Upper Tribunal (Immigration and asylum chamber), 2017-11-14, AA/07725/2014
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Date | 14 November 2017 |
| Published date | 24 November 2017 |
| Hearing Date | 07 November 2017 |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) |
| Status | Unreported |
| Appeal Number | AA/07725/2014 |
Appeal Number: AA/07725/2014
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/07725/2014
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
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Heard at Upper Tribunal Manchester |
Decision & Reasons Promulgated |
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On 7th November 2017 |
On 14th November 2017 |
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Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS
Between
SI
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
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The Appellant is a citizen of Pakistan.
Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014
Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.
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The Appellant, with permission, appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, who, in a determination promulgated on the 27th January 2017 dismissed her claim for protection.
The background:
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The Appellant’s immigration history is set out within the determination. The appellant entered the United Kingdom with her spouse and children on the 24th March 2013 having applied for a visit visa on the 5th December 2015 valid from the 27th December 2015 until 27th June 2013. On the 11th April 2013 the appellant claimed asylum with her family members as her dependants.
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The Appellant was interviewed and her claim was refused in a decision letter of the 11th September 2014.
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The basis of her claim related to problems which had occurred in Pakistan in or about January 2013 where a man came to her place of work and had made threats against her and her family and he proposed marriage to her notwithstanding that she was already married and also that she convert to his faith. In March 2013 it was claimed that this man and others came to the family house and began shooting. The attack was reported to the police whilst they made a report, they did not follow it up. It was asserted that this was because of the man’s position and his membership of the Sipah-i-Sabah. She also claimed that she had been accused of blasphemy as a result of comments that she had made to this man about his religion during phone calls made to her.
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The Appellant exercised her right to appeal that decision and the appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal on the 21st January 2015. The judge had the opportunity of hearing the evidence of the Appellant and that of her husband and for that evidence to be the subject of cross-examination. The judge in the determination found the Appellant’s account to be implausible and dismissed the appeal.
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The Appellant sought permission to appeal that decision on the basis that the First-tier Tribunal Judge failed to provide sufficient or sustainable reasons for the adverse credible findings that were contained within the determination and in particular that the judge had failed to make findings on the evidence of the Appellant’s husband. Permission was granted by the Upper Tribunal on the 28th May 2015.
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The hearing came before the Upper Tribunal on 5 May 2016. In a determination promulgated on 16 May 2016 Upper Tribunal Judge Smith found errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. In particular, the judge found that there was a failure to make any finding on the Appellant’s husband’s evidence which on the face of it was capable of corroborating two parts of the Appellant’s case; the man’s pursuit of the Appellant and her rejection of him which she stated led to the allegations made against and the attack on their house, which if accepted, may support her case as having been targeted. As recorded at paragraph 15, the presenting officer accepted the materiality of that error. At paragraph 16 the judge recorded for completeness that she was satisfied that there was a material error of law in the treatment of the background material. The Upper Tribunal Judge therefore set aside the decision and remitted the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a second hearing.
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The appeal then came before the First-tier Tribunal on 13 January 2017. The judge again heard the evidence from both the Appellant and her husband but reached the overall conclusions at paragraph 73 that the Appellant had not demonstrated to the lower standard of proof required that she had a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan. It is plain from reading the determination as a whole and the findings of fact made that he did not accept that the Appellant or her husband had given a consistent and credible account as to the circumstances in Pakistan. In the alternative, at paragraph 70, he stated that even if the claim was “entirely credible” that this was a case whereby the family could relocate to a further area within Pakistan.
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The Appellant sought permission to appeal that decision on three grounds and on 29 March 2017 permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Coker for the following reasons;
“it is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal Judge failed to have regard to the Appellant’s evidence, failed have proper regard to the documentary evidence submitted on her behalf and failed to address the evidence adequately or at all.”
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At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal on the 14th August 2017 Mr Wood, who represented the Appellant in the First-tier Tribunal, relied upon the grounds that were before the Tribunal. In respect of ground one, he submitted that the judge misdirected himself in law in relation to his assessment of the documentary evidence. At paragraph [62] the judge rejected the documentary evidence provided by the Appellant (in particular the FIR and threatening letters) by reaching the conclusion that they had been “simply provided the purposes of this appeal and are not genuine” and therefore did not attach any weight to them. Furthermore, the judge failed to demonstrate that he is considered that documentary evidence in conjunction with the Appellant’s account and that the judge not engage with the evidence. He submitted that it was an error of law to approach the assessment of documentary evidence by considering whether the documents were genuine or not. This is a case in which the respondent had made no assertion that the documents provided were forgeries or were “not genuine”. He further submitted that in relation to the evidence from CLAAS, the judge fell into error at paragraph [63] by discounting that material as information given solely by the Appellant when there had been reference at page 12 of the bundle as to an investigation having taken place and at page 17 of the Appellant’s bundle, and email which referred to the genuineness of this report.
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Thus he submitted that the judge by concentrating on the genuineness of the documents rather than their reliability when seen in the context of the evidence as a whole was a misdirection in law.
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There were also other documents that the judge had not considered. Mr Wood made reference to the newspaper reports at pages 25 and 26, the evidence relating to the telephone call at pages 27 and 28 which was relevant to the factual account given.
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As to ground two, it was submitted that the judge erred in law in his assessment of the evidence and in particular the assessment of plausibility of the account. In this regard he submitted that at paragraphs 56 to 71, the judge did not engage with the background evidence submitted on behalf of the Appellant when reaching an assessment on the plausibility of the Appellant’s account. He relied upon the decision of HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 and in particular paragraphs 28 and 30.
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Thus he submitted that the judge failed to demonstrate any consideration of the Appellant’s account against the background country evidence. He referred the Tribunal to parts of the background material which he stated should have been considered when making an overall assessment.
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As to ground three, he submitted that the judge purported to consider the Appellant’s account at its highest. This would mean that the judge accepted the entirety of her account and if that was so it would include that there was a fatwa. In those circumstances the conclusion at [70] family could internally relocate was lacking in reasoning and also was inconsistent with the country guidance in AK and SK (Christians: risk) Pakistan CG [2014] UKUT 00569.
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Thus he submitted that the judge had fell into error and that the determination should be set aside.
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Mr McVeety on...
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