal security certificate in the substantive section 7 subject access
request proceedings (paragraph 29);
2. Mr Campbell’s rights under s ection 7 of the DPA were purely personal rights which did not survive his
death as a cause of action. They were more akin to the ri ghts under the matrimonial causes legislation
than to other statutory rights which may pass to t he estate (such as under discrimination law) (paragraph
The UT struck out the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The DECISION of the Upper Tribunal on the preliminary issue is to strike out the
appeal under case reference GINS/5065/2014 (Mr D. Campbell, Deceased) for want of

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1 cases
  • Fryers and Hogg v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
    • United Kingdom
    • Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber)
    • January 17, 2019
    ...13. On 8 November 2018 we issued a decision on the preliminary issue arising in GINS/5065/2014 (see Campbell v Secretary of State [2018] UKUT 372 (AAC)). Our decision was that Mr Campbell’s appeal under section 28(4) of the 1998 Act did not survive his death on 17 January 2015. We according......

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