SC v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Judge Sutherland Williams |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] UKUT 165 (AAC) |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) |
| Subject Matter | Personal independence payment – general,Revisions,supersessions,reviews,Tribunal procedure,practice,Sutherland Williams,M |
| Date | 16 May 2019 |
| Published date | 11 June 2019 |
SC v SSWP (PIP) [2019] UKUT 165 (AAC)
CPIP/2132/2018
1
DECISION OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER)
Before Upper Tribunal Judge Sutherland Williams
Decision
1. This appeal by the claimant succeeds. Permission to appeal having been
given by District Tribunal Judge Rocke on 17 July 2018, and in accordance
with the provisions of section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and
Enforcement Act 2007, I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting
in Carlisle on 13 February 2018 (under reference SC924/17/00318) and remit
this matter to a differently constituted panel in the Social Entitlement Chamber
of the First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with the Directions
given below.
2. Both parties agree that the decision of the tribunal was made in error of law.
Neither party has requested an oral hearing and I am satisfied that this matter
can be dealt with on the papers before me. The submissions from the parties
are clear and further oral submissions are unlikely to assist.
Primary issue and conclusions
3. In this appeal, I consider the general powers of a tribunal following an appeal
from a personal independence payment supersession decision.
4. I conclude that on an appeal against a decision superseding or refusing to
supersede, where the tribunal finds that the reasons given for the decision by
the Secretary of State are inadequate, the tribunal has jurisdiction to make its
own superseding decision, providing that there are grounds and an evidential
basis to do so.
5. In particular, if the First-tier Tribunal finds that there is both a ground and
basis to supersede, it has jurisdiction to make the decision that the Secretary of
State should have made (thereby remedying any defects in the decision) and
should therefore not simply set the Secretary of State’s inadequately reas oned
decision aside as invalid.
6. While cases will always rest on their individual circumstances and facts, I
have herein identified a three-stage approach for tribunals in such appeals,
which may assist as a starting point:
i. First, the Tribunal should ask: is there a basis in law for the
Secretary of State’s supersession decision?
ii. Second, and if so, the Tribunal should ask: has the Secretary of
State provided adequate reasons (when addressing all of the
evidence available) to explain and sustain the decision?
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