Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2016-10-05, IA/48948/2014
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Date | 05 October 2016 |
| Published date | 27 July 2018 |
| Hearing Date | 12 September 2016 |
| Status | Unreported |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) |
| Appeal Number | IA/48948/2014 |
Appeal Number: IA/48948/2014
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: IA/48948/2014
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
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Heard at Field House |
Decision & Reasons Promulgated |
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On 12 September 2016 |
On 5th October 2016 |
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Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STOREY
Between
S Z
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss G Loughran, Counsel, instructed by Wilson Solicitors
For the Respondent: Miss S Kotas, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Bangladesh, has permission to challenge the decision of First-tier Tribunal (FtT) Judge Cameron sent on 22 June 2016 dismissing the appellant's appeal. The appellant's grounds were three fold. First, it was argued that the judge erred in concluding that the appellant would continue to be discreet in his practice of the Christian faith. Second, the judge was said to have erred by failing to analyse the posited discreet behaviour of the appellant on return in accordance with HJ (Iran) [2012] UKSC 31 principles, which required the decision-maker to ask whether one of the reasons for such behaviour would be fear of persecution. Third, it was contended that the judge had erred in failing to consider whether the proposed internal relocation of the appellant would be reasonable as well as safe.
2. I am grateful to both representatives for their succinct submissions.
3. I do not find the first two grounds to the point. Despite some equivocal passages in the judge’s decision he made a clear finding that the appellant would face a real risk of persecution in his home area by virtue of likely hostile treatment in his home area by his family and surrounding community on account of his conversion to Christianity (whilst in the UK): see [123] – [124].
4. If there is any material error in the judge’s decision it can only be in relation to his treatment of the issue of internal relocation. In this regard I find no such error. It is clear that the judge was satisfied first for all that the appellant would be able to achieve safety (= not face a real risk of persecution) in one of the “number of areas [in Bangladesh] which are most predominantly Christian”. In reaching this conclusion the judge not only had regard to background country evidence pertaining to the situation of Christians in Bangladesh; he also undertook a specific assessment of whether the appellant's family might track the appellant down in one for the predominantly Christian areas. From [129] and [131] it is clear that on both counts the judge was satisfied relocation to such areas would achieve safety for the appellant.
5. The third ground contends that the judge failed to address the second limb of the internal relocation (or protection) analysis, namely whether it was reasonable to expect the appellant to relocate in his particular circumstances. Whilst it is true the judge did not structure his assessment in such a way as to identify two separate stages to his treatment of internal relocation, it is equally clear: (i) that he addressed reasonableness (noting in [134] that he did not accept that “it would be unreasonable or unduly harsh to expect the appellant to relocate to a more Christian dominated area away from Dhaka!”); (ii) that his assessment took into account the appellant's particular circumstances in this context, finding at [126] that there was no evidence he would not be accepted by the Christian communities in such areas; (iii) that at [127] and [130] the judge found that the appellant had good educational qualifications and that as a result he would be able to find work and support himself; and (iv) that at [132] the judge found that the appellant had ties of language and culture with Bangladesh which would aid him in finding work. Such considerations were properly treated as central to the issue of reasonableness.
6. As already intimated, there are several equivocal passages in the determination dealing with the issue of the appellant's conversion and whether that would be known to people in Bangladesh and it is difficult to disagree with Miss Loughran’s observation that these convey a flawed treatment of the discretion issues. But such passages simply had no material impact on the judge’s essential reason for dismissing the appeal which was that the appellant had a viable internal relocation alternative that was both safe and reasonable.
Notice of Decision
7. For the above reasons, the FtT Judge did...
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